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Kurzfassung 
Kurzfassung 
Mergers & Acquisitions werden für Unternehmen, in den heutigen Zeiten des immer 
dynamischer werdenden Wandels der Märkte und den damit einhergehenden 
Herausforderungen des schnelleren Wachstums für Unternehmen, wichtiger denn je. Es ist 
hierbei jedoch zu beobachten, dass ca. 45-60% dieser Übernahmen nicht die finanziellen oder 
strategischen Ziele erreichen, die von ihnen gefordert wurden. Die in der Literatur zu 
Unternehmensübernahmen untersuchten Variablen erklären dabei den Erfolg von 
Unternehmensübernahmen nur sehr unzureichend. Es muss sich somit die Frage gestellt 
werden, welche weiteren Faktoren den Erfolg von Unternehmensübernahmen beeinflussen und 
wie sich diese Faktoren auf die Performance der Unternehmen in Übernahmen auswirken. 
Unterschiedet man die Performanceauswirkungen nach den beiden, an der Übernahme 
beteiligten Unternehmen, ist beobachten, dass Zielunternehmen aufgrund der hohen, durch die 
Akquirierer gezahlten Prämien, fast ausschließlich gewinnen, wohingegen die 
Performanceauswirkungen für Bieterunternehmen unklar sind und durch eine Vielzahl von 
Variablen unterschiedlich beeinflusst werden. Ziel der vorliegenden Dissertation ist es, 
wichtige, die Performance von Akquirierern in Übernahmen beeinflussende Variablen 
herauszuarbeiten sowie deren Einfluss auf eben diesen Erfolg von Akquirierern zu untersuchen. 
Hiermit soll ein Beitrag zu Erklärung der uneinheitlichen Ergebnisse für Bieterunternehmen in 
Übernahmen  geleistet werden.  
Das erste Paper entwickelt das Konstrukt der „Organizational absorptive capacity”, welches 
seinen Fokus auf Beschränkungen seitens des Managements richtet, um bei Akquirierern 
Unterschiede im Unternehmenswachstum durch Akquisitionen zu erklären. Unter der 
Annahme, dass „Organizational absorptive capacity“ die Wachstumsperformance von 
Unternehmen in Übernahmen einschränkt, erarbeitet der erste Beitrag moderierende 
Konditionen, die den Zusammenhang zwischen dem Konstrukt „Organizational absorptive 
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capacity“ und der Akquisitionsperformance moderieren. Das Resultat ist ein theoretisches 
Framework, das neue Erkenntnisse über die Einflussfaktoren der Akquisitionsperformance 
liefert, in dem es die „Organizational absorptive capacity“ als kritischen Faktor dieser 
Akquisitionsperformance herausarbeitet.  
Der zweite Beitrag analysiert ob und wie der Aktienmarkt spezifisches Humankapital des 
CEOs bzw. Gründers von Gründungsunternehmen, die Zielunternehmen in 
Unternehmensübernahmen werden, bewertet. Während die Vermögensgegenstände von 
Zielunternehmen in Übernahmen durch den Aktienmarkt generell positiv wahrgenommen 
werden, sollte dies für Vermögensgegenstände, die an den Gründer gebunden sind, nicht 
notwendigerweise gelten. Die Ergebnisse der Event Studie in diesem Beitrag zeigen einerseits, 
dass der Aktienmarkt die intangiblen Vermögensgegenstände der Zielunternehmen, gemessen 
anhand von Patenten, positiv bewertet, dass er jedoch negativ reagiert, wenn diese 
Vermögensgegenstände durch den CEO der Gründungsunternehmen kontrolliert werden. 
Hiermit zeigt der Beitrag auf, dass die Performance von Akquirieren nach der Übernahme im 
hohem Maß davon abhängt, inwiefern die spezifischen, intangiblen Vermögensgegenstände der 
Gründungs-Zielunternehmen durch den Akquirierer nach der Übernahme weiterhin zugänglich 
und nutzbar sind, was nicht notwendigerweise für das spezifische Humankapital der Gründer 
bei Gründungsunternehmen gilt. 
Der dritte Beitrag untersucht anhand einer Event Studie den Einfluss von Shareholder 
proposals, die gemeinsam und in spezifischen Kombinationen bei Akquirierern eingereicht 
werden, auf die Aktienkursreaktion von Akquirieren in Übernahmen. Die Resultate der Analyse 
der Aktienkursreaktionen, auf die bei den Akquirieren eingereichten Shareholder proposals 
zeigen, dass die Reaktion der Aktienkurse der Akquirier auf die Einreichung einzelner 
Shareholder proposals anders ausfällt, als die Reaktion auf die Einreichung von interagierenden 
Governance-Bündeln. 
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Der vierte Beitrag nimmt eine soziale Netzwerkperspektive ein und untersucht anhand einer 
qualitativen Studie die Rolle von Integrationsmanagern (IMs) als Knowledge Broker innerhalb 
des Integrationsprozesses in Akquisitionen. Im speziellen analysiert das Paper den Prozess der 
strategischen Entwicklung der sozialen Beziehungen durch die IMs mit den Mitarbeitern des 
Zielunternehmens und wie die IMs das daraus resultierende Sozialkapital nutzen, wenn sie den 
intendierten Wissenstransfer zwischen den Organisationen vorantreiben. Basierend auf 
Tiefeninterviews mit IMs, Zielmanagern und Mitarbeitern des Zielunternehmens in einer 
Multiplen Case Study, bestehend aus sechs Akquisitionen, zeigen die Resultate, dass der Erfolg 
des Integrationsprozesses für Akquirierer überwiegend von den Fähigkeiten der IMs abhängt, 
ihre Schnittstellenpositionen in Bezug auf das Wissen strategisch zu nutzen. Ebenso decken die 
Ergebnisse Mechanismen auf, wie soziale Netzwerke im Integrationsprozess entstehen und wie 
das resultierende Sozialkapital anschließend durch IMs genutzt wird, um den Wissenstransfer 
zwischen IMs und den beiden Gruppen an Mitarbeitern zu mobilisieren, wodurch der Erfolg 
der Integration erhöht wird. 
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Short Summary 
Short Summary 
In times of dynamic market changes and challenges of faster company growth associated with 
it, Mergers & Acquisitions become more important than ever. In the majority of cases, up to 
40-60 %, M&As are not able to deliver the expected strategic and financial value. Variables 
researched in the Acquisitions literature thereby only partially explain the performance in 
acquisitions. Given these numbers, the question comes up, which additional variables, besides 
those that have already been investigated, influence acquisition performance. By dividing the 
performance implications by the two types of companies involved in the deal, studies show that 
target firms almost always win in acquisitions, whereby in contrast, acquirers’ post-acquisition 
performance is, up to date, still contradicting. Consequently, the aim of the dissertation at hand 
is, to work out important variables which influence the performance of acquirers as well as to 
analyze the influence of these variables on acquirers’ success. Thus, the dissertation will 
contribute to the mixed acquirer performance findings in acquisitions. 
In the first paper, the construct of organizational absorptive capacity is applied to 
organizations with a focus on managerial constraints to explain differences in acquisitive 
growth. Assuming that organizational absorptive capacity limits the performance of growing 
through acquisitions, the paper develops conditions that modify the relationship between 
organizational absorptive capacity and acquisition performance. The result is a theoretical 
framework which offers novel insights into predictors of acquisition performance, by showing 
that organizational absorptive capacity is a crucial factor in determining acquisition 
performance. 
The second paper analyzes whether and how the stock market evaluates the specific human 
capital of the CEO and founder of entrepreneurial target firms in acquisitions. While in general 
target firms assets are positively evaluated by market participants, this should not necessarily 
hold for assets owned by the founder of the target firm. The findings of the paper in an event 
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study show that stock market participants positively evaluate target firms intangible assets, as 
measured by patents, but that also the opposite holds if the assets are under control by the 
founder CEO. The paper concludes that the acquirer’s post-acquisition performance strongly 
depends on the continued access to the targets’ specific intangible assets, which is not 
necessarily the case for the founder’s specific human capital. 
The third paper focusses on the influence of the combination of shareholder proposals that 
operate jointly and in specific combinations, to analyze acquirer returns in takeovers in an event 
study. By analyzing the share price reactions to shareholder proposals submitted at acquirers in 
acquisitions, the results show that the individual governance mechanisms influence the share 
price reaction of acquirers at takeover announcement differently than several governance 
mechanisms do so in interacting bundles. 
The fourth paper takes a social network perspective and focusses on the role of integration 
managers (IMs), by qualitatively exploring IMs’ role as knowledge brokers within the 
integration process in acquisitions. The article specifically investigates the process of how IMs 
strategically develop their social ties with target employees and how they make or do not make 
use of their resulting social capital when trying to facilitate the intended transfer of knowledge 
between the organizations involved in the acquisition. Based on in-depth interviews with IMs, 
target managers and target employees in a multiple case study with six acquisitions, the results 
demonstrate that the success of the integration process largely depends on IMs’ capabilities to 
strategically exploit knowledge brokering positions. The results also reveal mechanisms of how 
social networks are formed and how the emerging social capital is then used in order to mobilize 
knowledge transfer between IMs and both groups of employees, enhancing integration process 
performance. 
 
Keywords: Mergers & Acquisitions, Corporate governance, Integration process
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 UNDERSTANDING THE PHENOMENON OF M&A 
When following the news these days, nearly every second report features news about 
companies undertaking Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) (M&A and acquisitions will be used 
interchangeably henceforth) in some kind of way and every third headline in the newspaper 
announces a new deal. From Siemens’ wind power division buying Gamesa, one of its Spanish 
competitors in the slowing market for wind turbines, to Midea, gaining access to Kuka, one of 
the world’s leading robot manufacturers. From to the acquisition of Monsanto, the Vietnam-
war and glyphosate stigmatized agricultural giant by Bayers’ chemical division, to GE, the 
highly innovative conglomerate US icon once brought to life by Thomas Edison, taking over 
Alstoms energy division. M&A are more than ever on the rise. 
2015 saw 89.440 global deals worldwide (Statista, 2016) with an all-time high of 4.304 $ 
trillion (Wall Street Journal, 2016) and the outlook for 2016 is far away from slackening. 
KPMGs 2016 M&A outlook report, in which 550 M&A professionals were asked on their 
estimation of the trends in the M&A market for the current year 2016, prognosticates another 
hot deal year with the number of M&A deals to accelerate and the average deals size to ascend 
in 2016 (KPMG, 2016). Deloittes 2016 M&A trends report underlines these findings by 
interviewing roughly 2300 executives in the U.S., who identified the most important 
developments for the global M&A business: Deal activity will remain strong, deals will be 
smaller, strategic and more transformational, acquirers increasingly look for foreign targets, 
and divestitures are on the move (Deloitte, 2015). 
Simultaneously, scholarly research on M&A has increased pace in the last couple of years 
(Bauer, Hautz, & Matzler, 2015). Starting with the first publications more than one hundred 
years ago (Bauer & Matzler, 2014), M&A research has been rapidly prospered over the last 
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three decades. Was there only a relatively small number of about 15 articles published in 2000 
(Ferreira, Santos, de Almeida, & Reis, 2014), the publication rate constantly rose within the last 
decade – with two small setbacks in 2003 and 2008 – culminating in more than 50 articles on 
the topic released in leading scientific journals alone in the year 20121 (Reis, Carvalho, & 
Ferreira, 2015). This increasing M&A importance within the scholarly community manifests 
for example in universities installing M&A research centers (e.g. MARC at the Cass Business 
School, London), MBA and business courses at top-tier universities (“M&As and corporate 
strategy” course at INSEAD, Fontainebleau), in recent publications in regular journal volumes 
of top management journals (Cuypers, Cuypers, & Martin, 2016; Lehmann & Schwerdtfeger, 
2016; Trichterborn, zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, & Schweizer, 2016; Uhlenbruck, Hughes-Morgan, 
Hitt, Ferrier, & Brymer, 2016), or special issues dedicated to the topic (e.g. Organization 
Studies, 2015, 26 (10)).  
When trying to converge to the phenomenon of M&A, the definition of M&A is inconsistent, 
as the term M&A is a melting pot for mergers, acquisitions, carve-outs, etc. The process of 
M&A itself is likewise not univocally defined as “there is no consensus on the boundaries of 
an M&A process, when an acquisition begins or concludes, or the number and characterization 
of the phases within the process” (Gomes et al., 2013, p.16). However, there is accordance that 
there is a moment, in which ownership transfers from the target to the acquirer and that there 
are two distinct phases, the pre- and the post-acquisition phase, which are divided by the date 
of closing (Gomes et al., 2013). Acquisitions thereby comprise many different forms like 
horizontal (when firms acquire their competitors), vertical M&A (firms acquire their 
distributors or suppliers), or conglomerate acquisitions (firms acquire unrelated companies) 
(Haunschild, 1993; Moatti, Ren, Anand, & Dussauge, 2015; Walter & Barney, 1990), or the 
                                                 
1
 More up to date numbers on published M&A articles are not available due to missing Meta analytical M&A 
studies counting those publications. 
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acquisition of private/public firms (companies listed at the stock market) by private/public 
acquirers (Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001). Furthermore, the transaction price can be paid 
for by cash or by stock from the acquirer (Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992; Eckbo, 
Giammarino, & Heinkel, 1990; Huang & Walkling, 1987; Walker, 2000) and the acquisition 
can be executed in a friendly or hostile manner (Dodd & Ruback, 1977; Schnitzer, 1996; 
Wansley, Lane, & Yang, 1983). 
The area of M&A has attracted an enormous number of researchers who try to understand and 
forecast M&A outcomes (Meglio & Risberg, 2010), coming from various management 
disciplines like strategy, finance, organizational behavior, cross-culture or process research 
(Bauer & Matzler, 2014; Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006). These researchers have analyzed 
M&A from different theoretical standpoints like e.g. social network theory (Ishii & Xuan, 2014; 
Westphal, Seidel, & Stewart, 2001), agency theory (Lehmann & Schwerdtfeger, 2016; Wright, 
Kroll, Lado, & Van Ness, 2002), or organizational learning theory (Barkema & Schijven, 
2008a, 2008b) just to name a few important ones. They applied various methods to approach 
the object of investigation, like event study methodology (Andrade et al., 2001; Brown & 
Warner, 1985; Lehmann & Schwerdtfeger, 2016), standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)-
regression (Cuypers et al., 2016), questionnaires (Trichterborn et al., 2016), qualitative 
interviews (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004; Graebner, 2004), bibliometric methods (Ferreira et 
al., 2014), or Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Campbell, Sirmon, & Schijven, 2016). 
Both, the practical reports by leading consulting companies mentioned earlier as well as 
scientific literature show that M&As have grown an important means for companies to follow 
their strategic agendas, comprising business, product or geographic objectives (Bilgili, 
Calderon, Allen, & Kedia, 2016; Deloitte, 2015; Ferreira et al., 2014; KPMG, 2016). Moreover, 
they have become major drivers of company growth (Bauer & Matzler, 2014; Baum, Li, & 
Usher, 2000; Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006; Kim, Haleblian, & Finkelstein, 2011; Moeller, 
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Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2005). Bower (2001) has pointed out that companies initiate M&A for 
various reasons as for example to deal with overcapacities in their industries to gain back market 
share, to expand geographically in adjacent territories, to extend their product line or market 
reach, to gain access to R&D, which they otherwise would have to costly develop by their own, 
or to be at the cutting edge of converging industries. Besides these factors, literature provides 
empirical evidence that companies undertake acquisitions e.g. due to the intended maximization 
of market power (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993), managerial hubris (Berkovitch & 
Narayanan, 1993; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990; Roll, 1986), or due to managements’ self-
interest (Malatesta, 1983) like for instance a higher management compensation (Agrawal & 
Walkling, 1994; Harford & Li, 2007). 
Next to those variables impacting the motivation to undertake M&A, literature has 
predominantly addressed factors influencing the performance of the parties involved in the deal. 
These studies demonstrate that M&As significantly impact the performance of companies 
(Laamanen & Keil, 2008). Most of the research on acquisition performance has concentrated 
in some way on either conglomerate acquirers (Agrawal et al., 1992), relatedness between 
acquirer and target (Wansley et al., 1983), the method of payment for the acquisition (Walker, 
2000), and acquirers’ acquisition experience (Barkema & Schijven, 2008a, 2008b). 
Furthermore, research has focused on the acquisition process itself as for instance on the process 
of post-merger integration (Monin, Noorderhaven, Vaara, & Kroon, 2013; Vaara, 2002; Zollo 
& Singh, 2004). This literature shows that the results from the analysis of those variables 
researched are mixed and so far only explain a small part of varying results in M&A 
performance (King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004). Moreover, as M&A research shows that in 
sum acquisitions often do not deliver what has been expected upfront the acquisition (Barkema 
& Schijven, 2008b; King et al., 2004) and that less than half of all M&As conducted ever reach 
their expected goals under financial or strategic points of view (Cartwright & Schoenberg, 
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2006; Ranft & Lord, 2000), displaying high failure rates of 50% and more (Hunt, 1990; Marks 
& Mirvis, 2000), it seems more than necessary to analyze further variables, impacting the 
performance of companies in acquisitions. 
1.2 OVERRIDING RESEARCH QUESTION AND STRUCTURE OF THE 
DISSERTATION 
As mentioned above, M&A are in the majority of cases (40-60 %, sometimes even between 
70 and 90%) not able to create value (Bower, 2001; Christensen, Alton, Rising, & Waldeck, 
2011; Homburg & Bucerius, 2006). Given these numbers, the question comes up, which 
additional variables, besides those that have already been investigated, influence acquisition 
performance. Moreover, if those factors investigated so far do not sufficiently explain success 
or the absence of success, the pressing question is: which (additional) variables influence the 
success of acquisitions? As outlined earlier, an enormous number of variables exits which 
influence acquisition performance (Datta, Pinches, & Narayanan, 1992; Haleblian, Devers, 
McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009; King et al., 2004). However, those variables 
researched in the literature on M&A only explain a small part of varying results in M&A 
performance, which lets studies summarize that the “[…] post acquisition performance is 
moderated by variables unspecified in existing research” (King et al., 2004; p. 188). 
Performance research in M&A is thereby of particular interest for strategy scholars, as the 
literature findings of this acquisition performance are – especially for acquirers– inconsistent 
(Aklamanu, Degbey, & Tarba, 2015; Gomes et al., 2013; Haleblian et al., 2009). Despite several 
meta-analytic reviews which have been published in the last years, trying to consolidate M&A 
communities’ knowledge (Haleblian et al., 2009; Hitt et al., 2012; Meglio & Risberg, 2010; 
Papadakis & Thanos, 2010), M&A research is still attracted by the fact that our common 
understanding of the antecedents, the acquisition and post-merger integration process itself and 
especially the performance outcomes of M&A is still mixed (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Hitt 
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et al., 2012). Thus studies show that target firms almost always win in acquisitions (Asquith, 
1983; Jensen & Ruback, 1983), whereby in contrast, acquirers’ post-acquisition performance 
is, up to date, still contradicting (Agrawal et al., 1992; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Some 
studies show acquirers to win, whereas others find them to break even (King et al., 2004; Lang, 
Stulz, & Walkling, 1989), and others again show acquirers to loose (Bradley, 1980). 
Consequently, the overriding research question of this dissertation is as follows: Which factors 
are crucial for acquirers’ M&A success and how do these factors influence acquirers’ 
performance in M&A? 
In trying to bring light to these mixed findings for acquirers in acquisitions and to answer 
the above stated research question, the present thesis will in a next step work out the most 
important variables, discussed within the M&A literature, which influence acquisition 
outcomes and thereby especially acquisition performance for acquirers and targets. From this 
manifold number of research topics, the dissertation will afterwards derive four important future 
research opportunities. To address these research gaps, this dissertation consists of four papers, 
whereby each of these papers is concerned with a different facet of how various determinative 
variables influence the performance of acquiring companies within the context of M&A. One 
paper goes one step further, by additionally trying to integrate target firms into the analysis, and 
analyzing the influence of organizational absorptive capacity on target firms in acquisitions. 
The different papers develop theory and deliver evidence of factors which on the one hand 
permit acquirers to successfully shape the M&A process, and improve acquisition performance, 
and on the other hand carve out variables, which destroy value for acquirers and which should 
thereby be taken into account.  
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1.3 LITERATURE FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH GAPS IN THE FIELD OF 
M&A 
To shed light on the myriads of important topics M&A research has dealt with, and to identify 
promising areas for future research, I will first create a short time scale of important trends 
researched in M&A literature, and second, building upon and extending Haleblian et al. (2009), 
develop a finer grained integrative framework encompassing important variables, M&A 
research has focused on. Hereby the selection of the researched topics is of course subjective 
and raises no claim to completeness, but was selected for the reason that those topics receive 
most of the attention of the M&A community. Those topics will be divided into antecedents, 
moderators, acquisition and post-merger integration process, and performance outcomes of 
M&A. In a subsequent step, I will derive important research gaps from this M&A literature 
review which the four papers of this dissertation will address. Figure 1 shows the time scale 
and figure 2 the integrative literature framework. 
Following and supplementing Ferreira et al. (2014), figure 1 shows that the first decade of 
M&A research was predominantly based on financial, economic, institutional and resource 
dependence theories (Jensen, 1986; Lubatkin, 1983; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Rumelt, 1974; 
Williamson, 1973), converging to the topic of acquisitions mostly with descriptive approaches 
and deriving recommendations. The subsequent period from 1991 to 2000 saw a rise of 
additional theoretical foci, like transaction cost economics (Chatterjee, 1986; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) and a stronger orientation towards performance analyses (Chatterjee, 
Lubatkin, Schweiger, & Weber, 1992; Chatterjee, 1992; Datta, 1991). The following decade 
furthermore experienced a rise of studies dealing with resources and knowledge (Cassiman, 
Colombo, Garrone, & Veugelers, 2005; King, Slotegraaf, & Kesner, 2008), firm capabilities 
(Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; Ranft & Lord, 2002), organizational learning (Barkema & 
Schijven, 2008a, 2008b; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999), cultural 
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issues in acquisitions (Björkman, Stahl, & Vaara, 2007; Teerikangas & Very, 2006), and 
governance (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007; Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Loderer & Martin, 
1997). Finally, the period from 2011 to date is characterized by an increase in interrogations of 
performance (Moatti et al., 2015; Trichterborn et al., 2016), governance topics (MCCann, 
Reuer, & Lahiri, 2016; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014), and post-merger integration (Bauer et al., 
2015; Uzelac, Bauer, Matzler, & Waschak, 2015). 
Antecedents of Acquisitions 
Starting with the antecedents of acquisitions, literature has predominantly concentrated on 
resource redeployment, market discipline, managerial hubris and management compensation. 
First, turning to resource redeployment, literature reveals that acquirers often use acquisitions 
to redeploy resources between acquiring and target companies after the acquisition (Capron, 
Dussauge, & Mitchell, 1998). The redeployment of resources impacts acquisition performance 
differently, depending on the type of resources (King et al., 2008) and upon the type of company 
– acquirer or target – from which those resources stem (Capron, 1999), leading to asset 
divestiture at the receiving but not the delivering firm (Capron, Mitchell, & Swaminathan, 
2001). 
Facing the motive of market discipline within the market for corporate control, studies have 
long pointed at the fact that, based on the notion of the separation of ownership and control 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976), acquisitions are a means of disciplining an ineffective management 
of the target (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1989, 1988), leading to better performance (Jensen, 
1986, 1988; Jensen & Ruback, 1983), as poor performing managements are essentially lower 
compensated (Agrawal & Walkling, 1994), or even replaced after the acquisition (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). Furthermore, literature argues that the market for corporate control serves as a 
matching mechanism between large, established firms and smaller, entrepreneurial firms 
(Blonigen & Taylor, 2000; Jones, Lanctot, & Teegen, 2001; Junkunc, 2007). Hereby, the access 
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to high-tech firms is indicated to be an important vehicle to attract knowledge and know-how 
(Audretsch, Kuratko, & Link, 2015; Ireland, Hitt, & Sirmon, 2003; Kuratko, Hornsby, & 
Hayton, 2015), Moreover, literature highlights the importance of intangible assets of target 
companies to become a takeover target (Duysters & Hagedoorn, 2000; Hagedoorn & Duysters, 
2002; Lehmann, Braun, & Krispin, 2012; Tsai & Wang, 2008; van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, 
& Duysters, 2009). It is displayed that incumbent firms enjoy competitive advantages in the 
commercial exploitation of innovations, while start-up firms enjoy advantages in their 
exploration (Gick, 2008; Granstrand & Sjolander, 1990; Henkel, Ronde, & Wagner, 2015; 
Steffens, Davidsson, & Fitzsimmons, 2009). Literature has thereby analyzed announcement 
effects of bidder and target companies in acquisitions, exhibiting that bidders experience 
positive returns, due to the access to valuable external knowledge (Desyllas & Hughes, 2008). 
IPO-targets are expected to receive positive returns due to lower information asymmetries 
through the IPO (Ang & Kohers, 2001). By contrast, research on acquisitions of high-tech start-
ups and entrepreneurial firms by larger incumbents, dealing with how the stock market 
perceives takeovers of targets, in which the target possess inalienable, intangible specific assets, 
is rare within the M&A literature. Paper two of this dissertation is concerned with that topic. It 
analyzes how the stock market evaluates acquirers in M&A, which are conducted as R&D, 
when target companies are in possession of inalienably bound intangible assets, whereby the 
performance is measured by acquirers’ share price reaction to such takeover announcements. 
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Figure 1: Time scale of important research topics in the M&A literature 
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Figure 2: Integrative Literature Framework 
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Literature dealing with the antecedent of managerial hubris depicts that acquiring managers 
tend to overestimate their capabilities to deliver value and consequently overpay in acquisitions. 
This means they pay a higher price than what the target is really worth (Morck et al., 1990), as 
they overrate their own ability to manage the new company after the acquisition (Berkovitch & 
Narayanan, 1993; Roll, 1986). Hereby, CEOs do not only pay higher acquisition premiums due 
to their overconfidence, which leads to wealth destructing acquisitions (Hayward & Hambrick, 
1997; Malmendier & Tate, 2008), but are also more likely to initiate acquisitions, especially 
diversifying acquisitions. If cross border acquisitions are for example rather driven by 
managerial hubris than domestic ones, represents a research area which needs further attention 
(Seth, Song, & Pettit, 2000). 
Management compensation literature reveals that managers undertake acquisitions as they 
strive after higher compensation and greater power after the acquisition. Literature, for instance, 
exposes that the compensation of CEOs strongly increases after the acquisition, regardless of 
the real performance of the acquisition, as CEOs receive comprehensive stock and option grants 
(Bliss & Rosen, 2001; Harford & Li, 2007). Literature further demonstrates that the power of 
CEOs generally increases if they manage bigger firms after the acquisition, as they have more 
power to influence board decisions, negatively impacting acquisition performance (Grinstein 
& Hribar, 2004; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993). As research for example reveal that CEOs in 
companies in which owners are in control are lower remunerated than in firms which are 
manager controlled (Kroll, Wright, Toombs, & Leavell, 1997), more studies are wanted, 
regarding the question of how various governance mechanisms influence management 
compensation after acquisitions. 
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Moderators of acquisition outcomes 
Turning to the moderators of acquisition performance, M&A literature has predominantly 
concentrated on payment type, acquirers’ historical performance, organizational learning and 
acquisition experience of the acquirer, and governance and ownership. 
Literature dealing with the payment type in acquisitions displays that firms pay the deal price 
in cash when they think that their company is undervalued and with stock when they think the 
firm is overvalued (King et al., 2004). Regarding performance, it is indicated that cash deals 
produce higher benefits to acquirers than stock deals do (Eckbo et al., 1990; Huang & Walkling, 
1987; Walker, 2000), as a result of asymmetric information between acquirers’ management 
and its shareholders (Linn & Switzer, 2001; Loughran & Vijh, 1997). 
Turning to the historical performance of acquirers’, literature has predominantly shown that 
acquirers’ performance increases if high performing acquirers take over low performing target 
firms (Heron & Lie, 2010; Lang et al., 1989; Servaes, 1991). The reason lies on the one side in 
the fact that acquirers with agency issues seem to invest in projects with negative NPV’s (Rau 
& Vermaelen, 1998) and on the other side in the fact that low performing targets offer the best 
chances to raise value after restructuring (Chatterjee, 1992). Nonetheless, literature is disunited 
on the effects of historical performance. Thus other studies reveal that the choice of poor 
performing targets can also lead to decreasing returns at acquirers’, as those acquirers may not 
be able to successfully reorganize these messed up targets (Clark & Ofek, 1994), leaving room 
for future research opportunities. 
Although acquirers’ experience from former acquisitions through learning processes should 
positively impact acquisition performance in the subsequent acquisition, literature on 
acquisition experience yields that the outcome depends on several influencing factors (Barkema 
& Schijven, 2008a). Acquisition experience alone is not the key for superior acquisition 
performance, as the performance depends on organizational learning like the codification of 
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experience knowledge (Zollo & Singh, 2004) or articulation, sharing and internalization 
(Trichterborn et al., 2016), the right appropriation of knowledge from the former acquisition to 
the current one (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999), as well as firm similarity and industry 
dissimilarity (Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002; Hebert, Very, & Beamish, 2005; Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005). Research on the similarity and dissimilarity is only just at the beginning to 
understand how much similarity or dissimilarity is beneficial for acquisition success 
(Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002; Hayward, 2002). Furthermore, this stream of literature has just 
begun to explore if acquirers only learn from undertaking iterated acquisitions, or if these 
acquirers are also able to learn by observing related acquisitions by competitors (Delong & 
Deyoung, 2007; Francis, Hasan, Sun, & Waisman, 2014) 
Finally, governance and ownership research in acquisitions mostly follows the agency 
perspective in that management compensation influences interest alignment between managers 
and their shareholders (Haleblian et al., 2009). The findings are mixed: Some studies display 
that moderate levels of ownership lead to higher acquisition returns (Wright & Boswell, 2002), 
whereas others bring to light that CEOs who have more power over their boards obtain higher 
bonuses and strive for bigger acquisitions, leading to more negative acquisition returns 
(Grinstein & Hribar, 2004). Within the context of M&A, literature points at the fact that “value 
in more fully examining the influence of governance mechanisms on acquisition behavior” 
(Haleblian et al., 2009, p.489) exists, whereby M&A literature is still in its infancy when it 
comes to the understanding of how governance mechanisms influence the misalignment 
between managers and shareholders (Kroll et al., 1997). Thus, besides the above mentioned 
executive compensation, various other corporate governance mechanisms can influence 
acquisition behavior and outcomes of companies, as for example shareholders possessing 
varying profit maximization interests, which can or cannot coincide with the interests of the 
companies’ shareholders (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
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Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). The shareholders may force firms into takeovers (Haleblian et al., 
2009), or determine which form of market entry mode – strategic alliance or acquisition – is 
chosen (MCCann et al., 2016). Furthermore, shareholder proposals, which are shown to have 
an impact on firm performance in general (Dalton et al., 2007; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014), 
may influence the interest alignment between acquirers’ management and its shareholders, 
thereby leading to superior or inferior management of the new company after the M&A. Paper 
three of this dissertation draws on this research gap. It analyzes how different forms of corporate 
governance mechanisms via shareholder proposals at acquirers’ influence acquirers’ 
performance in acquisitions. More specifically, this essay focusses on the impact of the 
combination of shareholder proposals that operate jointly and in specific combinations (so 
called governance bundles) on acquirers’ returns in takeovers in an event study. 
Besides these just mentioned areas of moderator research in acquisitions, another promising 
area deals with questions of how external firm growth through acquisitions (Baum et al., 2000; 
Kim et al., 2011) is limited, thereby pointing out that limits to growth represents an area where 
additional theory development is needed (Lockett, Wiklund, Davidsson, & Girma, 2011; 
Lockett, 2005; Shepherd & Wiklund, 2009). Already Penrose (1959) argued that managerial 
limits to growth in general can be expanded to acquisitions. Notwithstanding, the associated 
mechanisms enabling and constraining firm growth have still not been developed. For 
managers, an acquisition involves opportunity costs that keep them from doing something else 
(Levinthal & Wu, 2010; Penrose, 1955). The value to be realized from such acquisition is likely 
to be higher when existing managers and organizational processes can absorb the additional 
demands an acquisition represents, or when a firm has sufficient organizational absorptive 
capacity. Thus questions of how the absorptive capacity of an organization is influenced by 
acquisitions and how, in turn, this organizational absorptive capacity impacts acquisition 
performance are fruitful areas for future research. Paper one of this dissertation deals with this 
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topic, by developing theory of how organizational absorptive capacity is influenced by external 
firm growth through acquisitions and how in turn this organizational absorptive capacity 
influences acquisition performance.  
Acquisition and post-merger integration process 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) were with their seminal work on acquisition processes among 
the first who regarded the acquisition as an entity and understood it as a process, concentrating 
on the intraorganizational dynamics during the acquisition process. They evinced that the 
evolution of capabilities and the transfer of competencies are the most important mechanisms 
for acquisition success. Within the acquisition context, the integration process itself is 
considered the most value creating vehicle to successfully shape the acquisition as a whole 
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). This important vehicle to create value 
in acquisitions has deserved growing attention within the M&A and especially within the 
acquisition process literature. Studies have concentrated on various factors which occupy a 
pivotal role within this process to become more successful. Such factors contain, for instance, 
the resource complementarity between acquirer and target (Bauer & Matzler, 2014; Kim & 
Finkelstein, 2009), the degree/level (Pablo, 1994; Zollo & Singh, 2004) and speed of integration 
(Bauer & Matzler, 2014), the autonomy left to the target (Datta & Grant, 1990; Zollo & Singh, 
2004), the perception of (in-)justice by employees (Ellis, Reus, & Lamont, 2009; Monin et al., 
2013), cultural issues between acquirer and target (Bauer, Matzler, & Wolf, 2016; Björkman et 
al., 2007), previous integration experience (Al-Laham, Schweizer, & Amburgey, 2010; Ellis, 
Reus, Lamont, & Ranft, 2011), or the extent of resource redeployment after the acquisition 
(Capron, 1999). Furthermore it has been yielded that the transfer of knowledge between the 
parties involved is of tremendous importance for the integration process to become successful 
(Bresman, Birkinshaw, & Nobel, 1999). For successful knowledge transfer, in turn, to occur, 
literature has prominently pointed to social capital and especially to trust within networks 
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(Graebner, 2009; Inkpen & Tsang, 2005). With the exception of Graebner (2009a) who 
investigates how trust asymmetries between both parties involved in the deal originate, develop 
and, subsequently, influence their behavior, research on social capital as antecedent of 
successful knowledge transfer in acquisitions is sparse. Having said this, the analysis of the 
M&A integration process from a social capital perspective seems desperately necessary, as it 
allows researchers to investigate not only the role of trust (as part of social capital’s relational 
dimension), but also the structural as well as the cognitive dimension. These two additional 
dimensions, in turn, might disclose that on the one hand, the position of central knowledge 
brokers within the post-acquisition network matter for successful knowledge transfer, and that 
on the other hand mechanisms to promote norms and values play a crucial role for the 
integration process success. Paper four of this dissertation attends to that matter. It explores 
which mechanisms help integration managers (IMs), as individuals who are indispensable 
within the integration process, to strategically set up their social ties in such ways and with 
those target employees that important knowledge is transferred, leading to a more or less 
successful integration process. 
Acquisition outcomes 
Finally, capturing the right hand side of Figure 1, research on M&A has long been engaged 
with questions concerning acquisition outcomes. Herby studies have predominantly dealt with 
the performance of acquisitions, measuring it by the reaction of share prices, accounting 
numbers, and innovative performance. A smaller number of studies devoted themselves to other 
acquisition outcomes like acquisition premiums or management and employee turnover 
(Haleblian et al., 2009). 
Research analyzing the share price performance of companies in takeovers has a long 
tradition (Asquith, 1983; Dodd, 1980; Halpern, 1983; Keown & Pinkerton, 1981; Servaes, 
1991) and uses so called event study methodology to explore the share price reaction of the 
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affected companies at the announcement of the deal (Brown & Warner, 1985, 1980). In general 
these studies reveal that acquirers stock price declines around the time the acquisition is 
announced (Andrade et al., 2001; Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Walker, 2000), whereas targets’ 
share prices significantly rise in the event window around the announcement (Asquith, 1983; 
Bradley, 1980; Dodd & Ruback, 1977; Huang & Walkling, 1987). These results can be 
predominantly traced back to the payment of too a high premium by the acquirer for the target 
(Laamanen, 2007), which leads to decreasing share prices at acquirers, but to increasing ones 
at target firms. The long term share price performance again is demonstrated to be mostly 
negative (King et al., 2004). Further possibilities for research in the field of event studies for 
instance encompass the analysis of the appropriateness of the estimation windows, in which the 
market parameters of the model to measure the abnormal stock price returns, are defined (Aktas, 
de Bodt, & Cousin, 2007). 
Accounting studies, however, analyze the impact of M&A on accounting numbers of the 
acquirer and target firm after the acquisition (Bruner, 2002). Those studies, for example, 
analyze the cash flow performance (Healy, Palepu, & Ruback, 1992) or the influence on the 
EBIT of acquirers and targets (Powell & Stark, 2005), evincing that corporate performance 
generally improves after the acquisition (Cornett & Tehranian, 1992). This holds especially in 
strategically motivated acquisitions (Healy, Palepu, & Ruback, 1997). The performance 
improvement in this connection however depends on the level of integration (Zollo & Singh, 
2004) and on how the assets of the firms are divested and redeployed after the deal (Capron, 
1999). Thereby research is in disagreement on how much integration is beneficial, which assets 
should be redeployed, or from which company those assets to be redeployed should stem. 
Consequently, this lack of unity leaves room for future research opportunities. 
Research on innovation performance in acquisitions spawns that the transfer of knowledge 
between both parties plays an important role for innovation performance (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; 
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Bresman, Birkinshaw, & Nobel, 2010), but above this finding yields mixed findings on how 
innovation performance is influenced in acquisitions. On the one hand, literature features that 
if acquirers and targets display complementary resources, innovation performance increases 
after the acquisition (Cassiman et al., 2005; King, Covin, & Hegarty, 2003), whereas the 
performance decreases if technologies at both companies are substitutes (Cassiman et al., 2005). 
On the other hand, studies bring to light that acquirers innovation performance after an 
acquisition can decrease (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1990), both in technological as well as in 
non-technological acquisitions, whereby the relatedness between acquirer and target displays 
an inverted U-shape connection with the innovation performance of acquirers (Cloodt, 
Hagedoorn, & Van Kranenburg, 2006). The innovation performance at target key inventors 
after the acquisition of the target however can be reduced (Ernst & Vitt, 2000), or targets 
innovative performance can increase, as it becomes more amenable to innovative resources by 
the acquirer (Barden, 2012). Future research possibilities result from gaps in the analysis of 
long-term innovation performance of acquirers’ (Cloodt et al., 2006) and from the varying 
influence of human and task integration on innovation success of companies (Bauer et al., 
2016). 
Turning to non-performance outcome variables, studies dealing with acquisition premiums as 
an outcome variable in acquisitions have addressed acquirers and targets in influencing 
acquisition premiums, featuring that targets which issue poison pills as takeover defenses 
increase acquisition premiums (Comment & Schwert, 1995). Furthermore, target managers who 
possess high amounts of ownership bargain more rigorously, until they feel compensated for 
their loss of ownership through the acquisition, in turn leading to higher premiums (Song & 
Walkling, 1993). Beyond that, higher target shareholder control also increases takeover 
premiums (Moeller, 2005). Studies focusing on acquirers, instead, demonstrate that 
management hubris leads to higher premiums (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997) and that 
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acquisition premiums, in turn, tend to be higher when information asymmetries are greater, 
hampering acquirers’ assessment of the target resources (Laamanen, 2007). The opposite is true 
for lower information asymmetries (Reuer, Tong, & Wu, 2012). Thus, research on acquisition 
premiums highlights the importance of further research on knowledge transfer and 
organizational learning between acquirer and target (Haleblian et al., 2009), and between the 
firms involved in the deal and companies located within their network (Beckman & Haunschild, 
2002). 
Research on turnovers in acquisitions indicates that management turnover at acquirers 
(Haveman, 1995) and at target firms is higher after acquisitions (Krug, Wright, & Kroll, 2015; 
Lubatkin, Schweiger, & Weber, 1999), whereas results on the performance implications of 
these turnovers are mixed. For instance, Bilgili, Calderon, Allen, & Kedia (2016) depict, based 
on the theory of relative standing, that the turnover rate depends upon how executives feel or 
how they are seen within the company. A higher turnover rate is observed when managers are 
seen or if they feel substitutable and vice versa. Furthermore, turnover researchers have focused 
on employee turnover, pointing at the circumstance that this turnover is more likely when 
acquirers and targets are related and targets perform worse than their industry peers 
(O’Shaughnessy & Flanagan, 1998). Iverson & Pullman (2000) found that turnover depends on 
the status of the employees (e.g. white collar vs. blue collar workers and older vs. younger 
employees). Future research opportunities comprise the creation of a better understanding and 
especially the development of forecasts of how the process of laying off employees works 
(Iverson & Pullman, 2000), and how subsequently those layoffs affect firm performance of the 
companies where they take place (O’Shaughnessy & Flanagan, 1998). 
The four research articles of this dissertation are briefly introduced in sections 1.3.1 to 1.3.4. 
Table 1 summarizes the content of each article in this dissertation. 
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Table 1: Overview of the Four Research Articles in this Dissertation 
 (1) Organizational 
Absorptive Capacity 
and the Road to 
Acquisition 
Performance 
(2) Evaluation of IPO -
Takeovers: An Event 
Study 
(3) Governance Bundles – 
Their Impact on Acquirer 
Returns in Acquisitions 
(4) The value creating role of 
integration managers in M&A 
integration processes – A social 
network perspective 
Performance  Growth through 
acquisitions 
 Acquirers’ share price 
reaction 
 Acquirers’ share price 
reaction 
 Integration process success 
Research 
Question 
 How do acquisitions 
influence 
organizational 
absorptive capacity 
at acquirers and 
targets and how 
does this capacity in 
turn impact 
acquisition 
performance? 
 How does the acquiring 
company and how does 
the stock market 
evaluate the acquisition 
of high-tech firms? 
 How are acquirers’ 
individual governance 
mechanisms and the 
combination of these 
mechanisms perceived 
by the financial market 
at the announcement of 
the takeover? 
 How do IMs strategically develop 
their social network ties during the 
integration process? 
 By means of which mechanisms does 
the arising social capital between IMs 
and target actors facilitate knowledge 
transfer, which in turn positively 
influences integration process 
performance? 
 Which other effects influence the 
ability of IMs to successfully act as 
knowledge brokers? 
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Data  No data; Theory 
development 
 Corporate takeovers of 
German IPO-firms 
 42 bidders and 59 
targets 
 170 international 
acquirers 
 Shareholder proposals 
 30 integrations managers, target 
managers, and target employees  
Method  Theory development  Event study 
methodology 
 OLS-regression 
 OLS-regression with 
interaction effects 
 Qualitative guided interviews 
Contribution  Developing 
managers as 
important to 
organizational 
absorptive capacity 
 Anticipation that 
different conditions 
influence a firm’s 
capacity for 
acquisitive growth 
 Showing how 
successful 
integration of target 
firm managers 
facilitate growth 
 Developing the role of 
founder CEOs and the 
market for corporate 
control of IPO firms 
 Delivering additional 
support on event 
studies to analyze 
announcement effects 
in acquisitions 
 Development of how 
corporate governance 
issues influence 
acquisitions 
 Disclosure of how 
different types of 
shareholder activism 
affect firm performance 
differently 
 Showing that 
shareholder proposals as 
specific forms of 
governance mechanisms 
are perceived by the 
stock market 
 Demonstration that the success of the 
integration process largely depends on 
IMs’ capabilities to strategically 
exploit knowledge broker positions 
 Highlighting of the mechanisms of 
how social networks are formed 
 Showing how the emerging social 
capital is used in order to mobilize 
knowledge transfer between IMs and 
both groups of employees and to 
enhance integration process 
performance 
 Revealing of structural lock-ins 
during the pre-closing stage between 
IMs and target employees 
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1.3.1 Organizational Absorptive Capacity and Acquisition Performance 
In this chapter, my co-authors and I apply the construct of absorptive capacity to organizations 
with a focus on managerial constraints to explain differences in acquisitive growth. While 
Penrose (1959) suggested that management limits constrain firm growth, there is a paucity of 
research examining organizational constraints to acquisitive growth. Assuming that 
organizational absorptive capacity limits the performance of growing through acquisitions, we 
develop conditions that modify the relationship between organizational absorptive capacity and 
acquisition performance. With our resulting theoretical framework, we contribute to acquisition 
literature by offering novel insights into predictors of acquisition performance. By drawing on 
Penrose’s (1959) observations on managerial limits to growth, our first contribution lies in 
developing managers as important to organizational absorptive capacity. Second, we contribute 
to the acquisition literature by anticipating that different conditions influence a firm’s capacity 
for acquisitive growth. Third, we outline how successful integration of target firm managers 
can facilitate growth. Finally, we begin to explain how variance in acquisition performance 
(Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992; King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004) relates to whether a 
firm has appropriate organizational absorptive capacity. We contend that organizational 
absorptive capacity is a crucial factor in determining acquisition performance, and specifically 
develop how different contextual factors can increase or decrease the ability of firms to manage 
an acquisition. 
This article is currently under review at the special issue on “Innovation Management in 
Collaborative Partnerships” at R&D Management (Impact Factor: 1.19, Ranking: 70 out of 120 
(Business), JOURQUAL: B). Previously, it has been under review at the special issue on “The 
Strategic Management of Dynamic Growth” at Long Range Planning (Impact Factor: 2.936, 
JOURQUAL: B) and at European Management Review (Impact Factor: 1.75, 
Ranking: Management 78 out of 192, JOURQUAL: B). 
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1.3.2 Evaluation of IPO-Takeovers: An Event Study 
In this chapter, my co-authors and I argue that the acquisition of innovative and 
entrepreneurial firms has become an important issue in gaining competition advantages. While 
there exists a fruitful and promising literature analyzing M&A activities in general, there is only 
limited evidence available on the acquisitions of high-tech start-ups and entrepreneurial firms 
by larger incumbents. This study addresses this issue and focuses on acquisitions targeted at 
public IPO-firms. Our main interest is whether and how the stock market evaluates the specific 
human capital of the CEO and founder of the entrepreneurial target firm. While in general target 
firms assets are positively evaluated by market participants, this should not necessarily hold for 
assets owned by the founder of the target firm. The findings clearly show that stock market 
participants positively evaluate target firms intangible assets, as measured by patents. But that 
also the opposite holds if the assets are under control of the founder CEO. Our results thus 
strongly supports conclusions derived from property rights or incomplete contract theory on 
joined ownership of assets and performance. We conclude that the acquirer’s post-acquisition 
performance strongly depends on the continued access to the targets’ specific intangible assets, 
which is not necessarily the case for the founder’s specific human capital. With our study we 
add to research on the role of founder CEOs and the market for corporate control of IPO firms, 
and by contributing to empirical research drawing on event studies to analyze announcement 
effects in acquisitions. 
This article is published in Small Business Economics (Impact Factor: 1.795, 
JOURQUAL: B). The article has also been presented at the 34th Strategic Management 
Conference in Madrid, Spain, the 75th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management in 
Vancouver, Canada and was nominated for the “Best Paper Award” within the scope of the 34th 
Strategic Management Conference in Madrid, Spain. 
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1.3.3 Governance Bundles – Their Impact on Acquirer Returns in Acquisitions 
In this chapter, my co-authors and I base our argumentation on agency theory, and consider 
the combination of external governance mechanisms of acquirers’ investors in the context of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A), investigating the mixed findings for acquirer returns in 
takeovers. We focus on the influence of the combination of shareholder proposals that operate 
jointly and in specific combinations, to analyze acquirer returns in takeovers in an event study. 
By analyzing the share price reactions to 722 shareholder proposals submitted to 170 acquirers 
in our sample, our results show that the individual governance mechanisms influence the share 
price reaction of acquirers at takeover announcement differently than several governance 
mechanisms do so in interacting bundles. With our research we contribute to M&A literature 
which calls for greater research on how corporate governance issues influence acquisitions 
(Haleblian et al., 2009). We partially explain the mixed acquirer findings reported in the 
literature (King et al., 2004; Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004) by showing that effects of 
governance proposals and their combination on corporate performance in acquisitions do exist. 
Furthermore we advance the corporate governance literature in general and the shareholder 
activism literature in particular by answering the call by Goranova and Ryan (2014) on how 
different types of shareholder activism affect firm performance differently and add to the 
corporate governance literature by showing that shareholder proposals as specific forms of 
governance mechanisms are indeed perceived by the market, display within acquirers’ share 
price reactions. 
This article will be under review at European Management Journal (Impact Factor: 1.437, 
JOURQUAL: B) and was also under review within the selection process of the Academy of 
Management Conference, Anaheim, California. 
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1.3.4 The value creating role of integration managers in M&A integration processes – A 
social network perspective 
Integration processes have been shown to be the most value enhancing vehicle in acquisitions. 
In this chapter my co-author and I attribute the mixed findings of acquiring firms’ returns to 
this very process underlying each acquisition. Taking a social network perspective and focusing 
on the role of integration managers (IMs), we qualitatively explore IMs’ role as knowledge 
brokers within this process. More precisely, we investigate the process of how IMs strategically 
develop their social ties with target employees and how they make or do not make use of their 
resulting social capital when trying to facilitate the intended transfer of knowledge between the 
organizations involved in the acquisition. Based on in-depth interviews with IMs, target 
managers and target employees in a multiple case study with six acquisitions, our results 
contribute to M&A literature by demonstrating that IMs are not by the very nature of their 
network position successful, but that instead the success of the integration process largely 
depends on IMs’ capabilities to strategically exploit such knowledge broker positions. We also 
expand social network theory by highlighting the mechanisms of how social networks are 
formed and how the emerging social capital is then used in order to mobilize knowledge transfer 
between IMs and both groups of employees and to enhance integration process performance. 
Furthermore we partially add to the underdeveloped research area on social liabilities in 
networks, by revealing that IMs faced structural lock-ins during the pre-closing stage, were 
only allowed to establish ties to a couple of top managers at the target firm and were not able 
to build ties to relevant actors of the target network. 
This article will be under review at European Management Review (Impact Factor: 1.219, 
Ranking: 78 out of 192 (Management), JOURQUAL: B). This article has been presented in 
various forms at the 5th Annual Conference of the EuroMed Academy of Business, Montreux, 
Switzerland, the OMT Dissertation Proposal Workshop during 74th Annual Meeting of the 
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Academy of Management, Philadelphia, USA, the 34th Strategic Management Conference, 
Madrid, Spain, the 33rd EGOS Colloquium, Athens, Greek and the 75th Annual Meeting of the 
Academy of Management, Vancouver, Canada and was nominated for the “Best Practical 
Implications Award” within the scope of the 34th Strategic Management Conference in Madrid, 
Spain. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Sustaining growth is an increasing challenge as firms face a dynamic environment (D’Aveni, 
Dagnino, & Smith, 2010), and falling short of growth expectations can have significant 
implications on organizations. For example, (Laurie, Doz, & Sheer, 2006) find a 61 percent 
average drop in the stock price of Fortune 50 firms that experience reduced growth. When 
internal options do not achieve desired levels of firm growth, managers often conduct 
acquisitions (Baum et al., 2000; Kim et al., 2011; Moeller et al., 2005). However, while 
constraints to organizational capabilities have been predicted (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001; Ng, 
2007), explaining limits to growth represents an area where additional theory development is 
needed (Lockett et al., 2011; Lockett, 2005; Shepherd & Wiklund, 2009). We argue that Edith 
Penrose's (1959) insights on managers as a limit to growth offer a useful theoretical vantage 
point for addressing this gap with respect to acquisitions.  
Penrose (1959) held that managerial limits to growth extended to acquisitions, but the 
associated mechanisms enabling and constraining firm growth have not been developed. In the 
context of acquisitions, we define organizational absorptive capacity as the ability to 
coordinate activities to absorb resources from an acquired firm (Gaddis, 1987; Junni & Sarala, 
2013; Reagans, Argote, & Brooks, 2005). In our application, we primarily examine managers 
as a limiting factor in organizational absorptive capacity as managerial action is needed to 
achieve desired coordination (Kitching, 1967; Laamanen & Keil, 2008), as performance falls 
when employees and organizations are at capacity (cf. Lukas, Menon, & Bell, 2002). We hold 
that this is distinct from the construct of acquisition capability (e.g. Zollo & Singh, 2004), as a 
capable person can still fail when overwhelmed by competing demands. In other words, an 
acquisition capability relates to codified knowledge that facilitate acquisitions, and 
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organizational absorptive capacity relates to availability of processes and personnel to apply 
acquisition capabilities.  
With our resulting theoretical framework, we contribute to acquisition literature by offering 
novel insights into predictors of acquisition performance. By drawing on Penrose's (1959) 
observations on managerial limits to growth, our first contribution lies in developing managers 
as important to organizational absorptive capacity. We use the metaphor of a road and the 
amount of traffic on it to help communicate the connections between organizational absorptive 
capacity and acquisitive growth. Organizational processes that support an acquisition depend 
on prior decisions (the number of lanes in a road and its proper maintenance) that impact the 
ability of managers to meet the increased demands of an acquisition. Second, we contribute to 
the acquisition literature by anticipating that different conditions influence a firm’s capacity for 
acquisitive growth. For example, reckless driving and bad weather reduce the capacity of a road 
to handle traffic, and better acquisitions require driving at the right speed and in designated 
lanes, as the road to complete integration is long and winding. Third, we outline how successful 
integration of target firm managers can facilitate growth. Finally, we begin to explain how 
variance in acquisition performance (Agrawal et al., 1992; King et al., 2004) relates to whether 
a firm has appropriate organizational absorptive capacity. We contend that organizational 
absorptive capacity is a crucial factor in determining acquisition performance, and we 
specifically develop how different contextual factors can increase or decrease the ability of 
firms to manage an acquisition.  
2.2 THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND PROPOSITIONS 
Management faces a continuous challenge of balancing between organic incremental growth, 
leveraging networks and alliances, and growing through acquisitions (Capron & Mitchell, 
2010). It is well established that different strategic needs make different forms of growth more 
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or less desirable (Moatti et al., 2015). However, a firm’s environment often drives changes 
where growth options are limited and success depends on current resource endowments. For 
Penrose (1959), meeting these demands required balancing the rate and direction of firm growth 
with the capacity to manage it. As a result, organizational absorptive capacity applies to 
different types of acquisitions in different ways. When firm strategy drives an acquisition, we 
hold that a firm’s availability of managerial talent determines whether its implementation is 
successful. Before developing our propositions, we discuss management challenges in 
acquisitions. 
2.2.1 Managers and acquisitive growth 
Acquisitions challenge managers in different ways and points of time and require multiple 
capabilities, including: evaluating targets; negotiating deals; coordinating integration, 
socialization, and acculturation of combining firms; and placing an acquisition within a firm’s 
long-term growth strategy. Existing literature provides a guide on what is important across the 
different phases of an acquisition. For example, relatedness and complementarity have been 
found to be an antecedent of acquisition performance (Bauer & Matzler, 2014; Kim & 
Finkelstein, 2009; Stahl & Voigt, 2008) that influences the speed of integration (Homburg & 
Bucerius, 2006). This suggests that managing acquisitions is not only about finding the right 
target, but managing the acquisition process (Haleblian, McNamara, Kolev, & Dykes, 2012; 
Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). 
Acquisitions are complex phenomena that evolve over time and early decisions can influence 
later outcomes. For example, post-acquisition performance is aided by the formation of joint 
routines, such as communication, during the pre-acquisition stage (Agrawal, Anand, Bercovitz, 
& Croson, 2012; Allatta & Singh, 2011). Once the deal is completed, management’s ability to 
coordinate integration, socialization, and acculturation is of paramount importance, while at the 
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same time the capacity to do so is largely fixed. Research reflects the importance of 
management in acquisitions with prescriptions to have adequate management available 
(Anslinger & Copeland, 1996), and recognizes that acquisitions limit the ability of managers to 
coordinate diverse activities (Zhou, 2011). Further, full integration to combine firm procedures 
and cultures can take as long as 5 to 25 years (Barkema & Schijven, 2008b; Cording, 
Christmann, & King, 2008; Covin, Kolenko, Sightler, & Tudor, 1997; Lu, 2014). Restated, 
acquisitions result in a changed organizational identity and work processes, and managers are 
responsible for those changes that take both effort and time to achieve. 
While different acquisitions call for different integration approaches (Schweizer, 2005), 
acquisitions change the social context of firms and drive changes in employee identity that 
disrupt coordination. This makes creating a sense of continuity from the past to the present, and 
from the present to the future an integral part of acquisition integration (Hogg & Terry, 2000; 
Ullrich, Wieseke, & VanDick, 2005). One way to facilitate integration is to train and use 
integration managers, appointed by the acquirer, to support the acquisition process (Ashkenas, 
DeMonaco, & Francis, 1998; Ashkenas & Francis, 2000; Teerikangas, Véry, & Pisano, 2011). 
Another is to develop a “buddy system” that pairs current and target firm managers (Mayer & 
Kenney, 2004). Both of these solutions demand management attention and time to facilitate 
integration, when management time is limited and the window to complete integration finite.  
Integrating people is fundamentally a question of socialization, or processes driving 
acceptance of desired values and norms (Van Maanen & Schein, 1979). The acquiring and 
acquired firms’ history of interactions, relatedness, and the integration approach all likely affect 
employee socialization into a combined firm (Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001; Melkonian, Monin, 
& Noorderhaven, 2011; Stahl, Larsson, Kremershof, & Sitkin, 2011). This relates to the concept 
of acculturation introduced by Nahavandi & Malekzadeh (1988) to capture cultural dynamics 
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in acquisition processes. They distinguish between different modes of acculturation, including 
integration, assimilation, separation, and deculturation. 
Overall, we view organizational absorptive capacity as balancing the feasibility and efficiency 
of managers implementing an acquisition (e.g., integration, socialization, and acculturation of 
a target firm) on top of pre-existing managerial demands. The concept of capacity relates to a 
firm’s acquisition capability that resides in the knowledge and experience of a firm’s managers. 
Referring to the road metaphor mentioned earlier, having an acquisition capability is associated 
with a firm having needed infrastructure, or established network of roads. Meanwhile, capacity 
represents the efficient use of a road where there is not an over investment in too many lanes 
for too few cars, or too many cars for too few lanes. Further, after a road is built, the underlying 
capability needs to be maintained. 
Acquisition planning and implementation can grow organizational absorptive capacity by 
giving managers that are both old and new to a firm experience in working together (Penrose, 
1955). Acquisitions also coincide with process development since growth creates gaps in skills 
and coordination that absorb management attention to solve mismatches in demands, structures, 
and systems (Garnsey, Stam, Heffernan, & Hugo, 2006; Nicholls-Nixon, 2005). Effective 
coordination requires that managers have experience working together, leading to acquiring 
firm managers experiencing less disruption to established routines and relationships that give 
them an advantage in managing change (Penrose, 1959; Reagans et al., 2005; Tan & Mahoney, 
2005). 
Considering the impact of acquisitions on managers is important, as even capable managers 
and coordination systems will display less capacity when confronting uncertain situations 
(Weick & Roberts, 1993). In general, managers from an acquiring firm experience less 
disruption and should thereby be able to help others move toward preferred definitions of 
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organizational identity (Kavanagh & Ashkanasy, 2006). However, target managers involved 
with acquisition planning will also have an advantage from knowing change is imminent. Both 
groups of managers have a dominant influence on new employee socialization, or on the process 
of achieving desired task, social and organizational knowledge and behaviors (Bauer & Green, 
1998; Tan & Mahoney, 2007; Weeks & Galunic, 2003). At the time of a given acquisition, our 
premise is that a firm can only grow as fast as it has an organizational absorptive capacity to 
oversee that growth that is largely dependent on managers in an acquiring firm. Existing 
research suggests this premise has merit, as the availability of management has been identified 
as the strongest constraint of firm growth (Penrose, 1959; Richardson, 1964). Determining a 
firm’s organizational absorptive capacity likely relates to its past growth.  
Founding conditions imprint the initial form of an organization and have enduring influence 
that limits change (Boeker, 1989; Marquis & Huang, 2010). The structures and processes 
adopted at the founding of a firm become the way to do things and significantly impact a firm’s 
continued growth (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). One reason founding conditions have a 
lasting impact is that past experience influences aspiration for growth (Greve, 2008). The 
implication is that initial processes and growth provide a baseline experience that sets both 
conditions to manage growth and future growth expectations. In other words, past growth 
establishes organizational processes and expectations for growth (e.g., road conditions) that 
provide the infrastructure of organizational absorptive capacity. 
Even when socialized into the organization, target firm managers will likely be less effective 
in the short-term. However, there are likely to be benefits from adding experienced managers 
from a target firm. External managers may help refocus attention on explaining interrelations 
in a way that maintains awareness, which would otherwise be lost (Weick & Roberts, 1993). In 
other words, an acquisition, because it disrupts processes, may facilitate growth by driving new 
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processes for coordination in a larger firm. Growth reduces the usefulness of prior routines and 
it requires further attention to update processes needed for coordination during implementation 
(Stensaker, Falkenberg, & Gronhaug, 2008). By implication, a benefit of acquisitions is that 
they drive changes to organizational routines that otherwise may display inertia. 
A continued restraint on growth relates to a firm’s ability to obtain experienced managers of 
sufficient quality at required rates (Slater, 1980). As firms grow larger this constraint becomes 
more problematic, as the need for experienced managers to maintain similar levels of growth 
increases. For example, when a firm has a 10 percent growth rate, the number of additional 
managers required for a firm with 100 employees is less than one with 10,000. Without 
additional experienced managers, firm growth likely reaches a constant or diminishing rate. 
Clearly, successful and growing companies often face staffing constraints. This is consistent 
with observations that management capacity is inelastic (Tan & Mahoney, 2005) or firm growth 
varies around a consistent average (Garnsey et al., 2006). For larger firms, adding experienced 
managers at a fixed rate will eventually result in reduced growth. As growth falls below 
expectations, acquisitions can offset shortfalls in organic growth. However, we argue that the 
success of an acquisition depends on sufficient organizational absorptive capacity.  
2.2.2 Organizational Absorptive Capacity and acquisition performance 
Acquisitions impact a firm and its performance. For managers, an acquisition involves an 
opportunity cost that keeps them from doing something else (Levinthal & Wu, 2010; Penrose, 
1955). The value to be realized from an acquisition is likely higher when existing managers and 
organizational processes can absorb the additional demands an acquisition represents, or a firm 
has sufficient organizational absorptive capacity. While acquisitions require significant 
management attention, not every acquisition has the same potential to impact performance 
(Barkema & Schijven, 2008b). Just like road conditions can change the capacity of a road for 
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traffic, we anticipate that different factors moderate organizational absorptive capacity for an 
acquisition. Our associated framework, which is based on a review of extant research, is shown 
in Figure 3 and discussed in the following subsections. 
Figure 3: Organizational Absorptive Capacity and Moderators of Acquisition 
Performance 
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acquisition correlate with the size of a target, then the relative size of an acquirer and its target 
will be an important consideration. For example, it is easier to merge onto a highway in a Mini 
Cooper than with a semi-trailer. Further, research suggests a target firm’s size needs to be small 
enough relative to an acquirer to be integrated, yet large enough to influence performance in a 
combined firm (King et al., 2008). If a target is too small, the performance impact on an acquirer 
may be minimal or not meet expectations, and a contributing reason may be smaller acquisitions 
may not attract needed levels of management attention. Meanwhile, targets that are too large 
can exceed the ability of managers to integrate operations (merging traffic creates a traffic jam).  
In other words, organizational absorptive capacity or the number of lanes and the efficiency 
of their use represents a constraint on acquisitive growth. Put another way, the amount of 
merging traffic (target size) relates to the integration challenge and whether performance will 
be impacted. The result is a management trade-off. On one hand, multiple acquisitions require 
similar levels of management attention or multiple on ramps can clog traffic, as each acquisition 
demands additional manager time and attention. On the other hand, a single large acquisition 
can exceed organizational absorptive capacity to integrate operations, or safely merge a large 
amount of traffic at one time. This logic is consistent with research that suggests one reason 
acquisitions are abandoned is that a target firm is too large (Wong & O’Sullivan, 2001). 
The optimal situation likely involves having a target’s relative size within an acquiring firm’s 
established growth rate. There is limited research examining this issue, but Nolop (2007) found 
acquisition performance was highest when a target firm’s size was under five percent of an 
acquirer’s market capitalization. We argue that this may be due to acquirers choosing to stay 
within their established ability to integrate processes and to socialize new employees. In other 
words, successful acquisitive growth relates to the difference between an acquirer’s 
organizational absorptive capacity (past growth or number of lanes on a road) and a target firm’s 
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relative size (amount of merging traffic). Assuming targets are smaller than an acquirer, the 
optimal condition will likely involve conditions where past growth exceeds a target firm’s 
relative size. A theoretical optimum would exist when a target’s size is just below an acquirer’s 
past growth rate. This reflects that firms operate below maximum efficiency (Srinivasan & 
Mishra, 2007) and potentially desire maintaining some slack capacity. Further, an acquisition 
within a firm’s organizational absorptive capacity will have clear status differences (Podolny, 
1993) that enables integration of target firm employees. For example, drivers merging from a 
single lane that disappears into six lanes of traffic likely pay more attention than when they are 
driving in three lanes that join another road with three lanes to form a road with six lanes of 
traffic. Based on the preceding logic, we propose the following:  
Proposition 1: Organizational absorptive capacity for an acquisition involves comparing 
an acquirer’s past growth rate to a target firm’s relative size where the difference displays 
an inverted-U relationship with acquisition performance. 
Additional forces during the planning of the acquisition and integrating the target firm likely 
moderate organizational absorptive capacity for an acquisition, and we develop logic for the 
influence of multiple characteristics that enable acquiring larger targets without sacrificing 
performance. We also outline other acquisition characteristics that may negatively impact 
organizational absorptive capacity for an acquisition. We select moderators from variables 
commonly used in acquisition literature to explain acquisition performance (Hitt et al., 2012; 
King et al., 2004). We begin with a discussion of related acquisitions. 
Related acquisitions 
Literature suggests that common industry and technology experience make organizations 
increasingly similar (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and positively impact transfer of knowledge 
(Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002). Organizational practices within an industry often converge 
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from a desire to enhance legitimacy (Oakes, Townley, & Cooper, 1998), and integration should 
be less difficult when acquiring and target firms have similar practices and routines that result 
from dealing with a similar external environment. This is also likely true for organizational 
“cultures” that are influenced by the industry environment, as cultural distance has been found 
to increase the workload of managers overseeing growth (Hutzschenreuter, Voll, & Verbeke, 
2011). 
The organizational culture of firms is to some extent specific to industry and technology, as 
technology constrains variation by defining work routines (Brown & Duguid, 2001; Chatman 
& Jehn, 1994; Neffke & Henning, 2013). As a result, related acquisitions leverage skills and 
processes that each firm already possesses (Neffke & Henning, 2013). They may also be 
characterized by strategic and market complementarity that has been found to be an important 
antecedent of acquisition performance (Hitt et al., 2012; Kim & Finkelstein, 2009). Returning 
to our road metaphor, merging traffic will be easier when it is traveling at similar speeds and 
road signs are in a familiar language. When firms display enough commonality to facilitate 
coordination, such an acquisition should place less demand on organizational absorptive 
capacity. Therefore, we propose the following:  
Proposition 2: Related acquisitions positively moderate the relationship between 
organizational absorptive capacity and acquisition performance. 
Acquisition Experience 
Research suggests that there is a positive relationship between task repetition and performance 
(Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002), and firms with a wide scope of experience have been found to 
demonstrate superior capacity to absorb new technologies and procedures (Shipilov, 2009). 
Assuming this is true, managers with acquisition experience will be more prepared for 
acquisition integration and creating value (Barkema & Schijven, 2008a). For example, 
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increased managerial experience with acquisitions and associated integration and restructuring 
can lead to better decisions in subsequent acquisitions (Barkema & Schijven, 2008b; Dillon & 
Lafley, 2011), reinforcing observations that prior acquisition experience enables capturing 
more value from subsequent acquisitions (Hitt et al., 2012). This relates to experienced 
acquirers being better at mitigating surprises during acquisition integration (Puranam & 
Srikanth, 2007). Relating this to the road metaphor, drivers travelling a familiar road have 
greater confidence in dealing with bad weather. 
Still, managerial perception of success in previous acquisitions may be negatively related to 
the performance of the focal acquisition, and this effect may increase as managers accumulate 
experience (Zollo, 2009). This is likely less true if a firm performs similar (related and 
complementary) acquisitions. Research suggests that firms with a strategically motivated 
acquisition program increase the likelihood of developing their experience into relevant 
capabilities (Ellis et al., 2011), and an acquirer’s program of acquisitions has been found to be 
an important predictor of performance (Laamanen & Keil, 2008). Acquisitions, then, need to 
be viewed as manageable processes rather than as unique events (Ashkenas et al., 1998). In 
other words, even experienced drivers must concentrate on their driving. Continuing this line 
of reasoning, it is reasonable to suggest that a firm with an acquisition program for sustaining 
growth can inoculate its employees to the uncertainty of acquisitions as well as the need to 
update work processes. Therefore, experience and associated learning can make successive 
acquisitions easier, and we propose the following: 
Proposition 3: Acquisition experience positively moderates the relationship between 
organizational absorptive capacity and acquisition performance. 
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Concurrent Acquisitions 
Concurrent acquisitions can help explain non-linear effects of acquisition experience on 
performance (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). However, most research examines acquisition 
experience using simple count measures that ignore the potential for acquisitions to overlap, 
although some studies recognize that a characteristic of unsuccessful acquisitions is completing 
several at the same time (Hitt, Harrison, Ireland, & Best, 1998). We suggest concurrent 
acquisitions involve circumstances that overly strain a firm’s organizational absorptive 
capacity. In keeping with the road metaphor, locations where multiple highways intersect over 
short distances, such as roundabouts, can cause merging traffic to cross multiple lanes to reach 
a needed exit. The complexity and high number of merging lanes invariably resulted in mile 
long traffic jams until the interchanges were redesigned. 
The risk of multiple acquisitions is that managers can become overwhelmed by dealing with 
uncertain and complex information. For example, the demands of local operations in larger and 
complex firms likely creates locally rational decision making that negatively effects overall 
performance (Glazer, Steckel, & Winer, 1992). For road traffic, this means one person 
switching lanes to move ahead can create delays for others. Additionally, expectations that 
capacity limits do not apply may relate to managerial hubris motives for acquisitions that are 
associated with negative performance (Clougherty & Duso, 2011; Moeller et al., 2005). A 
growing reliance on acquisitive growth can create hubris that may lead to an overreliance on 
acquisitions for growth. When acquisitions are concurrent, the capability to manage operations 
can be exceeded by multiple acquisitions that increase complexity due to larger size, dispersion 
of operations geographically and across products, and the number of competing processes and 
employee perspectives. This likely contributes to lower capacity to improve performance as 
needed integration of processes and socialization of employees from multiple target firms 
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increases the challenges of coordination needed for smooth operations (i.e., traffic jam). 
Therefore, we propose:  
Proposition 4: Concurrent acquisitions negatively moderate the relationship between 
management capacity and acquisition performance. 
Status of the target (public vs. private) 
Literature on acquisitions has analyzed the impact of acquiring private or public firms on 
performance both from the viewpoint of acquiring and target firms (Bargeron, Schlingemann, 
Stulz, & Zutter, 2008; Capron & Shen, 2007). Target firms have been shown to receive higher 
premiums if the acquirer is a public firm (Bargeron et al., 2008). Still, most research focuses on 
the impact of public or private status of the target on acquirer performance. Higher performance 
for acquirers taking over private targets is attributed to negotiation conditions that drive lower 
premiums, such as fewer contested bids (Chang, 1998; Conn, Cosh, Guest, & Hughes, 2005; 
Draper & Paudyal, 2006). Prior investment using equity alliances can also reduce information 
asymmetry to enable better valuation that can lead to higher value for the acquirer (Folta & 
Miller, 2002; Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002). 
Extant literature suggests that acquisitions of publicly traded target companies elicit higher 
acquirer returns than acquisitions of privately held firms. For example, Ang and Kohers (2001), 
as well as Draper and Paudyal (2006), suggest that premiums paid for targets that are private 
exceed those of publicly traded targets. The reasoning is that private firms select when to sell 
and to whom they sell, or they enjoy a better bargaining position associated with a higher selling 
price that lowers available acquirer gains (Draper & Paudyal, 2006). Another reason is that 
(barring a prior equity investment) private firms have greater information asymmetry from 
having less information publicly available. Returning to our road metaphor, driving unfamiliar 
roads with a map (public information) is easier than driving with only road signs as a guide.  
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Capron and Shen (2007) argue that information asymmetries, associated with the private 
status of target firms, lead to higher target evaluation costs and thereby to a lower performance 
for the acquirer. Shen and Reuer (2005) make a similar argument that firms featuring highly 
intangible assets can lead to ex ante misinterpretations of those assets to lower acquisition 
performance. For example, taking a company public before an acquisition reduces information 
asymmetries and thereby search costs of the acquirer (Ragozzino & Reuer, 2007; Reuer & Shen, 
2003). Further, for firms with intangible assets, such as for instance specific knowledge or 
intellectual property rights, the evaluation process is prolonged to increase the costs of 
assessment, lowering acquirer performance regardless of the purchase price (Coff, 1999). Based 
on greater information asymmetries for private firms, we contend that evaluating the value of a 
privately held target firm (versus a publicly traded company) influences the extent of 
evaluation, planning and coordination that are possible with corresponding reductions in 
organizational absorptive capacity. By extension, the reverse argumentation should be true for 
public targets. Therefore, we make opposing propositions: 
Proposition 5a: The acquisition of a private target negatively moderates the relationship 
between organizational absorptive capacity and acquisition performance. 
Proposition 5b: The acquisition of a public target positively moderates the relationship 
between organizational absorptive capacity and acquisition performance.  
Prior social ties 
Research has examined the impact of social ties and associated social capital in a variety of 
settings, such as relationships between companies and their suppliers (Asanuma, 1985; Baker, 
1990; Uzzi, 1997), regional production networks (Romo & Schwartz, 1995), business units in 
intra-firm settings (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998), corporate venture capital triads (Weber & Weber, 
2011), improved information exchange between competitors (Ingram & Roberts, 2000), and 
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information sharing and learning across organizations (Kraatz, 1998). Social ties have been 
shown to influence firm strategy, structure and performance (Mizruchi, 1996) by facilitating 
knowledge transfer (Hansen, 1999; Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; Tsai, 2001; Uzzi, 1997; Wijk, 
Jansen, & Lyles, 2008). In the acquisition literature, social ties between acquiring and target 
companies can impact negotiation decisions, and influence acquisition performance (Ishii & 
Xuan, 2014). 
However, views differ on the consequences of social ties for acquisitions. On the one hand, 
social ties between acquirers and targets may negatively influence the acquisition performance. 
For example, Ishii and Xuan (2014) find that social ties between top managers and directors of 
merging companies, based on educational background and employment history, negatively 
affect acquisition performance of the combined entity. They trace these results back to a due 
diligence that is taken less seriously and circumstances where taking over more profitable 
targets are missed. On the other hand, studies argue that social ties between merging firms 
promote better information sharing and increase performance. Cai and Sevilir (2012) reveal that 
social ties between acquiring and target companies lead to improved knowledge transfer and 
understanding of a target firm’s operations and culture that is needed for improved performance. 
Improved knowledge transfer provides advantages associated with successful acquisitions (Cai 
& Sevilir, 2012). Since organizational absorptive capacity is dependent on coordination, we 
anticipate that firms with social ties to companies that become their targets perform better, as 
the information exchange between the two companies and the evaluation of the target is 
facilitated. Therefore, we propose: 
Proposition 6: Pre-acquisition social ties positively moderate the relationship between 
organizational absorptive capacity and acquisition performance. 
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Absorptive capacity 
In their seminal work, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) describe absorptive capacity as the ability 
of a company to acquire, integrate and monetize new external knowledge. Absorptive capacity 
is built over time, by congregating a relevant base of knowledge (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998), and 
is typically related to R&D expenditures (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Within acquisition 
research, absorptive capacity is not commonly considered.2 An exception is offered by Zahra 
and Hayton (2008), who find a moderating effect of absorptive capacity on the impact of 
international venturing efforts of companies on financial performance. Specifically, they find 
that the anticipated relationship between acquisition activity and growth only manifests after 
absorptive capacity is added as a moderating variable. Lane and Lubatkin (1998) and Cohen 
and Levinthal (1990) make similar arguments; however, it is likely that knowledge not only 
needs to be related, but also complementary. In other words, knowledge of combining firms 
needs to be similar enough to facilitate understanding and diverse enough to add value (King et 
al., 2008). The integration of target firms, especially where tacit knowledge plays a role, is time 
consuming (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986) and it disrupts the operations of integrating firms (Ahuja 
& Katila, 2001). One of the challenges in acquisitions is combining organizational practices 
and knowledge that are often dissimilar. However, investment in knowledge creation and 
similarity of that knowledge should mitigate integration challenges to facilitate the assimilation 
and exploitation of external knowledge (Zahra & Hayton, 2008). Returning to the road 
metaphor, integration will be easier if traffic laws (i.e., values) and signage (i.e., routines) for 
merging organizations are similar. Therefore, we propose: 
Proposition 7: An acquirer’s absorptive capacity positively moderates the relationship 
between organizational absorptive capacity and acquisition performance. 
                                                 
2
 For a review of absorptive capacity research outside acquisitions, see e.g. Zahra & George (2002) 
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External advisors 
Literature argues that external advisors are able to produce relevant information needed in the 
various phases of acquisitions. This includes fairness opinions on acquirers and target firms 
(Kisgen, Qjqian, & Song, 2009) and identifying synergies (Allen, Jagtiani, Peristiani, & 
Saunders, 2004). External advisors help to identify potential bidders and targets, complete 
offers, search for higher bids, defend against hostile offers, evaluate competing bids, and 
consult on price determination, or the acceptance or rejection of the offer price (McLaughlin, 
1990). External advisors include management consultancies and accounting firms (Hayward, 
2003), boutique advisors (Song, Wei, & Zhou, 2013), legal advisors, and investment banks 
(McLaughlin, 1990; Servaes & Zenner, 1996). The use of external advisors in general and 
investment banks in particular is extremely common in acquisitions (Agrawal et al., 2012; 
Francis, Iftekhar, & Xian, 2006; Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 2012; Song et al., 2013). 
Again, applying our road metaphor, external advisors can be thought of as a GPS system that 
helps in navigating a new route. 
External advisors offer up-to-date knowledge, new perspectives, extra resources, support of 
change initiatives, or legitimization (Czerniawska, 2002) that can ease management demands 
during an acquisition. The prevalence of external advisors has led to research that examines 
their impact on acquisition performance, whereby the evidence is inconclusive. In examining 
the effects of financial advisors on the performance of target companies, Kale, Kini, and Ryan 
(2003) find that the reputation of an acquirer’s financial advisor negatively impacts the wealth 
gains accruing to the target firm. However, Bowers and Miller (1990) reveal that target firms 
gain when a prestigious investment bank is involved in the deal. This result is confirmed by 
Rau (2000) who illustrates that target companies earn higher premiums in transactions where 
prestigious investment banks are used.  
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The impact of external advisors on the performance of acquiring firms is also inconsistent. 
Similar to Rau (2000), Allen and colleagues (2004) find that the abnormal returns for acquirers 
are significantly lowered by prestigious advisors due to conflicts of interest. In contrast, 
Golubov and colleagues (2012) find higher performance when prestigious advisors counsel an 
acquirer. Bowers and Miller (1990) outline how external advisors help acquiring firm managers 
to develop skills to analyze target firms and investments during target selection, suggesting 
external advisors can reduce demands on managers. This is confirmed by Servaes and Zenner 
(1996) who identify reasons to use investment banks, such as finding and evaluating target 
companies and composing a bid at lower costs. Target evaluation costs become extremely 
relevant when acquisitions are more complex (Servaes & Zenner, 1996), such as technology 
acquisitions (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Tsai & Wang, 2008). We hold that the use of external 
advisors (e.g., investment banks and consultants) can augment an acquirer’s existing 
management and lower information demands to facilitate acquisitions. For example, investment 
banks lower information asymmetries between an acquirer and target leveraging their 
experience during takeovers of companies from similar industries (Servaes & Zenner, 1996). 
Therefore, we propose: 
Proposition 8: The use of external advisors positively moderates the relationship between 
organizational absorptive capacity and acquisition performance. 
2.3 DISCUSSION 
Building on Penrose's (1955, 1959) seminal work on firm growth, we develop how managers 
limit acquisitive growth using the concept of organizational absorptive capacity, and we detail 
how associated constraints can help explain differences in acquisition performance. 
Specifically, we develop how a firm’s direction and rate of growth is determined by the 
available organizational absorptive capacity and that ignorance of constraints can result in 
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inefficiencies, missed opportunities, and growth constraints. We also offer a comprehensive 
framework for explaining how and why managerial challenges are the main reason behind poor 
acquisition performance (Lockett, 2005). Using the metaphor of traffic on a road, we highlight 
the multiple dimensions and interconnections that moderate acquisitive growth and acquisition 
performance. 
2.3.1 Research implications 
The logic developed here suggests that acquisitions may be motivated by the express purpose 
of disrupting an acquiring firm’s organizational processes to enable continued growth. The 
addition of target firm operations and employees will drive an examination of processes for 
work coordination that updates routines needed for growth. For example, the integration of 
target firm managers can augment growth by adding experienced managers more quickly than 
internal development allows. This may help overcome the challenge of both coordinating work 
inside a larger firm and sustaining growth with a longer term implication that integrating target 
firm managers will expand organizational absorptive capacity. While acquiring firm managers 
have a temporary advantage (Richardson, 1964), successful integration of target firm managers 
will expand the pool of managers with experience in working together (Moldashl & Fischer, 
2004; Penrose, 1955, 1959; Stensaker et al., 2008). To the extent that the integration is 
successful, this can explain Lockett and colleagues (2011) observation that acquisitive growth 
can leverage organic growth. 
While we highlight organizational absorptive capacity as important to firm growth and 
acquisition performance, there is also research suggesting firm growth is random (Geroski, 
2005; Sutton, 1997). These two views are largely incompatible and difficult to reconcile in that 
both likely play a role. However, in the specific context of acquisitions, we outline how 
organizational absorptive capacity varies and influences acquisition performance. The success 
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of acquisitions largely depends on having sufficient managers to coordinate work, update and 
integrate organizational processes, and socialize acquired employees. Importantly, in addition 
to developing the concept and influence of organizational absorptive capacity on firm growth, 
we also show how it can be applied by comparing an acquirer’s past growth rate to a target’s 
relative size. 
We also outline factors that moderate organizational absorptive capacity for acquisitive 
growth with related acquisitions and acquisition experience enhancing the ability of managers 
to oversee an acquisition and improve firm performance. Meanwhile, the impact of concurrent 
acquisitions likely constrains the ability of firms to complete acquisitions, and it may relate to 
managerial hubris. Considering the impact of concurrent acquisitions on firm managers 
suggests simple count measures of acquisition experience do not fully capture the impact of 
acquisitions on management attention. While the foundation for these relationships and others 
in our framework is grounded in existing research, the developed ideas are novel and require 
empirical testing.  
The relationships we develop also help to explain some key findings in acquisition research. 
In contrast to target firm shareholders that receive a premium for their shares (Asquith, 1983; 
Bradley, 1980; Jensen & Ruback, 1983), performance implications for acquiring companies are 
mixed (Agrawal et al., 1992; King et al., 2004). Our propositions may help to structure and 
clarify these findings by possibly tracing losses for acquirers to factors that influence 
organizational absorptive capacity that relates to managerial demands associated with the 
relative size of combining firms. This can explain the dismal performance of mergers of equals. 
Information asymmetry can also increase management demands and lower organizational 
absorptive capacity when intangible assets are acquired or a target is private. However, the use 
of external advisors, such as investment banks or consultants, may help to lower information 
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asymmetries and mitigate managerial demands to facilitate acquisitive growth. The reasoning 
of pre-acquisition social ties between the involved parties in the deal likely follows a similar 
pattern. 
2.3.2 Managerial implications 
Our framework and ideas support viewing management as a firm’s most valuable resource 
(Lockett, 2005). We develop how management growth aspirations are related to acquisition 
activity to meet financial market expectations for sustained growth (Laurie et al., 2006). 
Assuming organizational absorptive capacity can be predicted from past firm growth, firms can 
use acquisitions to achieve more predictable levels of growth. Further, by identifying specific 
moderators, we demonstrate that organizational absorptive capacity for acquisitive growth can 
be broadened or narrowed like the lanes of a road. For example, acquirers should also take into 
account the status of the target to be acquired, due to the above mentioned information 
asymmetries that drive higher evaluation costs and increased demands on managers. 
Additionally, success on prior acquisitions may expand a firm’s capacity to manage 
acquisitions, but it can also contribute to situations where managers pursue deals that are too 
large or overly concurrent. It is possible that employing external advisors can mitigate these 
problems.  
Another important decision for the acquiring company involves target selection. Acquirers are 
encouraged to screen for targets in areas where they perform R&D for potential 
complementarities. These conditions can facilitate the transfer of relevant knowledge, lower 
managerial demands, and contribute to improved performance. Top managers need to be aware 
of organizational absorptive capacity in pursuing acquisitive growth, and understand that 
organizational processes to enact change depend on middle managers. This has a direct 
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managerial implication, because ill-considered acquisitions are associated with increased senior 
management turnover (Walsh, 1988). 
2.3.3 Limitations and future research 
Identifying boundary conditions for theory strengthens its contributions (Feldman, 2004), so 
it is important to recognize limitations and identify promising areas for additional research. 
While Penrose (1959) proposed management limits to firm growth, we focus on clarifying 
capacity limits to acquisitive growth. As a result, we focus on how organizational absorptive 
capacity can influence acquisition performance. However, acquisitions may simply signal a 
lack of internal growth and the transfer of excess resources to suboptimal applications, or not 
be motivated by increased performance. We also expect that acquisitions by integrating 
experienced managers can help to generate a firm’s capacity for acquisitions. Further, we 
anticipate experience with acquisitions can further this effort by making an acquirer’s managers 
and employees more comfortable with disruptions to work routines. Still, we do not directly 
consider a relationship for a target firm’s growth on organizational absorptive capacity and 
subsequent acquisition performance, and this can be examined by future research. We also do 
not account for reductions in organizational capacity from other non-routine planning activities, 
such as alliances. Other non-routine activities will absorb management attention, and we do not 
consider their impact on acquisitive growth. Case study research may be needed to examine 
how managers spend their time in planning and implementing acquisitions. 
In closing, the accelerated pace of change confronting firms makes reconsideration of growth 
strategies important. Simply relying on internal growth may preclude meeting growth 
expectations and delay responses to dynamic markets. Acquisitions offer faster access to 
resources, and their use as part of a growth strategy may offer a method to generate 
organizational absorptive capacity and enable updating organizational processes needed to 
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sustain growth. However, success in a given acquisition likely is influenced by contextual 
factors, such as the relatedness of an acquisition or the acquisition experience of a firm’s 
managers, and avoiding concurrent acquisitions. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Acquisition of high-tech firms is an important means to attract knowledge and know-how in 
pursuing a corporate entrepreneurship strategy (Audretsch et al., 2015; Ireland et al., 2003; 
Kuratko et al., 2015). While acquisitions of innovative and entrepreneurial firms are of great 
popularity in academic literature, there is only limited evidence available on acquisitions of 
high-tech start-ups and entrepreneurial firms by larger incumbents. Exceptions are Xiao (2015) 
and Cattaneo, Meoli, and Vismara (2015). Xiao (2015) explores whether acquisitions by 
multinational enterprises promotes the growth of new technology-based firms and concludes 
that only for a small subsample growth in employees is significantly positive. Cattaneo et al. 
(2015) show that the prestige and the internationalization of a university affect the propensity 
of affiliated spin-offs to be targeted in cross-border M&As.  
Our study is concerned about how the acquiring company and how the stock market evaluates 
the acquisition of high-tech firms. In particular, we investigate stock market reactions to 
announcements of corporate takeovers of high-tech initial public offering (IPO) firms.  
Our study also adds to the wealth of event studies investigating abnormal stock prices of large 
and established firms involved in corporate mergers and acquisitions (see e.g. Bruner, 2002; 
Datta et al., 1992; Haleblian et al., 2009; Siegel & Simons, 2010). While these studies almost 
all analyze whether there exist expected benefits for either the target or acquiring firm, our 
study is based on how these expectations depend on the targets assets and the specific 
ownership.  
Most of the empirical work on M&A activities is done from a corporate governance 
perspective and a theory based on the principal-agent framework (Audretsch & Lehmann, 
2014). One exception is Lichtenberg and Siegel (1989) who introduced matching theory to 
explain the performance of M&A activities. They argue that stock market should react 
positively on takeover announcements if the complementary assets brought into the firm by the 
Chapter 3: Evaluation of IPO-Firm Takeovers: An Event Study 
55 
 
takeover could be kept within the boundaries of the firm. If market participants are pessimistic 
that the complementary assets bought could be sufficiently integrated and thus anticipate a 
mismatch, stock market reactions on announcements of such takeovers should then be 
negatively (Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1989; Siegel & Simons, 2010). 
An extensive literature in corporate entrepreneurship confirms the matching argument and 
highlights the importance of a targets intangible assets to become a takeover target (Duysters 
& Hagedoorn, 2000; Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; Lehmann et al., 2012; Tsai & Wang, 2008; 
van de Vrande et al., 2009). This literature almost relies on that firm specific knowledge is 
linked and bounded to the firm as a legal entity and could thus be totally integrated after the 
merger.  
According to the matching theory of M&A, managers of the acquiring firm have to evaluate 
the tangible and intangible assets of the target firm in advance to realize a complementary fit 
with the own assets. Otherwise, a mismatch will occur if some critical intangible resources and 
assets could not be totally controlled and governed by the acquirer after the merger. We add to 
this literature analyzing if and how firm specific knowledge in entrepreneurial and high-tech 
firms linked to the founder chief executive officer (CEO) as the key inventor of the IPO-firm is 
evaluated in takeovers by stock market participants. Following arguments from matching 
theory (Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1989; Siegel & Simons, 2010) and incomplete contract theory 
(Brynjolfsson, 1994; Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990) we postulate positive stock 
market reactions when market participants expect that the assets could be totally controlled by 
the acquirer ex post, and negative if expected that not.  
Our study thus differs from previous research on M&A activities in our focus on the specific 
human capital of the founder CEO of the target company. We thus separate takeover 
announcements in two groups. One group contains targets that rather are independent of their 
initial owners with respect to having all critical strategic resources and innovative capabilities 
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accumulated internally. And second targets that at least to some extent depend on the firm 
specific knowledge of their initial founder CEO. In the latter case we postulate a misalignment 
of interests, a mismatch, since those CEOs could be reluctant to be taken over if their specific 
human capital is strongly linked to the firm’s tangible and intangible assets and may also lead 
to a hold-up problem for the acquirer after the merger (Foss & Klein, 2012; Gao & Jain, 2012; 
Hart & Moore, 1990; Lehmann et al., 2012; Rajan & Zingales, 2000). 
We argue that abnormal announcement returns are unexpected returns caused by unexpected 
information on the planned takeover reaching the market (Haleblian et al., 2009). Using a short-
horizon event study, our empirical results confirm that stock markets react to takeover 
announcement according the probability whether the complementary assets bought with the 
takeover could be kept after the takeover or not. Our results may have implications for both the 
acquiring and the target firm. The management of the target firms should carefully evaluate 
whether the founder and key inventor owns critical parts of the indispensable and intangible 
assets. The CEO and founder of the entrepreneurial firm should then credibly commit to the 
takeover announcement by transferring all patents to the firm in advance. Our findings may 
help to clarify the inconsistent evidence on abnormal returns earned by bidder shareholders that 
has been found in previous studies (Asquith, Bruner, & Mullins, 1983; Ben-Amar & André, 
2006; Campa & Hernando, 2004; Goergen & Renneboog, 2004; King et al., 2004; Moeller, 
Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2003). 
This study adds to research on the role of founder CEOs and the market for corporate control 
of IPO firms. A related study is Gao and Jain (2012), analyzing whether measures of CEO 
power moderates the relationship between founder management and target IPO wealth. While 
their study focus on CEO duality as a source of power in the bargaining process, our study 
draws on intellectual property rights linked to the founder CEO. In a previous study Lehmann 
et al. (2012) argue that founder CEOs cannot credibly commit to cooperate after the merger by 
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investing in relationship specific investments and thus altering the post-merger performance of 
the acquiring firm negatively. As a consequence the likelihood of being taken over significantly 
decreases with the number of patents controlled by the founder CEO of the entrepreneurial firm.  
This study also adds to empirical research drawing on event studies to analyze announcement 
effects. The overwhelming part of previous event studies on announcement effects is based on 
takeovers of large and established firms and often differs in their findings, according the type 
of shareholders (bidder or target) and the time horizon of the event study. Highly positive 
abnormal announcement returns are almost found in short-horizon event-studies (Bradley, 
Desai, & Kim, 1988; Bradley, 1980; Datta et al., 1992; Houston, James, & Ryngaert, 2001; 
Lang et al., 1989), while event studies with a broader time window often confirm lower 
abnormal returns (Asquith et al., 1983; Ben-Amar & André, 2006; Campa & Hernando, 2004; 
Goergen & Renneboog, 2004). While a few studies finds acquisitions to not enhance the value 
of the acquiring firm positively (Agrawal et al., 1992; Andrade et al., 2001; Asquith, 1983), 
others report significant losses to acquiring firms’ shareholders following acquisition 
announcements (Chatterjee, 1992; Datta et al., 1992; Dodd, 1980; King et al., 2004; Moeller et 
al., 2003). Our overall results confirm previous results that stock market evaluates the 
acquisitions of young and high-tech intensive IPO firms positively, leading to positive and 
abnormal announcement returns for shareholders. Controlling for intangible and critical assets 
linked to the founder CEO, the opposite holds, leading to negative abnormal announcement 
returns for shareholders of the bidding company. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The next section develops our theoretic argument 
and derives our hypotheses. The third section describes our data samples and the event study 
approach employed in our analyses. The results of these analyses as well as potential drawbacks 
and corresponding robustness checks are presented and discussed in the fourth section, while 
the final section summarizes our main findings and concludes. 
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3.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
3.2.1 Takeovers of entrepreneurial IPO firms as a win-win situation 
A growing body of literature argues that the market for corporate control serves as a matching 
mechanism between large and established firms and smaller and entrepreneurial firms 
(Blonigen & Taylor, 2000; Bonardo, Paleari, & Vismara, 2010a; Grimpe & Hussinger, 2008; 
Hall, 1990; Jones et al., 2001; Junkunc, 2007; Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1989). With respect to the 
proposed specialization among technology-based start-ups and technology-seeking incumbent 
firms in the market for innovation, incumbent firms are said to enjoy competitive advantages 
in the commercial exploitation of innovations, while start-up firms enjoy advantages in their 
exploration (Gick, 2008; Granstrand & Sjolander, 1990; Henkel et al., 2015; Steffens et al., 
2009). For incumbent firms, takeovers of start-up and entrepreneurial firms allow for acquiring 
innovations, such as new and sophisticated variations of products or services already offered 
by incumbents (Fabel, 2004; Henkel et al., 2015), that already have proven their viability and 
subsequently can be brought to the market by exploiting incumbents’ advantages such as 
broader resource bases, sufficient funding, and economies of scale and scope in production and 
other value chain activities. The acquisition of technologies, competencies, and knowledge 
from external sources has thus become a major motive for corporate mergers and acquisitions 
in recent years (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; Junkunc, 2007; Phan, Wright, Ucbasaran, & Tan, 
2009; Tsai & Wang, 2008). Young and entrepreneurial firms’ innovation endeavors are 
assumed to be more likely to create breakthroughs but these firms are not always able to bring 
their innovations to the market (Junkunc, 2007; Wright, Birley, & Mosey, 2004). While large 
and established firms are in funds to invest in new technologies, they often lack new and 
incremental innovations. Since start-up and entrepreneurial innovation is more radical than that 
of established firms, Granstrand and Sjolander (1990) suggest a division of scientific labor 
between entrepreneurial and established firms. Such a division of labor implicitly defines their 
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roles as targets and acquirers so that takeovers may lead to a win-win situation for both parties 
(Gans & Stern, 2000). 
Accordingly, literature suggests specialization in the market for innovations among young and 
entrepreneurial firms on the one and established incumbents on the other hand (Steffens et al., 
2009). With respect to opportunity identification and exploration of promising innovations, 
environmental conditions seem to increasingly favor young and small entrepreneurial firms that 
are founded based on the belief in a new and widely untested invention or technology (Steffens 
et al., 2009). Specific human capital, technological know-how and employment systems now 
play key roles in these New Enterprises (Jennings, Jennings, & Greenwood, 2009; Rajan & 
Zingales, 2000) as they can allow for competitive advantages if successfully employed. 
Entrepreneurial firms provide both strong incentives to specifically invest in the innovation 
process and corresponding selection devices to identify opportunities more successfully as 
compared to incumbents (Fabel, 2004; Rajan & Zingales, 2001). Otherwise entrepreneurial 
firms lack managerial and financial resources to develop competitive advantages in the 
exploitation of their inventions (Ireland et al., 2003; Steffens et al., 2009). 
Being taken over after IPO reflects and values not only the past performance of the top 
management team positively (Colombo, Mustar, & Wright, 2010; Gans & Stern, 2000; Grimpe 
& Hussinger, 2008, 2009) it also promotes and supports established firms to attract critical 
technological resources by taking over young and high-tech IPO firms, leading to a win-win 
situation or match for both firms (Blonigen & Taylor, 2000; Bonardo et al., 2010a; Hall, 1990; 
Jones et al., 2001; Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1989): 
Hypotheses 1: The stock market evaluates takeover announcements of IPO-firms positively 
resulting in positive cumulative abnormal returns for the shareholders of the target and 
bidding firm. 
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3.2.2 Expected returns to IPO-firm shareholders 
Takeovers of newly public IPO-firms can be an attractive means for initial owners of divesting 
their stakes in the target firm (DeTienne & Cardon, 2012). Since IPO- and entrepreneurial firms 
often lack the resource bases of established firms to commercialize their ideas and innovations, 
it may be favorable for the firm’s current shareholders to have their firm being taken over by 
an established firm (Gans & Stern, 2000). The supply of acquisition targets is thus shaped by 
initial owners exit decisions and their expectations on future returns.  
Acquirers usually pay premiums on a target’s stand-alone value (Haleblian et al., 2009) 
resulting from higher returns extractable by the acquirer from a combination of the target’s and 
their existing resources and capabilities as compared to the values that could be extracted from 
the target as an independent entity. High-tech start-ups are thus often taken over by larger firms 
early in their firm life cycles because these larger firms own the necessary resources and have 
a comparative advantage in bringing entrepreneurial firms’ innovations to the market 
(Audretsch & Lehmann, 2007; Dai, 2005). Additionally, if there are advantages to be gained 
from access to complementary resources indispensable in developing a marketable product 
based on the target’s innovation, incumbent firms typically enjoy competitive advantages over 
smaller start-ups (Audretsch, 2001). Their willingness-to-pay for the target might thus exceed 
the value that can be extracted by initial owners from running the firm independently. The 
market for corporate control accordingly can be expected to increase the value that can be 
created from a newly-public IPO-firm’s resources and capabilities by reallocating ownership in 
the takeover target to the incumbent (Bonardo, Paleari, & Vismara, 2010b; Meoli, Paleari, & 
Vismara, 2013). 
Firms with significant holdings in intangible and difficult-to-value resources are in particular 
faced with asymmetric information. Thus, the IPO market and the market for corporate control 
might be interrelated in that the IPO market alleviates inefficiencies in the M&A market if 
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information asymmetries concerning the privately held target’s intangible resources are 
prohibitively high (Ang & Kohers, 2001; Bonardo et al., 2010a; Shen & Reuer, 2005). Bonardo 
et al. (2010b) argue that investors generally have concerns about IPO-firm’s legitimacy, 
especially if these possess few tangible assets only and do not command extensive track records, 
which can be alleviated by uncertainty-reducing signals, like an IPO. Taking the firm public 
prior to its eventual sale therefore can significantly increase returns to its initial owners by 
reducing information asymmetries and with that reducing corresponding bid price discounts. 
Accordingly, an acquirer’s intention to acquire a newly public IPO-firm should signal their 
expectation of generating additional value from combining the target with their existing 
resources and capabilities and leads the market to expect increases in post-acquisition target 
value from efficient use of its resources and capabilities arising from the target’s takeover.  
Hypothesis 2: The stock market evaluates takeover announcements of IPO-firms positively 
resulting in positive cumulative abnormal returns for target shareholders. 
3.2.3 Positive expected returns to bidder shareholders 
A particular firm’s success increasingly depends on its capability of innovating faster than its 
competitors (Phan et al., 2009; Ranft & Lord, 2002; Teng, 2007). Given the increasing pressure 
of timing innovations, the performance of established firms largely depends on novel 
technologies possessed by high-tech start-ups (Desyllas & Hughes, 2008). Mergers and 
acquisitions are viable vehicles in pursuing such a resource-based strategy as they allow for 
access to strategic and possibly otherwise not marketable resources that enable acquirers to 
create a sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). Given 
entrepreneurial start-ups’ relative advantages in exploration of promising innovations and 
capabilities and incumbents relative advantages in their exploitation, the combination of 
corresponding resources and capabilities accumulated within entrepreneurial start-ups with 
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those of an incumbent firm by means of mergers and acquisitions can be an efficient way for 
incumbents to innovate. 
Stock markets will perceive these advantages associated with accessing external technology 
and innovation sources by means of takeovers of newly-public IPO-firms and will expect 
additional values to be generated for the acquiring firm resulting from the target’s integration. 
Hypothesis 3: The stock market evaluates takeover announcements of IPO-firms positively, 
resulting in positive cumulative abnormal returns for bidder shareholders. 
3.2.4 Negative expected returns for bidder shareholders 
While the first three hypotheses have been tested and analyzed intensively in the literature, 
the following section draws on countervailing effects, namely negative expected returns for 
bidder shareholders. While there exists ample theoretical and empirical evidence that expected 
returns are negatively for bidder shareholders, this kind of literature draws mainly on 
governance problems of large and established companies and focusses on entrenchment effects, 
take-over protections, golden handshakes, poison pills or the moral hazard behavior of minority 
shareholders among others3 (see Andrade et al. (2001) for a survey). In the following we argue 
that also in the absence of such takeover hurdles which only increase the price for the target 
firm shares, expected returns for bidder shareholders may be negatively in some cases.  
A firm’s ability to derive competitive advantage from ownership of strategic resources 
critically depends on its ability to control those resources and capabilities that are indispensable 
for value creation (Ireland et al., 2003). Thus, post-merger success should strongly depend on 
how effective the acquired resources could be integrated and kept within the boundaries of the 
firm to control and exploit them. The scarce evidence available on acquisitions of high-tech 
                                                 
3
 Past research has identified several firm characteristics to have important influences on abnormal returns earned 
by bidder and target shareholders, such as for example past stock market valuation as evident by book-to-market 
ratios (Fama & French, 1993; Rau & Vermaelen, 1998), the decision between tender offers and mergers (Jensen 
& Ruback, 1983), or the relative sizes of bidders and targets (Agrawal et al., 1992). 
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start-ups and entrepreneurial firms by larger incumbents suggests that takeovers not always 
generate the expected results (Ernst & Vitt, 2000; Kapoor & Lim, 2007; Paruchuri, Nerkar, & 
Hambrick, 2006). These findings are being attributed to incumbents’ post-merger integration 
decisions (Colombo et al., 2010; Kapoor & Lim, 2007; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007). 
Young and knowledge based firms strongly depend on the specific investments made by its 
founders since these ventures closely develop around their skills and specific knowledge and 
require their continued availability (Arthurs, Busenitz, Hoskisson, & Johnson, 2009). 
Successful exploitation of an entrepreneurial firm’s resources poses exceptional difficulties 
with respect to its ability to ensure optimal specific investments by the key inventors of the new 
venture and thus to provide efficient incentives for these individuals (De Clercq, Castaner, & 
Belausteguigoitia, 2011; Jennings et al., 2009). In particular it needs an incentive scheme to 
overcome the moral hazard and hold-up problem associated with relationship specific 
investments (Brynjolfsson, 1994; Hart & Moore, 1990). Such optimal investments in intangible 
relationship specific investments are non-contractible and an outside party cannot verify the 
extent of investments (Soubeyran & Stahn, 2007). Given this incompleteness, individuals face 
potential hold-up problems after having specified their human capital to a firm’s value creation 
process which especially pertains to bargaining on ex ante non-contractible returns resulting 
from their specific human capital investments (Rajan & Zingales, 2000). Equity ownership can 
equip key individuals with both the right to decide on the use of assets in all instances not 
governed by contracts and the power to contradict unfavorable distributions of residual income 
by threatening to withdraw the assets they own in any ex ante not contractually specified 
situation (Brynjolfsson, 1994; Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990). Residual rights 
of control derived from equity ownership thus can provide essential incentives for optimal 
specific investment (Lehmann, 2006; Rajan & Zingales, 2001). 
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A target’s initial owners sell their equity ownership in the course of a takeover of their firm 
which leaves them without bargaining power in any not contractually specified situations after 
their firm’s acquisition. If the initial owner has at least a fraction of the target’s indispensable 
innovative knowledge and human capital complementary to the target’s alienable assets 
inalienably accumulated, they can be held-up by the acquirer in bargaining for a fraction of the 
integrated firm’s surplus. This hold-up risk will be increasingly severe the more initial owners 
invest in firm-specific human capital and capabilities, since they cannot derive any value from 
these without access to the complementary assets owned by the acquirer. Since initial owners 
can anticipate this potential hold-up, their incentives for continued post-acquisition specific 
human capital investments necessarily decrease. Given this specific investment being 
indispensable for the value creation process, these reduced incentives will be inefficient in 
maximizing total production value, since the joint value of the production relationship is 
positively related to the specific investments of all relevant individuals. The reallocation of 
ownership in a firm’s assets in the course of a takeover then inevitably lowers the value 
extractable from the target’s assets. 
If initial owners have relevant and indispensable knowledge then there may be no need for 
these individuals to have equity ownership to have bargaining power (Rajan & Zingales, 1998). 
As long as their knowledge and human capital cannot be transferred to other parties within the 
firm but is indispensable for value creation and use of complementary assets they can exert 
power by the mere threat of withdrawal of or exclusion of others from their knowledge. If initial 
owners’ specific human capital is required after a takeover of their firm, they can exert power 
over the acquirer by threatening to withhold their human capital and thus divert surplus from 
bidder’s shareholders to themselves. This decreases the value that the bidder can finally extract 
from the target and thus decreases the share of revenues from the target’s resources the bidder 
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can appropriate. If stock market participants are sufficiently informed, they take these issues 
into account in evaluating takeover announcements of IPO and entrepreneurial firms: 
Hypothesis 4: Shareholders of bidders targeting IPO-firms with intangible strategic resources 
inalienably bound to their initial owners correspondingly earn lower cumulative abnormal 
returns as compared to shareholders of bidders targeting IPO-firms that are independent of 
their initial owners. 
3.3 METHODOLOGY 
3.3.1 Event studies and announcement effects 
To test our hypotheses, we assess the stock market reaction to public takeover announcements 
targeted at German IPO-firms by employing the standard event study methodology. Event 
studies rely on the assumption that capital markets are at least semi-efficient, they assess the 
significance of the intended takeover as well as the degree to which the market perceives the 
event and prices the information conveyed in the underlying announcement (see e.g. Armitage, 
1995; Brown & Warner, 1980; Kothari & Warner, 2007; MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams & 
Siegel, 1997). With respect to takeover announcements, event studies allow for an assessment 
of the market’s evaluation of the impact that a reallocation of ownership in the target from target 
to bidder shareholders will have on the wealth of both of these groups of shareholders.  
3.3.2 Data sample 
Our data sample compiles corporate takeovers targeting German IPO-firms that had been 
floated in the ten-year period from 1997 to 2007. 83 of the total of 411 non-financial initial 
public offerings by German issuers in segments of the German Stock Exchange (Deutsche 
Boerse AG) received publicly announced takeover bids between their dates of IPO and 
December 31, 2007. IPO-firms were identified from Deutsche Boerse AG’s official primary 
market statistics, takeover announcements from several publicly available sources, most 
importantly the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). Historic stock price 
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information for bidders and targets was obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream and in a 
limited number of cases supplemented with information from Ariva.de, an independent German 
supplier of financial information. Due to limitations in the availability of historic stock prices, 
our final samples contain information on 59 of this total of 83 takeover targets as well as on 42 
bidders.4 The majority of cases where we could not obtain bidder stock price information entail 
takeovers of IPO-firms by privately held bidders where there naturally is no corresponding 
stock price. Missing target stock price information is mainly caused by deletion of historic daily 
stock prices from our data sources due to a delisting of the corresponding target subsequent to 
its successful takeover and applies foremost to the earliest takeovers in our initial sample. While 
these issues in data availability generally could bias our results, however, we do not have any 
reason to expect our final data sample to comprise an adverse selection of all IPO-firm 
takeovers. 
We additionally divide these full samples of 59 targets and 42 bidders into two groups each. 
The first groups (“entrepreneurial firms”) are comprised of bidders and targets, respectively, 
involved in transactions targeting IPO-firms that have inalienably bound intangible strategic 
resources to their initial owners, while the other groups (“independent firms”) contain those 
transactions targeting firms that have directly accumulated all these intangible strategic assets. 
We proxy an initial owners’ holdings in inalienable and intangible strategic resources by them 
being (partial) owners of patents so that a takeover transaction was classified as involving an 
entrepreneurial firm if the target’s initial owners are mentioned as applicants for at least one 
patent, either alone our together with the target as a legal entity.5 Information concerning an 
                                                 
4
 Increasing the time period from 1995 until 2010 does not increase the number of observations. Starting in 1990 
(or before) will only marginally increase the dataset but lead to other adverse effects biasing the results.  
5
 The analysis of patent ownership shows that the owner CEO is almost the sole owner of the patent. However, if 
they are jointly owned then the separation or availability of access the patent knowledge for its use may remain 
unclear. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this point.  
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individual’s patent ownership was manually extracted from the patent database of the German 
Patent and Trademark Office (www.depatisnet.de) by searching for individuals’ names as patent 
applicants. Patents retrieved from this database are not limited to those registered at the German 
Patent and Trademark Office or valid in Germany only but also include patents with a broader 
scope of protection and those registered at several foreign patent offices.  
Table 2 gives an overview of all takeover announcements considered in our full data samples 
as well as in the entrepreneurial and independent firm groups by year of IPO and of their 
coverage relative to all 83 takeovers in the respective time period. 
Table 3 summarizes all takeover announcements considered in our full data samples as well 
as in the entrepreneurial and independent firms groups by target industries and of their coverage 
relative to all 83 takeovers in the respective time period. 
 
Table 2: Takeover announcements and relative coverage by years of takeovers 
Takeover Takeovers Targets   Bidders 
years Totals Full Sample Entr. T. Ind. T.   Full Sample Entr. T. Ind. T. 
1999 1 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%   0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
2000 5 3 60% 1 20% 2 40%   2 40% 0 0% 2 40% 
2001 7 1 14% 0 0% 1 14%   3 43% 0 0% 3 43% 
2002 10 3 30% 1 10% 2 20%   4 40% 2 20% 2 20% 
2003 15 11 73% 1 7% 10 67%   6 40% 1 7% 5 33% 
2004 12 10 83% 3 25% 7 58%   5 42% 1 8% 4 33% 
2005 10 9 90% 3 30% 6 60%   6 60% 2 20% 4 40% 
2006 10 9 90% 1 10% 8 80%   7 70% 1 10% 6 60% 
2007 13 13 100% 2 15% 11 85%   9 69% 2 15% 7 54% 
Total 83 59 71% 12 14% 47 57%   42 51% 9 11% 33 40% 
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As table 2 depicts, the relative coverage of all takeovers targeting German IPO-firms in our 
samples in general increases the closer the respective IPOs are to the end of our observation 
period on December 31, 2007.6 Table 3 shows that the relative coverage of all corporate 
takeovers overall is higher for IPOs in technology and human capital intense industries than it 
is for those in traditional industries such as consumer goods. Announcements of takeovers of 
firms in technology-based industries and announcements from more recent takeover years 
might therefore be slightly overrepresented in our final samples. 
  
                                                 
6The number of entrepreneurial firms is rather low – Germany is by far no IPO country. Increasing the time period 
to 20 years, from 1992 until 2012 will not increase the number of entrepreneurial firms as defined above.  
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Table 3: Takeover announcements and relative coverage by industries 
 
 
Target Takeovers Targets   Bidders 
industries Totals Full Sample Entr. T. Ind. T.   Full Sample Entr. T. Ind. T. 
Medtech 1 1 100% 0 0% 1 100%   1 100% 0 0% 1 100% 
Biotech 3 3 100% 3 100% 0 0%   3 100% 3 100% 0 0% 
IT & TC Hardware 4 3 75% 0 0% 3 75%   3 75% 1 25% 2 50% 
Consumer Goods 4 1 25% 0 0% 1 25%   2 50% 0 0% 2 50% 
Other Technologies 5 2 40% 1 20% 1 20%   2 40% 1 20% 1 20% 
Trad. Industries 6 4 67% 0 0% 4 67%   2 33% 0 0% 2 33% 
E-Commerce 7 6 86% 1 14% 5 71%   6 86% 1 14% 5 71% 
Trad. Services 8 6 75% 1 13% 5 63%   5 63% 0 0% 5 63% 
Media & Entertainment 11 8 73% 1 9% 7 64%   2 18% 0 0% 2 18% 
IT & TC Service 34 25 74% 5 15% 20 59%   16 47% 3 9% 13 38% 
Total 83 59 71% 12 14% 47 57%   42 51% 9 11% 33 40% 
Chapter 3: Evaluation of IPO-Firm Takeovers: An Event Study 
70 
 
3.3.3 Computation of average and cumulative average residuals 
An event study is based on analyzing abnormal returns to a firm’s shareholders, this is, returns 
that are unexpected as the underlying event is unexpected and accordingly has not yet been 
priced by the market. 
Our analyses employ the standard event study methodology (see e.g. Armitage, 1995; Brown 
& Warner, 1985; MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997) and use the market model7 to 
estimate the returns that could have been expected without the respective takeover 
announcement. This accordingly leads us to derive each individual bidder’s and target’s 
abnormal announcement return iARτ
 
at day τ  in event time relative to the takeover 
announcement day, which is labeled 0τ = , according to 
 
( )i i iAR R E Rτ τ τ= −   (1) 
where the expected return to firm 'i s  stock follows from 
 
( )i i i mE R Rτ τα β= +   (2) 
and where iRτ  is the realized return on firm 'i s  stock and mR τ  is the return investors would 
have earned on a market portfolio. Each return is computed as the percentage change in stock 
and market portfolio prices, respectively, from day 1τ −  to day τ . We employ the CDAX as 
the value-weighted market index of all stocks traded in regulated market segments of the 
German Stock Exchange to approximate daily returns on a market portfolio. 
In a next step we need to define event windows (i.e. periods of time around the day at which 
the intended takeover is publicly announced) during which we expect the market to take note 
of and accordingly evaluate the proposed acquisition, i.e. the period during which we expect to 
                                                 
7
 We additionally checked for robustness of our results with abnormal returns derived from the market adjusted 
model. See our discussion of drawbacks and robustness checks below for details. 
Chapter 3: Evaluation of IPO-Firm Takeovers: An Event Study 
71 
 
observe abnormal returns. While it is hard to justify theoretically any specifically chosen event 
window, research employing short-horizon event studies typically considers several event 
windows of different length assuming that market participants become at least partially aware 
of an event some time before the announcement. Thus, part of abnormal stock price behavior 
will take place before the event day.  We chose three different event windows [t1, t2]: the 
lengthiest one investigates abnormal returns across a symmetric 21-days window around the 
takeover announcement day 0τ = , this is, the period [-10, +10], thereby following studies like 
(Markides, 1992) or (Wright, Ferris, Hiller, & Kroll, 1995). This symmetric window around the 
announcement of the event is chosen for several reasons. First of all, if too long event windows 
are chosen, this will severely reduce the power of the test statistic used, which in turn will lead 
to wrong conclusions about the significance of the abnormal returns caused by the event (Brown 
& Warner, 1985, 1980; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). Second, too lengthy event windows entail 
the danger that other events than the investigated takeover announcement could bias abnormal 
returns attributed to this specific event by causing abnormal stock price behavior themselves 
(Betton, Eckbo, & Thorburn, 2008; Kothari & Warner, 2007; Oler, Harrison, & Allen, 2008). 
And third, it can be stated that the nature of the event being studied should determine the length 
of the event window (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997; Ryngart & Netter, 1990), for example 
capturing possible information leakage some days in advance of the event announcement. For 
that reason two asymmetric 6-day event windows finally investigate cumulative average 
residuals earned by target and bidder shareholders due to rumors preceding eventual public 
takeover announcements or other reasons for anticipation. They were chosen to cover the event 
windows [-10, -5] and [-5, 0]. 
We now can derive individual firm 'i s  abnormal returns iARτ  for each of the event window 
days by estimating its intercept and slope, iα and iβ, by regressing historic pre-event window 
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returns on its stock against corresponding market portfolio returns and subsequently computing 
expected returns for the event window days according to equation (2). While estimation periods 
of at least 100 trading days of length seem appropriate to derive accurate estimations of iα  and 
iβ  from the market model (Armitage, 1995), we employed estimation periods of the 250 trading 
days8 preceding each of our event windows. Finally, abnormal returns are obtained by 
subtracting these expected from actually observed returns, as expressed by equation (1) above. 
Subsequently, these abnormal returns iARτ  are aggregated cross-sectionally to bidder average 
residuals and target average residuals across all N bidders and targets, respectively, according 
to  
 
1
1 N
i
i
AR AR
Nτ τ
=
= ∑   (3) 
Time-series aggregation of bidder average residuals and target average residuals according to  
 
2
1 2
1
( , )CAR AR
τ
τ τ τ
τ τ=
=∑   (4) 
finally yields the corresponding cumulative average residuals for the portfolios of firms under 
consideration for each time period [t1, t2]. 
3.4 RESULTS 
Figure 4 below plots cumulative average residuals for our portfolios of bidder and target firms 
for our lengthiest (21-days) event window against event window days9. As such, it exhibits the 
development of cumulative abnormal returns earned by investors in our bidder and target firms’ 
portfolios, respectively, relative to those earned by investors in the market portfolio. 
                                                 
8
 With the exception of one target firm which was publicly quoted for 160 trading days only prior to the 
announcement of its takeover. 
9
 Appendix 1 exhibits average as well as cumulative average residuals for the full samples of bidders and targets 
across all the individual days of our event windows. 
Chapter 3: Evaluation of IPO-Firm Takeovers: An Event Study 
73 
 
Figure 4 suggests several preliminary conclusions. Firstly, the market seems to anticipate 
takeover announcements at least for takeover targets since the corresponding cumulative 
average residuals begin to notably increase well before the actual announcement day, which is 
event day 0. 
Figure 4: Cumulative average residuals for 21 days event window 
 
Our plot of cumulative average residuals suggests a notable increase in abnormal returns earned 
by investors in the targets portfolio around day -4 relative to the day of the public announcement 
of the targets’ takeovers. Secondly, the information that the rumored event in fact takes place 
seems to already get to the market one day before the public takeover announcement, which 
leads to a clearly visible drop in bidders’ and to a pronounced increase in targets’ cumulative 
average residuals. We could fix the announcement dates with certainty, the actual event date in 
its sense with respect to an event study, however, seems to be fixed incorrectly. Thirdly, already 
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about two days after the takeover announcement cumulative average residuals seem to begin a 
steady decline. These observations point to a considerably fast incorporation of information 
conveyed with a public takeover announcement into bidders’ and targets’ stock prices and thus 
suggest an efficient working of the stock market. 
In a next step, we assess the cross-sectional distribution of the cumulative average residuals 
aggregated across our event windows for both the full samples of bidders / targets and for 
bidders / targets divided according to their involvement in takeovers of entrepreneurial and 
independent targets, respectively. We test our hypotheses by testing whether mean cumulative 
abnormal returns are significantly different from zero and exhibit the hypothesized signs.  
Table 4 below presents our results for the bidders and targets full samples as well as divided 
into the two groups covering takeovers targeted at entrepreneurial and at independent firms 
respectively. In testing whether observed cumulative average residuals are significantly 
different from zero we employ standard t-tests10 (Kothari & Warner, 2007). Comparisons 
among the two groups of takeover targets were obtained from two-tailed tests of mean 
comparisons, with adjustments for differences in individual firm cumulative abnormal returns’ 
variances among both, if applicable.11 
Hypotheses 1 which postulates positive abnormal expected returns for both the shareholders 
of the target and the bidding firm could be confirmed. The coefficients for all three windows 
are positively and in particular statistically significant in the [-5,0] window. 
                                                 
10
 We additionally checked for robustness of our results with the specific t-test proposed in (MacKinlay, 1997). 
11
 Assume an investor buys a portfolio of the 12 entrepreneurial targets 10 days before the official takeover 
announcement occurs and sell the shares exactly 10 days after the announcement. Then s/he would receive a return 
of 16.158 percent within this 20 day buy-and-hold period compared to an investment in the underlying benchmark, 
the CDAX. Investing in the 9 bidder companies within the same time window and selling then after 20 days will 
not lead to an abnormal return compared to the benchmark. Although this investment could lead to a loss of 4.407 
percent compared to the benchmark, this difference is not statistically different from zero.  
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Table 4: Cumulative average residuals for bidders and targets 
    Subsamples   Full Sample  
  Window Entrepreneurial Targets Obs. Independent Targets Obs.       T-Value   All Targets Obs. 
Targets                           
  [-10, -5] -0.324%   12 +1.436%   47 +0.715     +1.078%   59 
  [-5, 0] +16.816% * 12 +16.082% *** 47 -0.075     +16.232% *** 59 
  [-10, +10] +16.158% ** 12 +14.033% ** 47 -0.182     +14.465% *** 59 
Bidders                        
  [-10, -5] -5.430% *** 9 +2.154% * 33 +3.082 ***   +0.529%   42 
  [-5, 0] +0.187%   9 +3.325% *** 33 +1.144     +2.653% ** 42 
  [-10, +10] -4.407%   9 +4.952% * 33 +1.698 *   +2.947%   42 
* / ** / ***: cumulative average residuals for sampled targets / bidders significantly different from zero to 90% / 95% / 99% levels of confidence. Column “T-Value” 
reports the results of two-tailed tests of mean comparisons among the entrepreneurial and the independent targets groups. 
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Hypothesis 2, which postulates positive abnormal returns to target shareholders, can also be 
confirmed for two of our three event-windows. The market seems, as is already suggested by 
figure 4, to notice the takeover attempt some days before its public announcement so that target 
shareholders earn significantly positive abnormal returns during the 6-days pre-event window 
ranging from event day -5 to the takeover announcement day and during our lengthiest 21-days 
event-window ranging from day -10 to day +10. We do not observe any significant abnormal 
returns during the earliest of our pre-event windows, however. During the [-5, 0] event window, 
investors in the full sample of takeover targets earned an abnormal 16.232 percent return 
relative to the market portfolio, during the lengthiest window they earned significantly 
abnormal 14.465 percent. While investors in the entrepreneurial target portfolio seem to earn 
slightly higher abnormal returns as those in the independent target portfolio, these differences 
are not statistically significant to any reliable level of confidence.  
Hypothesis 3, which states that shareholders of bidders targeting newly public IPO-firms 
should earn positive abnormal returns in the time period around the takeover announcement, 
can partly be confirmed. During the 6-days event window from event day -5 until the 
announcement day, investors in the full portfolio of bidders earn statistically significant positive 
returns (2.653 percent as compared to the overall market portfolio). During the earlier pre-event 
window and across our lengthiest event-window which also covers post-announcement days, 
however, we find positive but not statistically non-zero abnormal returns. These results overall 
are in line with those found in (Kohers & Kohers, 2000, 2001). Investigating acquisitions of 
high-technology firms, they report an average significantly positive short-period gain of 0.92 
percent accruing to bidder shareholders at the time of the merger announcement which pertains 
for both, cash and stock offers. However, for the three year period subsequent to the takeover 
they report significant losses to bidder shareholders of -17.45 percent. In Kohers and Kohers 
(2000) they exhibit positive cumulative abnormal bidder returns of 1.26 percent in a two day 
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event-window surrounding the announcement of high-tech firm takeovers which leads them to 
attribute the observed significantly positive bidder shareholder returns to investors’ optimistic 
forecasts on bidders’ announcements of takeovers of young and innovative firms.  
Finally, our results derived from dividing the full sample of bidders into the two groups of 
those bidding for entrepreneurial and those bidding for independent targets, respectively, allows 
us to test hypothesis 4. While we do not find any statistically significant abnormal returns for 
investors in the entrepreneurial target acquirers group across the lengthiest 21-days and the 6-
days event-window from days -5 to 0, these investors earn significantly negative -5.43 percent 
abnormal returns as compared to the market portfolio across the [-10, -5] event-window. This 
partly confirms hypothesis 4: across the earliest 6-days event-window and across the lengthiest 
event-window, investors in the entrepreneurial target acquirer’s portfolio earn significantly 
lower abnormal returns than investors in the independent target acquirer’s portfolio. The latter 
group of investors consistently earns significantly positive abnormal returns as compared to the 
market portfolio, namely 2.154 percent across the earlier and 3.324 percent across the later 6-
days event window (although not significantly different from those earned on the 
entrepreneurial target acquirers portfolio), and finally an abnormal return of 4.952 percent 
across the lengthiest event-window considering a symmetric 21-days period around takeover 
announcements.  
3.5 DISCUSSION 
3.5.1 Patent analysis and the merger process 
The positive perception of stock market participants pertains to both target and bidder 
shareholders and, with respect to the latter, is in line with previous event studies on high-tech 
firm takeovers (Kohers & Kohers, 2000, 2001). Shareholders of bidders targeting firms whose 
resources and capabilities can readily and without exploitation impediments be exploited by 
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incumbents earn significantly positive abnormal returns even surpassing those found in Kohers 
and Kohers (2000, 2001). 
However, our results also point to a potential explanation for previously inconsistent findings 
on negative abnormal returns earned by bidder shareholders. Although in our full sample we 
find overall slightly positive abnormal returns, shareholders of bidders targeting firms that 
depend on their initial owners’ specific knowledge and assets significantly lose wealth. As 
mentioned before, negative abnormal returns to bidder shareholders are often observed in the 
case of large and established companies where managers tend to invest in takeover protections. 
This should not be the case in high-tech and entrepreneurial firms where takeovers are often 
seen as a reward for past effort instead of a punishment of a weak management. Referring to 
property rights theory we argue that these findings could be explained by the incompleteness 
to control all relevant assets after the merger. This, however, raises the question which could 
not be answered by our study: If the management of the bidding company has the same 
information as the market participants, why should they then start a takeover announcement for 
companies where the CEO owns some substantial assets which could not totally be owned and 
exploited after the merger?  
The merger process is often divided into the phases, targeting, due-diligence, technological 
compatibility and valuation. While Breitzman and Thomas (2002) argue for large mergers that 
the insights from patent analysis and its use in M&A targeting and due-diligence is still the 
exception rather than the rule, this should be also hold for small entrepreneurial firms. In this 
process, identifying the strength and weaknesses and in particular identifying the key innovators 
and inventors is one of the most important but also time and cost consuming tasks. Targeting 
refers to the identification of a target firm that will fill a particular R&D or technology gap. Our 
overall results point out that bidders tend to select their targets by the number of patents owned 
by the firm. Due diligence however involves verifying that a target company`s infrastructure, 
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technology and inventors are as good as expected. This involves ensuring that all intellectual 
property rights are retained and that the key innovators for the target would remain with the 
company (see Breitzman & Thomas, 2002). Our results indicate that acquiring companies may 
at least fail in parts in this process. While indicating the CEO as a key innovator of a high-tech 
and entrepreneurial firms is rather easy, verifying and ensuring that his/her intellectual and firm 
specific assets could be absorbed after the merger remains an open question. Successfully 
acquiring high-tech and entrepreneurial firms as a part of a large firm’s corporate 
entrepreneurial strategy means that the target company’s technology complements the 
acquiring company’s technology. Firms may either be too optimistic, compared to the stock 
market participants, that the CEO and founder as a key innovator remains with the merged 
company and if then does not tend to underinvest in relationship specific investments. Acquirers 
may also be too optimistic that, in the case the CEO as a key innovator leaves the company after 
the merger, all firm specific knowledge is bounded in the patents of the firm and the employees 
which remain after the merger.  
Patent analysis should thus be an important and necessary aspect of M&A activities in all 
phases of the process, not only in targeting firms but more important in due-diligence, 
compatibility, and valuation. The identification of ownership rights and valuing the importance 
of key innovators not only shapes post-merger performance, it may also save costs in advance.  
The market not only seems to perceive and positively evaluate the value creation potential of 
takeovers of small innovative firms but also their initial owners’ decisive role in actually 
deriving value from the target’s resources and capabilities and their potential to divert part of 
generated values away from bidder shareholders. Thus, CEOs as key innovators in high-tech 
and entrepreneurial firms which are not reluctant being taken over should ensure that their 
specific knowledge and patents are transferred to their firm in advance and thus could be 
explored and absorbed by the acquirer after the merger.  
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3.5.2 Drawbacks and robustness checks 
As for all studies some drawbacks apply to our study. These need to be discussed subsequently 
along with our robustness checks. Most importantly, the data samples employed in our study 
are quite limited in size. However, due to the type of event we are interested in, namely 
acquisitions of newly public IPO-firms, our options in gathering a larger number of 
observations were naturally quite limited. While our sample sizes, however, are not uncommon 
for event studies, especially for those investigating relatively rare events, as for example the 
studies summarized in McWilliams and Siegel (1997) reveal, small observation numbers might 
negatively impact the reliability of event study test methods. Especially the power of tests 
employed in event studies12, this is, tests’ abilities to detect significantly abnormal performance 
if it is present, is highly sensitive to sample sizes while test specification is generally not a major 
concern in studies of short event-windows (Kothari & Warner, 2007). To check our results for 
robustness with respect to identified significantly non-zero cumulative average residuals, we 
conducted specific t-tests as proposed in MacKinlay (1997) for the large samples of bidders and 
targets in addition to the classic t-tests employed so far. Consistent with previous research we 
do not find any major qualitative differences as compared to our results derived from standard 
t-tests13. 
A closely related issue in determining significantly non-zero abnormal returns results from 
the joint-test problem since reliable results from tests of significantly non-zero abnormal returns 
do not only depend on well-specified and powerful tests but also on the correctness of the 
assumptions made concerning the process generating expected returns. Event study tests 
                                                 
12
 For a detailed discussion as well as comparative studies of several of these tests, thorough discussion of potential 
issues in test reliabilities and powers, and influences of sample sizes and volatilities of sampled securities, see e.g. 
(Patell, 1976), Armitage (1995), Brown & Warner (1985, 1980), Kothari & Warner (2007), MacKinlay (1997), 
and McWilliams & Siegel (1997). 
13
 Corresponding results are not reported in detail in this paper, but are available on request. 
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accordingly do not only test for non-zero abnormal performance but also for the correctness of 
the employed expected returns model. Event studies have been found to deliver qualitatively 
similar results largely independent of the estimation model employed in determining expected 
returns (see e.g. Brown & Warner (1985, 1980), and the market model employed in our study 
seems to be one of the prevailingly used models (Armitage, 1995). Nonetheless, as robustness 
check of our results we additionally derived expected returns for the large samples of bidders 
and acquirers from the market adjusted model14. As compared to our results reported in this 
study and consistent with past research we did not find any major qualitative differences in 
results, neither when testing with the classic nor when testing with the specific t-tests. 
Given the selection of our final set of observation our issues experienced in data collection 
could potentially bias our results. However, we do not have any reason to expect our selection 
of investigated takeover announcements to be a somewhat adverse selection of all 83 takeovers 
that were announced during our investigation period, this is, we do assume our samples to 
contain the least promising or least valuable takeover targets or acquirers of the overall 
population. As tables 2 and 3 above suggest, takeover announcements of targets in technology-
based industries and announcements from more recent takeover years might be slightly 
overrepresented in our final samples. However, especially with respect to our research interest 
we do not expect these potential issues to severely bias our results. As a more bank-based then 
market-based country, the results could be biased towards a less developed stock market.  
3.5.3 Suggestions for future research 
A common but nonetheless important potential drawback to our study is the limited data 
sample sizes we could employ in this study due to the relatively rare event of interest. Future 
                                                 
14
 The market-adjusted model assumes an individual firm’s stock on average to earn the return on the market 
portfolio for any given point in time. See for example Brown & Warner (1985, 1980) for details. Results are of 
course available on request. 
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research might want to consider our research question in the context of larger-scaled event 
studies which could improve overall quality and reliability of event study tests. Following the 
same line of thoughts, it would be also of interest to conduct our analyses by grouping the 
targets and bidders in our sample industry wise and then analyze if the results differ between 
those groups. All in all our samples, especially the sample of entrepreneurial firms, is fairly 
small for a split, which does not allow us to make a convincing point regarding group-specific 
effects. 
Furthermore, bidders and targets involved in takeover announcements arguably are much 
more heterogeneous than can be covered by discriminating among only a limited set of distinct 
groups as we did in differentiating takeovers of entrepreneurial from those of independent firms. 
The outcomes of takeovers of young and IPO-firms with significant dependence on intangible 
strategic assets also might be influenced by the degree of decision autonomy granted to acquired 
key inventors after an acquisition of their firm (Colombo et al., 2010) or by the respective IPO-
firm’s and its key inventor’s origins such as university affiliations (Bonardo et al., 2010b; 
Bonardo, Paleari, & Vismara, 2011), all of which can be expected to influence takeover 
announcement abnormal returns. Similarly, the strategic intend of an acquirer finally 
determines the relevant performance threshold as well as the degree to which target resources 
are to be combined with those of the bidder. Accordingly, one might expect issues in bidder-
internal exploitation of acquired resources to be more important for strategic than for financial 
(i.e. portfolio) investments. Future research might wish to consider these potential influences 
of firm characteristics on abnormal returns to individual firms in the context of cross-sectional 
tests. 
Another important issue for future research would be the role of venture capitalists within this 
takeover process. When investing in new ventures, the venture capitalists might force the key 
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inventors to transform the patents towards the firm as a legal entity. The same may also hold 
for the CEO as the key inventor. 
Finally, employing regression analyses to determine potential influences of several firm 
characteristics on abnormal returns to individual firms would then allow to also improve on our 
approximation of relevance and importance of intangible strategic resources allocated to IPO-
firms’ initial owners by not only considering patent ownership but also patent counts and ratios 
as well as a measure of (economic) value such as a respective patents cross-citations with 
patents directly owned by the respective firm. This suggestion taken a step further, inclusion of 
patent citation patterns and especially cross-citations among bidder, target, and target initial 
owner patents would allow for better assessing complementarities among and relatedness of 
these intangible resources as well as of whether the new list’s takeover is only one step in a 
longer process of integrating target and bidder resources (see e.g. Ahuja & Katila, 2001; 
Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996; Schildt, Maula, & Keil, 2005). 
3.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This event study of public takeover announcements focuses on acquisitions targeted at public 
IPO-firms from German Stock Markets. We focus on the specific trade-offs  that incumbent 
firms face in taking over young and innovative IPO-firms with respect to potential issues in 
successfully exploiting acquired resources and capabilities. In particular, this study accounts 
for the relevance of firm-specific human capital and innovative capabilities inalienably bound 
to a takeover target’s initial owners which might impede the post-acquisition exploitability of 
acquired resources and capabilities. By discriminating among founder-dependent and 
independent targets, the results show that stock market negatively perceives and prices 
impediments to successful exploitation of an acquired target firm’s resources and capabilities 
but positively evaluates the advantages associated with takeovers of innovative IPO-firms by 
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larger and established incumbents. Thus, takeover announcements that involve targets with at 
least a fraction of indispensable intangible strategic resources inalienably bound to initial 
owners as key innovators lead bidder shareholders to earn significantly lower and obviously 
negative abnormal returns.  
To the extent that bidder managers are concerned with and respond to developments of their 
firms’ stock prices, our results might advise bidder managers to postpone a potential takeover 
target’s acquisition and to choose different organizational arrangements in accessing its 
intangible strategic resources if an important fraction of these is inalienably bound to the 
target’s initial owners. Additionally, potential issues in exploiting a target’s resources and 
capabilities might demand for being proactively addressed and communicated. Major 
shareholders of entrepreneurial firms such as founder managers and venture capitalists that plan 
to divest their stakes in the ventures in turn can be advised to credibly make their ventures 
independent of founder-specific intangible assets as early as possible in the firm life cycle.  
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Literature on M&As has long been engaged with the investigation of variables influencing the 
performance of the involved companies, thereby reporting mixed findings especially for 
acquirers (see Haleblian et al. (2009) for a seminal meta-analytical overview of antecedents, 
moderators and outcomes of acquisitions). Results on acquirers’ post-acquisition performance 
are by now contradicting (Agrawal et al., 1992), with acquirer performance found to be positive 
(Healy et al., 1992), negative (Eckbo & Thorburn, 2000) or insignificant (King et al., 2004). 
Thereby various theoretical lenses have been applied to the M&A context such as social network 
and social capital theory (Briscoe & Tsai, 2011; Ishii & Xuan, 2014), organizational learning theory 
(Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Bruton, Oviatt, & White, 1994) or institutional economics (i.e. 
principal agent theory). Within the latter field, corporate governance research understands 
takeovers as vehicles for the market for corporate control, disciplining ineffective target 
managers (Morck et al., 1989).  Besides other questions, this stream of research is concerned 
with the influence of shareholder activism on firm performance (Goranova & Ryan, 2014) by 
analyzing the influence of varying types of investor proposals on different performance outcomes 
like share prices (Klein & Zur, 2009). Findings of those studies using share prices as performance 
outcome are inconsistent, showing positive (Greenwood & Schor, 2009), negative (Cai & Walkling, 
2011) and constant (Agrawal, 2012) share price reactions. These mixed results recently lead 
research to state that the evidence of the effects of single governance mechanisms is discouraging 
(Misangyi & Acharya, 2014) and to call for studies which address “…the heterogeneity of 
shareholder activism and the potential interrelations among different types of activism” (Goranova 
and Ryan, 2014, p.27). Literature has hereby just begun to analyze combinations between 
various governance mechanisms on firm performance (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & 
Jackson, 2008). 
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With this study we add to this research gap and integrate corporate governance research into 
M&A research. We argue that specifically combined governance mechanisms, reflected within 
shareholder proposals, are causal for mixed acquirer findings. We reason that if shareholders 
submit shareholder proposals to change acquirers’ corporate governance, the stock market will, 
anticipate advantageous or less advantageous changes in corporate governance at acquiring 
companies at the announcement of a takeover and will, subsequently, react either positively or 
negatively – according to its evaluation of this proposal. More precisely, we expect the stock 
market to prognosticate whether the changes in acquirers’ corporate governance are beneficial 
for those firms to successfully manage the newly formed company after the takeover or not, 
and to react respectively. 
Integrating Goranova and Ryan (2014) insights that shareholderactivism is highly heterogenous 
and that those types of activism potentially interrelate, we reason that single shareholder proposals 
will only have minor or no effects on the share price reaction of acquirers at takeover 
announcement. Instead, we expect the combination of specific investor proposals, this is 
(bundles of proposals) to play a key role in the reaction of the market to announcements of 
takeovers. We hence venture the following research question: How are acquirers’ individual 
governance mechanisms and the combination of these governance mechanisms perceived by 
the financial market at the announcement of the takeover? We test our hypotheses by analyzing 
the share price reactions of 722 shareholder proposals submitted to 170 acquirers. Our results 
demonstrate that specific proposal types have significant positive and negative effects on 
acquirers’ share prices around the takeover announcement. Especially the combination of 
proposals as complements – the governance bundles – give rise to acquirers’ share prices 
effects.  
We contribute to M&A literature calling for greater research on how corporate governance 
issues influence acquisitions (Haleblian et al., 2009).We partially explain the mixed acquirer 
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findings reported in the literature (King et al., 2004; Moeller et al., 2004) by showing that 
governance proposals and their combinations indeed effect corporate performance in 
acquisitions.  
We further advance corporate governance literature in general and shareholder activism 
literature in particular by answering the call by Goranova and Ryan (2014) on how different 
types of shareholder activism affect firm performance differently. Our results clearly 
demonstrate that governance bundles have a greater influence on firm performance – especially 
in acquirers’ share price reactions in takeovers – than individual actions. These results 
contribute to enlighten the mixed evidence which exists on the effects of each single governance 
mechanism on performance (Dalton et al., 2007; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014). In addition, we 
reveal that specific governance mechanisms do not substitute (Dalton, Daily, Certo, & 
Roengpitya, 2003) but rather complement each other, displaying different effects when issued 
individually or in combination, thereby strengthening the effect on firm performance.  
Furthermore we add to corporate governance literature by showing that shareholder proposals 
as specific forms of governance mechanisms are perceived by the market. By anticipating the 
future capabilities of acquirers to manage the acquired company, the market either values or 
punishes the governance structures at acquirers. By being able to show that shareholder 
proposals and therewith the inherent governance mechanisms themselves influence the share 
price reaction of acquirers, our research supports studies which reveal an awareness and an 
anticipated implementation of those proposals (Ferri & Sandino, 2009). This can be assumed 
as shareholder proposals are shown to be accepted by the board of directors with increased 
regularity (Ertimur, Ferri, & Stubben, 2010) influencing various organizational outcomes (Guo, 
Kruse, & Nohel, 2008). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section II presents our theoretical 
argumentation of the markets anticipation of the governance mechanisms at acquiring 
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companies on their abnormal returns at takeover announcements and presents the development 
of our hypotheses. Section III describes our data set and our method. Section IV reveals the 
results of our regression analysis. Finally, section V presents our discussion and conclusion. 
4.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
4.2.1 Acquisitions and the market for corporate control 
Literature on M&As is concerned with the analysis of a richness of variables influencing the post-
acquisition performance for acquirers in takeovers. Results regarding acquirers’ post-acquisition 
performance are still contradicting (Agrawal et al., 1992), showing  acquirers to win ( Healy et al., 
1992), to lose (Eckbo & Thorburn, 2000), or to break even (King et al., 2004; Lang et al., 1989).  
Previous literature has attributed mixed acquirer findings for instance to the payment of too a high 
premium by the acquirer for the target, management hubris, an incapability to accomplish synergies 
or the selection of targets with a strategic or organizational misfit (Hitt et al., 2012), the post-
acquisition integration process (Angwin & Meadows, 2014) or various strategies and decisions the 
acquirer enforces during this process (Hitt et al., 2012; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007). 
 The selected antecedents for acquisition success or failure are thereby the result of various 
theoretical lenses which have been applied to the acquisition context like social network and social 
capital theory (Ishii & Xuan, 2014; Rogan & Sorenson, 2014), the resource based view 
(Uhlenbruck, Hitt, & Semadeni, 2006), or behavioral theory (Barkema & Schijven, 2008b). A 
further theory which is oftentimes applied to the acquisition context is corporate governance theory, 
whose theoretical foundation can be found within the agency perspective (Dalton et al., 2003). In 
general corporate governance research is concerned with the separation of ownership and 
management in companies (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), whereby the underlying agency perspective 
follows the assumption that problems occur, if managers (agents) deviate from the interests of 
shareholders (principals) (Dalton et al., 2007). In order to assure that these problems are cushioned, 
literature deals with mechanisms to control actions of managers (Connelly, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & 
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Certo, 2010). These mechanisms can be divided into internal and external ones, whereby the former 
contain actions by the board of directors (Certo, Covin, Daily, & Dalton, 2001) or executive 
ownership (Dalton et al., 2003). The external dimension of corporate governance incorporates the 
market for corporate control (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996), namely the acquisitions 
and its disciplining facets on the management of the respective targets (Morck et al., 1989; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997). The aim of the market for corporate control is to avoid misconduct of the 
management like shirking and spoils of office as well as the pursue of vested interests of managers 
(Morck et al., 1988). The replacement of the target company’s underperforming management 
through the acquisition has been shown to lead to a better performance, as the acquirer is better able 
to manage the assets of the respective target firm (Jensen, 1988). 
In the sense of the market for corporate control, we will argue that there would not be a takeover 
attempt, if other external corporate governance mechanisms of the target were beneficial for its 
shareholders. We thus consider the takeover to be some kind of last resort for the target’s 
shareholders as their corporate governance endeavors seem to have been unfruitful (Jensen, 1993). 
Thus our argument from an agency theory perspective is that acquirers initiate takeovers to control 
a badly performing management of the target. 
4.2.2 The influence of shareholder proposals on firm performance 
Another stream of literature which is located in the field of corporate governance focuses on 
shareholder activism which can be understood as: “…actions taken by shareholders with the 
explicit intention of influencing corporations’ policies and practices” (Goranova and Ryan, 
2014, p.3). Driven by activist investors (Haleblian et al., 2009), this practice has dramatically 
increased in the past years (Greenwood & Schor, 2009; Renneboog & Szilagyi, 2011). Shareholder 
activism research has been undergone a divarication into financial activism, based on agency theory 
(Gillan & Starks, 2007) and social activism focusing on stakeholders (David, Bloom, & Hillman, 
2007; Guay, Doh, & Sinclair, 2004).  
Chapter 4:  Governance Bundles – Their Impact on Acquirer Returns in Acquisitions 
 
 
91 
 
Studies on shareholder activism have thereby embraced a diverse set of topics ranging from 
antecedents (Karpoff, Malatesta, & Walkling, 1996; Zajac & Westphal, 1995), to processes 
(Gantchev, 2013), to outcomes (Klein & Zur, 2009; Ryan & Schneider, 2002). Shareholder activism 
can encompass actions like taking influence on firm behavior through meetings and negotiations 
between shareholders and the management (David et al., 2007), launching hostile media campaigns 
(Connelly et al., 2010) or direct interventions by shareholder proposals through proxy statements. 
These proposals allow shareholders to initiate specific actions, thereby reflecting their concerns 
about corporate governance (Gillan & Starks, 2000). 
The influence of varying investor proposals in the financial activism context has been investigated 
on performance outcomes like share prices (Klein & Zur, 2009) and generates inconsistent results, 
showing positive (Greenwood & Schor, 2009), negative (Cai & Walkling, 2011) and constant 
(Agrawal, 2012) share price reactions. These mixed findings lead scholars to state that the evidence 
of the effects of single governance mechanisms is discouraging (Misangyi & Acharya, 2014) and 
to call for studies which address “…the heterogeneity of shareholder activism and the potential 
interrelations among different types of activism” (Goranova and Ryan, 2014, p.27). M&A research 
is thereby far away from understanding the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on 
acquisition decisions and outcomes (Haleblian et al., 2009), and strategy and financial researchers 
have a lot to learn about how different corporate governance mechanisms and their combinations 
influence company performance in general (Goranova & Ryan, 2014).  
Grounded in agency theory we try to answer these calls by bringing together acquisitions as the 
main vehicle of the market for corporate control on the one hand and the controlling mechanism of 
shareholder proposals as form of investor activism at acquiring companies on the other. More 
precisely, we analyze acquirers’ share price reactions at the takeover announcement in consequence 
of submitted shareholder proposal bundles at acquirers. We can show that these bundle-effects 
differ from those of the individual governance mechanisms and argue that the mixed results, 
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concerning the effectiveness of governance mechanisms mentioned in the literature, are the result 
of the disregard of those governance mechanisms occurring in bundles. 
Studying the share price reaction of acquirers in the context of acquisitions is fruitful, as the stock 
market at this point will direct its specific attention to the governance structures of acquirers. The 
market will perceive the acquisition as a mean to discipline target managers (Jarrell, Brickley, & 
Netter, 1988) and will predict if those acquirers will be able to more efficiently manage the target 
after the takeover (Jensen, 1988) whereby the performance of the new company would increase. 
An upcoming takeover should also be a good situation in which shareholder proposals gain 
acceptance. This should be the case, as the board of directors, as representative of the shareholder 
base, should be interested in appointing an acquirer management, which is capable to better manage 
the target after the acquisition. This argumentation is in line with literature which assumes that 
shareholder proposals will experience support by other shareholders, as they are accepted by the 
board of directors with increased regularity (Ertimur et al., 2010; Thomas & Cotter, 2007). 
Shareholder proposals will thereby indeed impact various outcomes like for example the 
disassemblement of staggered boards (Guo et al., 2008) or the expansion of stock options (Ferri & 
Sandino, 2009). 
4.2.3 Hypotheses 
Say on pay proposals 
Say on pay proposals as one type of shareholder proposal enable shareholders on an annual basis 
to influence the compensation of executives such as bonuses, salary revisions, stock options or 
retirement benefits (Cai & Walkling, 2011; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Argued from a governance 
theory perspective, say on pay proposals in general are used to mitigate the principal – agent 
problem between managers and shareholders (Karpoff et al., 1996), as their justification lies at best 
in an obligation of the board to negotiate better aligned executive contracts, but at least in a better 
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communication between the shareholders and the management (Brunarski, Campbell, & Harman, 
2015). 
Literature dealing with the effects of say on pay proposals on the value of companies is rather 
scarce and is divided regarding the question whether or not those compensation related proposals 
create value for companies (Ferri & Maber, 2013).  The respective studies find either no significant 
(Gillan & Starks, 2000; Thomas & Cotter 2007), negative (Brunarski et al., 2015; Larcker, 
Ormazabal & Taylor 2011; Cai & Walkling 2011), or positive market reactions (Cai & Walkling 
2011; Ferri & Maber 2013)  of compensation related proposals on shareholder wealth. 
Literature dealing with positive market reactions as a result of changes in executive compensation 
for instance, shows that say on pay proposals lead to a positive market reaction of companies, when 
the CEOs of these companies are inefficiently paid, as agency costs are reduced and the interests of 
shareholders and managers are better aligned (Cai & Walkling, 2011). Ferri and Maber (2013) 
confirm this positive impact of say on pay proposals on the share price reaction of companies, if the 
CEO is overpaid and the company under investigation exhibits poor performance. According to the 
authors those results can be attributed to an improvement in monitoring mechanisms which align 
the interests of the shareholders and the management and lead to an increase in value. Cai and 
Walkling (2011) argue that say on pay proposals will better adjust the interests of shareholders 
and the management of a company those proposals are submitted to, thereby reducing agency 
costs and improving corporate governance. This line of thought should by transferrable to the 
context of M&A. If shareholders try to influence executive compensation before an upcoming 
acquisition via shareholder proposals, our argumentation from an agency theory perspective is, 
that their intention should be to better align managements’ interests with their own, especially 
with respect to the management of the target company after the acquisition. This line of thought 
holds as literature shows that conflicts between managers and shareholders strengthen in M&A 
situations (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The reason is that managers do not always undertake 
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value maximizing acquisitions and oftentimes try to maximize their own benefit at 
shareholder’s expense (Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2007). The capital market, which reacts to the 
alignment of shareholder and manager interests also in the Non-M&A case (Ferri & Maber, 
2013), evaluates the information inherent in an intended takeover announcement (MacKinlay, 
1997; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997) and is expected to perceive this assimilation of interests and 
thereby the improvement in corporate governance at acquirers’ positively. The market is, in 
turn, expected to anticipate this enhanced and more homogenous corporate governance 
structure to help the acquirer in better managing the new company after the takeover. As 
conflicts of interest between both parties rise in a takeover situation (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
acquirers’ share price reaction should be even stronger and better observable in an upcoming 
acquisition attempt, when governance mechanisms are better aligned. We therefore propose: 
Hypothesis 1: The issuance of say on pay shareholder proposals at the acquirer leads to a 
positive acquirer’s share price reaction. 
Independent auditors 
Independent auditors are defined as firms which deliver an unbiased estimation of companies’ 
financial statements, based on standard accounting principles (Goldman & Barlev, 1974; 
Levinthal & Fichman, 1988), whereby their fair value assessment of those companies’ assets is 
their main duty (Griffin, 2014). The independence of auditors requires a certain distance 
between auditor and audited company (Dogui, Boiral, & Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2014) and is of 
high importance within the process of auditing, as shareholders’ demands for reliable and 
trustful information is high (Antonio & Bassetti, 2014). Research on auditor independence has 
shown that auditors face potential conflicting interests. On one hand they are legally encouraged 
to deliver objective fair value assessments of companies (Griffin, 2014). On the other hand they 
are hired by the management of the company they audit (Levinthal & Fichman, 1988) and are 
thus economically dependent, receiving their auditing fees from those companies (Dogui et al., 
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2014). Thereby the jeopardy exists, that the management tries to influence the auditor’s report 
to present the company in a proper light towards third parties like investors and to impress 
shareholders, as these parties evaluate managements’ performance based on the auditor’s report 
(Goldman & Barlev, 1974). To mitigate these governance failures, shareholders issue proposals 
to replace the auditor in case they believe that the management performance is misrepresented. 
Transferring this agency theoretical reasoning to the M&A setting, the financial market’s 
reaction to the announcement of a takeover in which the acquirers’ shareholders issue proposals 
concerning the appointment of new independent auditors should be positive. This argument 
should hold, as acquirers’ shareholders usually know about an upcoming acquisition attempt, 
which should cause them to make an independent auditor proposal. Those independent auditors 
in turn, will help the acquiring firms’ managers to develop their skills to analyze target firms 
and investments during target selection. This argument seems reasonable as external advisors 
can reduce demands on managers (Bowers & Miller, 1990), thereby lowering information 
asymmetries between shareholders and acquirers’ managers to facilitate acquisitions (Servaes 
& Zenner, 1996), which eases the assessment of companies’ performance (Antonio & Bassetti, 
2014). 
By deploying a new independent auditor, whose assessment reflects the management 
performance, is expected to signal to the market, that acquirers’ shareholders will do everything 
in their power to assess the quality of the organization’s management (Levinthal & Fichman, 
1988). Given that takeovers are understood as main vehicles for the market of corporate control, 
the performance of acquirers’ management is the determining factor to make the shareholders 
believe that the acquirer will manage the new company more successfully after the acquisition. 
Thereby the efforts to effectively assess acquirers’ management seem to be especially important 
as literature on auditors in takeovers shows that managers tend to manipulate their earnings 
before the acquisition (Gong, Louis, & Sun, 2008). Further arguments which underline this 
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reasoning are that the switching of an auditor often occurs when companies need a change, 
which is the case with an acquisition (Levinthal & Fichman, 1988). We hence hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: The issuance of shareholder proposals on the appointment of new auditors at 
the acquirer leads to a positive acquirer’s share price reaction. 
Employee stock options 
Employee stock options (ESO) as payment components of employees and managers’ salaries 
have gained increasing popularity within companies (Core & Guay, 2001), whereby those stock 
options account for the main part of CEO compensation (Yermack, 1995). Besides research 
which investigates antecedents of ESO like market based incentives (Kato, Lemmon, Luo, & 
Schallheim, 2005), limited external financing opportunities ((Babenko, Lemmon, & 
Tserlukevich, 2011), or difficulties in controlling the management (Yermack, 1995), research 
on ESO concentrates on its implications. This research reveals that such ESO vehicle of 
payment leads to a better long-term orientation of the management (Ferri & Sandino, 2009). 
Moreover, research shows that employee stock options are used to better align the interests of 
shareholders and employees in companies as well as to attract, reward and retain employees 
(Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; Guay, Kothari, & Sloan, 2003; Kato et al., 2005). 
A further area in the field of ESO effects brings to light that ESO are used extensively (Bodie, 
Kaplan, & Merton, 2003), lead to management manipulation of earnings (Bergstresser & 
Philippon, 2006), and elicit opportunistic choices of grant dates (Yermack, 1997). This 
development has prompted regulating authorities to introduce regulations that compel 
companies to incorporate stock options as expenses with their fair value into their income 
statements at the date of option granting (Ravenscroft & Williams, 2009). 
We argue from an agency standpoint that the stock market reaction to the submission of ESO 
for the acquirer’s management should be negative during M&A. The common argument is, that 
shareholders submit those proposals at acquirers in the belief of an associated increase in the 
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long-term orientation of the management (Ferri & Sandino, 2009) and an associated improved 
alignment of the interests of shareholders and executives (Guay et al., 2003). We, however, 
expect the stock market to anticipate in the case of an upcoming acquisition that managers are 
above-average driven by the temptation to manipulate earnings (Gong et al., 2008) and to 
curtain their inferior performance in order to raise share price performance. Thus, if those 
proposals are submitted at acquirers upfront an M&A announcement, the market will anticipate 
managements’ camouflage tactic in covering their real performance, and will assume that the 
management of such companies will be less able to successfully manage the new entity after 
the acquisition: 
Hypothesis 3: The issuance of shareholder proposals to establish employee stock options at 
the acquirer leads to a negative acquirer’s share price reaction. 
Interaction between independent auditor and ESO proposals 
We have argued for several singular relations between governance mechanisms expressed via 
shareholder proposals and acquirers’ share price reaction. In this section we contend that the 
combination and interaction of different governance mechanisms (referred to as governance 
bundles), expressed via shareholder proposals, delivers a partial solution to the mixed findings 
of effects of governance proposals reported in the literature so far (Dalton et al., 2003, 2007). 
We argued, that the issuance of ESO proposals at acquirers may result in negative acquirer 
share price reactions, as the market will anticipate the potential of the managers to disguise their 
inadequate performance by rigging the financial numbers of the acquirers upfront the upcoming 
acquisition (Gong et al., 2008). Our reasoning concerning the market reaction to call for new 
independent auditors via shareholder proposals however was, that it should be positive, as the 
acquirer will do everything in its power to assess the quality of its management in successfully 
managing the new company after the acquisition (Levinthal & Fichman, 1988).  
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Turning to the perception on the interaction between the information about the issuance of 
employee stock option and the appointment of a new independent auditor, we argue that the 
influence of this governance bundle on acquirers’ share price reaction will be positive. If the 
financial market considers the potential of managers to manipulate financial numbers as high, 
as acquirers’ shareholders vote in favor of an enhanced proportion of stock options in the 
management compensation (Gong et al., 2008), the nomination of a new independent auditor 
upfront the upcoming acquisition should be perceived positive. The new auditor will lower 
information asymmetries between shareholders and acquirers’ managers, thereby delivering 
more transparency in assessing the financial performance of the acquirers’ management 
(Antonio & Bassetti, 2014). The financial market is thus expected to cherish this governance 
bundle more positively than in a single governance proposal, as it is even more an indication of 
how the management will be able to manage the new company after the acquisition: 
Hypothesis 4: The issuance of shareholder proposals to establish employee stock options in 
combination with shareholder proposals to appoint a new independent auditor at the 
acquirer leads to a positive acquirer’s share price reaction. 
Interactions between say on pay and independent auditor proposals 
We argued that the stock market will react positively to the announcement of takeovers by 
companies in which shareholders submit say on pay proposal upfront acquisition 
announcement. The market will do so as those proposals will better adjust the interests of the 
shareholders and the management at the firm they are submitted to. Thereby agency costs will 
be reduced and corporate governance improved, leading to a better performance of the company 
(Cai & Walkling, 2011; Ertimur, Ferri, & Muslu, 2011; Ferri & Maber, 2013) as well as a more 
successful management of the new company after the takeover (Wang & Xie, 2009).   
The market reaction to the announcement of takeovers by companies which have received the 
advice by their shareholders to appoint new independent auditors, should also be positive due 
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to the before mentioned better management performance evaluation a superior transparency 
between shareholders and management (Antonio & Bassetti, 2014). 
If shareholders submit proposals on say on pay and on the appointment of a new independent 
auditor as a governance bundle, we expect the market to react negatively. We argue that when 
shareholders of acquirers solely request the board to appoint a new independent auditor, the 
market will value the efforts of acquirers’ shareholders in suggesting a new independent auditor 
with higher transparency and a better assessment of the true performance of the acquirers’ 
management, resulting in a positive market reaction. However, when acquirers’ shareholders 
want to change both, the compensation of the management (say on pay proposals) and the 
performance evaluation of the management (independent auditors), we argue that this 
governance bundle is inefficient, as shareholders signal an extreme dissatisfaction with the 
payment of the management and are highly insecure about the performance situation of the 
company. Especially in the context of an acquisition, shareholders need clarity about the real 
performance of the management to estimate if managements’ performance is good enough to 
manage the new company after the acquisition (Antonio & Bassetti, 2014). By understanding 
takeovers as vehicles for corporate control, this dissatisfaction about executives’ compensation 
in combination with the uncertainty about the true management performance should the market 
let react negatively, as the financial market should perceive the acquirer to be less capable to 
successfully manage the new company after the acquisition. Hereby the stock market within 
the acquisition context should react even more positive than in other market reaction settings, 
as the market will even more emphasize to ascertain managements’ ability to manage the new 
company after the acquisition: 
Hypothesis 5: The issuance of say on pay shareholder proposals in combination with 
shareholder proposals to appoint a new independent auditor at the acquirer leads to a 
negative acquirer’s share price reaction. 
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4.3 METHODOLOGY 
4.3.1 Data Set 
As our intention is to analyze the stock market reaction of acquiring companies as a function 
of their governance mechanisms at the time the takeover is announced, we started our data 
collection by tapping the M&A database Zephyr, provided by Bureau van Dijk. It is one of the 
most comprehensive M&A databases with more than 1.2 million takeovers and takeover 
rumors. We concentrated our endeavors on takeovers of U.S. acquirers and targets listed at 
NYSE and NASDAQ to analyze share price reactions and shareholder proposals of acquirers, 
who undertook acquisitions between 2005 and 2015. This left us with more than 5000 
acquisitions. After adjusting our original sample by acquirers, which were not listed at the 
above-mentioned stock exchanges and by acquirers without our main interesting shareholder 
proposals described in the measurement section (we started with 925 proposals), we were left 
with a final sample of 170 acquisitions with more than 366 shareholder proposals submitted. 
Share prices of the acquiring companies as well as the two mentioned benchmark indices for 
the calculation of the abnormal returns in our event study were compiled from different 
independent suppliers of financial data like ARIVA.de AG (www.ariva.de), OnVista Media 
GmbH (onvista.de), and the German stock exchange (deutsche-boerse.com). Shareholder 
proposals of the acquiring companies, called DEF 14A reports were obtained from the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (www.sec.gov).  
4.3.2 Measures 
Dependent Variables 
As dependent variable we used the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of each acquirer. To 
receive CARs we calculated the abnormal returns of the acquirers by using standard event study 
methodology. The abnormal returns (ARs) were cumulated over two event windows to receive 
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two CARs for each acquirer. The calculations for the ARs as well as those for the CARs will 
be described in detail within the method section.  
Independent Variables 
Our main independent variables encompass the shareholder proposals derived within our 
theory section. These proposals gathered from www.sec.gov are “say on pay”, “independent 
auditor”, and “employee stock options (ESO)”. We chose those independent variables as 
literature shows that they are the most influential ones in influencing performance outcomes of 
companies (Cai & Walkling, 2011).To receive our independent variables, we analyzed DEF 
14A reports of all of our acquirers in the initial sample. Those companies, which had none of 
the above-mentioned proposals in their DEF 14A reports, were excluded. Concerning say on 
pay proposals, we counted the number of those proposals, submitted at each acquirer. The same 
holds for the number of employee stock option plans at the acquiring firms, where we counted 
the number of employee stock option proposals submitted by the shareholders. Each firm in the 
data sample, whose shareholders submitted proposals calling for a new independent auditor, 
received a 1 and 0 otherwise.  
Control Variables 
As control variables we included size and sector. Size might play a role, as bigger acquirers 
will be generally evaluated worse by the financial market, as those companies make bigger 
acquisitions and thereby receive higher losses, whereas smaller acquirers will be evaluated 
better by the market (Moeller et al., 2004). The size variable was included as a metric variable, 
comprising the total assets per acquirer in our sample.   
We also controlled for the sectors the acquiring companies are based in as higher acquirer 
returns in our sample could also be due to a sector or industry effect. Literature shows that 
accumulations of acquisitions in certain industries, which are the result of industry shocks, can 
lead to higher acquirer returns in those industries (Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001;). Every 
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sector was included as a single variable where a company was assigned a 1 if it belonged to a 
specific sector and 0 otherwise. Table 5 displays all sectors derived from bloomberg.com, which 
we included in our analysis as well as the distribution of the companies within the sectors and 
their mean. 
Table 5: Sectors and distribution of the companies within the sample 
Company sectors 
Distribution of companies 
within the sectors 
Distribution of companies 
within the sectors (%) 
Financials 27 15.88 
Consumer Discretionary 25 14.70 
Consumer Staples 8 4.70 
Materials 13 7.64 
Health Care 22 12.94 
Communications 9 5.29 
Technology 43 25.29 
Industrials 19 11.17 
Energy 3 1.76 
Aerospace & Defense 1 0.58 
N 170  
Percentage  100% 
4.3.3 Method 
To calculate abnormal acquirer returns as function of the governance proposals submitted at 
acquirers’, we applied standard event study methodology and used the market model 
)(
,,, titmiiti RR εβα +⋅+=  (Brown & Warner, 1985; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). Event studies 
analyze influences of economic events like an acquisition on the returns of the companies 
involved in the event. The underlying assumption is, that the emerging information about the 
event – if the capital market is efficient in that it incorporates the emerging information in a 
Chapter 4:  Governance Bundles – Their Impact on Acquirer Returns in Acquisitions 
 
 
103 
 
timely manner – will be immediately reflected within the share prices of the concerned firms 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). To trace back the share price reaction to the information of the 
submission of acquirers’ shareholders proposals at takeover announcement, we chose only 
takeovers in which there was no annual- or quarterly report between those two dates. 
We chose the market model15 as other models, which could also be applied to calculate the 
abnormal returns, assume α
 
as 0 and β  as 1, which turns out to be relatively imprecise. In a 
next step, we fixed the announcement day 0 of all takeovers in our sample. Afterwards we 
specified two event windows, one from day [- 5;+5] one from [ ]10;10 +−  in which we want to 
observe the abnormal stock market returns of each acquirer in the sample (event period). We 
chose event windows which are bigger than [- 1;+1] days around the announcement of the 
acquisition following studies like by Asquith et al. (1983) to assure that the information about 
the governance proposals reaches the market but not too long to run the risk of confounding 
events. Following, we determined calculation windows for the computation of the market 
parameters iα  and iβ  in the market model (estimation period). Therefore we took every 
company in the sample and went 250 trading days backwards in advance of the respective 
takeover announcement, as it is common in the literature on event studies (Brown & Warner, 
1985; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). The choice of 250 trading days in advance of the event to 
calculate the parameters of the market model guarantees, that there will be no bias in the 
parameter calculation (Keown & Pinkerton, 1981). The result where two estimation periods 
from [ ]6;250−−
 
and [ ]10;250−−  and respectively two iα  and iβ  resulted, one for the smaller 
estimation period and one for the bigger one. By only including the upstream period of 
measurement and not integrating the two event window periods into the estimation of the 
                                                 
15
 We also calculated the abnormal returns for the acquirers with the “constant mean return model” and the 
“market adjusted model” to check if differences arise. Reinforcing results from the literature on event studies 
(Brown & Warner, 1980), the results did not differ from those calculated by the market model. 
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parameters, we prevent a distortion of those parameters, as otherwise both the normal and the 
abnormal returns would portray the impact of the event, resulting in biased outcomes 
(MacKinlay, 1997). For the calculation of abnormal stock market returns of the acquiring 
company we chose benchmark indices to compare the daily stock prices of the respective 
acquiring companies with (Dennis & McConnell, 1986). Therefore, we selected only 
companies that are either listed at the NYSE or the NASDAQ. Share prices of the acquiring 
companies as well as share prices of the benchmark indices NYSE and NASDAQ in our sample 
were compiled from different independent suppliers of financial data like ARIVA.de AG 
(www.ariva.de), OnVista Media GmbH (onvista.de), and the German stock exchange 
(deutsche-boerse.com). Every share price i on day t )(
,tiR  for each acquirer was then regressed 
against every respective daily value of the benchmark index m on day t )(
,tmR for both 
estimation periods mentioned before.  
Our regressions resulted in 11 abnormal returns (ARs) for the smaller event window and 21 
abnormal returns for the bigger event window for each acquiring company in our sample. Those 
abnormal returns were than cumulated for each of the two event windows, resulting in two 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for each acquirer in the sample, one for the smaller and 
one for the bigger event window. In a final step CARs were subsequently deployed as dependent 
variables in the following main OLS-regressions. We run two regression analyses for each 
acquiring company with respectively one CAR as dependent variable. As independent 
variables, we used each time two types of shareholder proposals and their respective interaction. 
Furthermore we deployed all of our control variables in each regression. We checked if and 
affirmed that all requirements for using OLS-regressions were fulfilled. We also run 
bootstrapping regressions for control reasons, which revealed no differences in our results. 
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4.4 RESULTS 
Table 6 gives an overview of our independent and control variables in our study as well as the 
Pearson correlations between those variables. No significant correlations between our variables 
can be detected, except two correlations which are close to 0.5. Those exist between 
independent auditor and the interaction between independent auditor and say on pay proposals 
as well as between ESO and the interaction between ESO and independent auditors. After 
checking for variance inflation factors (VIF) we can space out multicollinearity, as our highest 
VIF is 1.65 (VIF maximum: 10). Values near 1 (which almost all our VIFs exhibit) are 
indicative of non-existent correlations. Table 7 shows the results of our regression analysis with 
both dependent variables CAR 1 and CAR 2. No variable in our CAR 2 regression becomes 
significant, which is most likely the result of the size of the event window around the 
announcement day of the acquisition. This assumption is underpinned by comparing the CAR 
1 model with the CAR 2 model, whereby the financial market seems to become aware of the 
acquisition only within our shorter event window. 
First, we turn to the effects of individual governance mechanisms. Our first hypothesis which 
stated a positive acquirer share price reaction at the announcement of takeovers by companies, 
in which the shareholder submitted say on pay proposals, cannot be confirmed by our data, at 
no statistical significance level. Thus the market does not seem to worship an alignment of 
interests between shareholders and the management upfront an acquisition. Our results for the 
acquisition context are in line with studies who report no influence of say on pay proposals on 
the performance of companies (Gillan & Starks, 2000; Thomas & Cotter, 2007). 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients 
 
N = 170; ***p<0.01; **p<0.0; variable values are rounded to two decimals
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Say on 
pay 
Independent 
auditor 
ESO 
ESO x 
independent 
auditors 
ESO x 
Say on pay 
Say on pay x 
Independent auditor 
Size 
Say on pay 0.06 1.01 1       
Independent 
auditor 
0.06 0.24 -0.17 1      
ESO 0.00 0.46 0.04 0.06 1     
ESO x 
Independent 
auditors 
0 0 0.05 -0.23 0.48 1    
ESO x 
Say on pay 
0 0 0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.10 1   
Say on pay x 
Independent 
auditor 
0 0 0.03 0.48 0.03 -0.05 0.11 1  
Size 9.56e+08 6.14e+09 0.11 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.05 0.11 1 
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Table 7: Regression analysis with acquirers’ CAR 1 and CAR 2 as dependent variables 
 CAR 1 CAR 2 
Say on pay 
0.00 
(0.88) 
-0.02 
(0.12) 
Independent auditor 
0.09*** 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.57) 
ESO 
-0.03** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.75) 
ESO x Independent auditors 
0.24*** 
(0.00) 
0.21 
(0.14) 
ESO x Say on pay 
0.01 
(0.59) 
-0.01 
(0.63) 
Say on pay x Independent auditor 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.97) 
Size 
3.48e-13 
(0.69) 
3.98e-13 
(0.81) 
Constant 
-0.03** 
(0.02) 
-0.03** 
(0.12) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
R2 
0.24*** 
(0.00) 
0.15 
(0.07) 
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.06 
N = 170; ***p<0.01; **p<0.05, based on two-tailed tests, robust standard errors; significance levels in parentheses; 
variable values are rounded to two decimals 
 
The second hypothesis which expected a positive acquirer share price reaction to takeover 
announcements of acquisitions, in which shareholders proposed the appointment of new 
independent auditors, is highly significant at p<0.01 percent. This result is in line with the 
argumentation that acquirers’ shareholders seem to know about the upcoming acquisition, 
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which, in turn, should cause them to make a proposal to appoint new independent auditors, who 
might help acquiring firms’ managers to develop skills to analyze target firms and investments 
during target selection, thereby lowering information asymmetries between shareholders and 
acquirers’ managers to facilitate acquisitions (Servaes & Zenner, 1996).This signals to the 
market that the acquirer will do everything in its power to assess the quality of its management 
(Levinthal & Fichman, 1988), to assure that the new company is successfully managed after 
the acquisition. 
Our third hypotheses about a negative influence of employee stock option shareholder 
proposals on acquirers share price reaction can be confirmed at the p<0.05 percent level of 
significance. This result can be interpreted in line with our argumentation that, although 
shareholders submit those proposals in the belief of an associated increase in the long-term 
orientation of the management (Ferri & Sandino, 2009) and an associated improved alignment 
of the interests of shareholders and executives (Guay et al., 2003), the stock market expects 
something different. It should anticipate that – especially in the case of an upcoming acquisition 
– managers are driven by the temptation to manipulate earnings, curtaining their worse 
performance and presenting the acquirer in a proper light, to raise share price performance 
(Gong et al., 2008). As a result, the market will give those firms credit for less successfully 
managing the new company after the acquisition, as it will anticipate managements’ camouflage 
tactic, if those proposals are submitted upfront the announcement of a takeover.   
In hypothesis four, we stated that if shareholders of acquiring firms submit governance 
bundles to establish ESO in combination with shareholder proposals to appoint new 
independent auditors, a positive acquirer’s share price reaction should appear at takeover 
announcement. Our results reveal that there is, indeed, a highly significant positive acquirer 
share price reaction at the p<0.01 percent significance level to the announcement of takeovers 
including this governance bundle at acquirers. Actually the information about the potential of 
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acquirers’ managers to manipulate the financial numbers should lead the financial market to 
react negative, if acquirers’ shareholders argue in favor of an enhancement of the proportion of 
stock options in the management compensation. However, the submission of proposals 
demanding the nomination of new independent auditors upfront the acquisition should let the 
market react positive, as the new auditor might lower information asymmetries an bring a higher 
transparency in assessing the financial performance of the acquirers’ management.  
Our last hypothesis five stated that there should be a negative relation between the governance 
bundle consisting of say on pay proposals and proposals suggesting the appointment of new 
independent auditors submitted by acquirers’ shareholders and the acquirers share price 
reaction at acquisition announcement. This hypothesis can be confirmed by our data at a high 
significance level of p<0.01 percent. We argued that in the situation in which acquirers’ 
shareholders want to change both the management compensation (say on pay proposals) and its 
performance evaluation (independent auditor), shareholders seem to be extremely unsatisfied 
with the payment of the management and are highly unsecure about the performance situation 
of the company. Especially within the acquisition context, shareholders need clarity about the 
real performance of the management to estimate if the managements’ performance is good 
enough to manage the new company after the acquisition. Thus this dissatisfaction about 
executives’ compensation in combination with the uncertainty about the true management 
performance will lead to a negative market reaction.   
4.5 DISCUSSION 
With our research we contribute to several streams of literature. First, we add to M&A 
literature which calls for more research on how corporate governance issues influence 
acquisitions (Haleblian et al., 2009). By not only showing that there are effects of governance 
mechanisms on companies’ share price performance in acquisitions but also, and most 
importantly, that these governance mechanisms impact corporate performance differently when 
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they come as bundles as opposed to their individual impacts. We thereby partially explain the 
mixed acquirer performance findings in takeovers reported in the acquisition literature 
(Agrawal et al., 1992; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Furthermore, we uncover that the 
importance of shareholder proposals in the context of acquisitions increases, as the financial 
market perceives those proposals and does react. 
Second and most importantly, we contribute to governance literature in general and to the 
literature on shareholder activism in particular by answering the call by Goranova and Ryan 
(2014) on how different types of shareholder activism affect firm performance differently. We 
do so by demonstrating that bundles (combination of governance mechanisms) have a much 
greater influence on share price reactions of acquiring firms in takeovers than individual 
proposals. With our results we contribute our share to the enlightenment of the mixed evidence 
on the effects of each of the governance mechanisms on performance (Dalton et al., 2003, 2007; 
Misangyi & Acharya, 2014). We furthermore support previous research which understands 
specific governance mechanisms as complements by delivering another study on governance 
bundles. We argue in line with Aguilera et al. (2008) and Misangyi and Acharya (2014) that 
corporate governance mechanisms act as complements in influencing firm performance and 
not, as often assumed in previous research, as substitutes, in mitigating the agency problem 
(Dalton et al., 2003; Zajac & Westphal, 1994). In addition to previous studies we go one step 
further in demonstrating that the performance implications for companies hinge upon the types 
of governance mechanisms applied, as sometimes these mechanisms unfold their impact 
individually and sometimes only in bundles. Then again, while the singular governance 
mechanisms seem to only partially influence firm performance, their interaction becomes 
highly significant. Again, others bundles seem to be inefficient, as they do not become 
significant. 
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Our study differs from previous governance research that also investigated the combination 
and interaction of different governance mechanisms and their influence on corporate 
performance (Aguilera et al., 2012, 2008; Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009; Tosi, 2008) by addressing 
the specific context of acquisitions. This specific context allows us to isolate and thereby to 
better observe performance implications of share price reactions at acquirers. At the 
announcement of an acquisition the market will raise specific attention to the governance 
structures of acquirers, evaluating its capabilities to manage the new company after the 
acquisition. The market will do so as changes in corporate governance at the target by an 
acquirer with good governance leads to better performing acquisitions (Wang & Xie, 2009). 
Our second contribution to governance literature lies in revealing significant influences of 
shareholder proposals on firm performance, in our case the share price reaction of acquirers. In 
contrast to various studies which report non-significant results of those proposals on 
performance (e.g. Agrawal, 2012), our research suggests that the market does anticipate the 
subsequent implementation of those proposals, as it otherwise would not react at all (Ferri & 
Sandino, 2009). We therefore add to research showing that shareholder proposals will be 
supported by other shareholders as they are with increased regularity accepted by the board of 
directors (Ertimur et al., 2010; Thomas & Cotter, 2007).  
Our results might be context specific as shareholders in acquisitions place particular 
importance on information about acquirers’ governance mechanisms. Shareholders’ assessment 
seems to be especially important in acquisitions as the performance of the acquirers’ 
management is the determining factor for the shareholders to think that the acquirer is capable 
to better manage the new company after the acquisition. 
Our study has various implications for theory and future research as well as practical implications. 
First, by recalling the fruitful insights from our study we encourage more research which analyzes 
how various corporate governance mechanisms influence different facets in acquisitions. Thereby 
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literature would more fully understand how different shareholder proposals influence acquirers’ 
performance in acquisitions and how various governance bundles impact the acquirers’ 
performance differently. Furthermore it might be perfectly possible that varying governance 
mechanisms and thereby shareholder proposals not only influence acquirers’ share prices or other 
performance outcomes of acquirers, but also a firm’s decision to become a target in an acquisition 
and its subsequent performance. Thus, varying and opportunistic interests by different investor 
groups at companies may lead to misalignments between these various shareholder groups and 
certain types of investors like hedge funds or activist investors, who may push companies into 
takeovers (Haleblian et al., 2009). Also, conflicting proposals from various parties could trigger 
unintended effects, which contradict the specific proposal by one party. In addition, the above 
mentioned context specificity of our results might lead researchers to test if shareholder proposals 
and the governance bundles behind also gain acceptance in other settings and to analyze the specific 
characteristics of these contexts. 
A second implication emerges for the corporate governance literature. Thus, this stream of 
research should view governance mechanisms more as governance bundles being complements 
and not substitutes and their influence on various performance outcomes. Thus, our study can 
probably act as a starting point for a typology of governance mechanisms. This could be 
comparable to the KANO model of customer satisfaction serving the financial market in 
perceiving the governance mechanisms of those companies as promising for successfully 
managing the new entity after the acquisition or not. Thus it could be possible that specific 
shareholder proposals at acquirers are taken for granted and lead to dissatisfaction and thereby 
to a negative financial market reaction when they are not present (Kano’s “must-be quality 
factors”). Other proposals and thereby governance mechanisms might lead to positive market 
reactions when being present, but to dissatisfaction when not (Kano’s “one-dimensional quality 
factors”). Again other governance mechanisms can lead to a positive market reaction when they 
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are present but not to dissatisfaction when they are not present (Kano’s “attractive quality 
factors”). 
Our study also presents implications for practitioners. By demonstrating that one can expect 
different outcomes depending on which bundles of governance mechanisms are observable at 
the acquirer, our study might help to dismantle information asymmetries between acquirers and 
the financial market. This would allow investors to structure their portfolio of proposals 
according to their interests. Furthermore, our results, which showed that specific combinations 
of shareholder proposals led to higher acquirer announcement returns, present an opportunity 
for shareholders to coordinate themselves in order to achieve their intended goals. Thus, if 
shareholders, instead of just working together to achieve the majority for one specific proposal, 
make an arrangement on which proposals to submit in combination, those shareholders or 
investors may achieve the desired outcome. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Literature on M&As has long been engaged with the investigation of a richness of variables 
influencing the post-acquisition performance of the involved companies, thereby reporting 
mixed findings especially for acquirers (see Haleblian et al. (2009) for a seminal meta-analytical 
overview of antecedents, moderators and outcomes of acquisitions). Results show that target 
firms almost always win in acquisitions (Asquith, 1983; Jensen & Ruback, 1983). In contrast, 
acquirers’ post-acquisition performance is, up to date, still contradicting (Agrawal et al., 1992; 
Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Some studies show acquirers to win, whereas others find them 
to break even (King et al., 2004; Lang et al., 1989), and others again show acquirers to loose 
(Bradley, 1980). Previous literature has attributed these mixed findings to the payment of too a 
high premium by the acquirer for the target, management hubris, an incapability to accomplish 
synergies, or the selection of targets with a strategic or organizational misfit (Hitt et al., 2012). 
Still others have assigned those mixed results to the acquirers’ post-merger integration process 
and the various strategies and decisions the acquirer enforces during this process (Angwin & 
Meadows, 2014; Hitt et al., 2012; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007). Besides various factors 
impacting the integration process success shown in the literature (see e.g. Ellis et al., 2009; 
Monin et al., 2013; Zollo & Singh, 2004), one of the key factors is knowledge transfer between 
the parties involved (Bresman et al., 1999). In turn, for successful knowledge transfer to occur, 
literature has pointed to the antecedent of social capital (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005). Social capital 
has been investigated in different types of relationships (Baker, 1990; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998; 
Uzzi, 1997; Weber & Weber, 2011) and has been shown to be of high importance in enabling 
and facilitating knowledge transfer in or between companies (Hansen, 1999; Inkpen & Tsang, 
2005; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998; Wijk et al., 2008). In this paper we define social capital according 
to Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) as “…the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded 
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within, available through and derived from the network and relationships possessed by an 
individual or social unit” (p.243). 
Within the context of acquisitions social network research is still in its infancy. Thus literature 
has for instance analyzed the influence of common board members between target and acquirer 
(Cai & Sevilir, 2012), existing director-senior executive network ties (Ishii & Xuan, 2014), 
client sharing between acquirers and targets (Briscoe & Tsai, 2011), or of indirect common 
client ties of acquirers and targets on acquisition performance (Rogan & Sorenson, 2014). With 
the exception of Graebner (2009) who investigates how trust asymmetries between both parties 
involved in the deal originate, develop and, subsequently, influence their behavior, literature on 
social capital in acquisitions is sparse. With our research we help filling this gap by applying a 
social network perspective to the M&A context, focusing on the post-merger integration 
process as main lever for acquirers to enhance value in acquisitions. We argue that IMs as 
central individuals within this integration process can act as knowledge brokers between 
acquirers and targets. Therefore our arising research questions are: How do IMs strategically 
develop their social network ties during post-merger integration process? How exactly and by 
means of which mechanisms does the arising social capital between IMs and target actors 
facilitate knowledge transfer, which in turn positively influences integration process 
performance? Which potential other effects influence the ability of IMs to successfully act as 
knowledge brokers? 
We examined those questions by applying multiple case studies with a grounded theory 
approach (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1984), conducting in-depth interviews with IMs, target 
managers and target employees, complemented by company data, to understand the processes, 
mechanisms and logics within the integration process from a social network perspective. Our 
results revealed that IMs are not by the very nature of their network position as potential brokers 
successful, but that instead only those IMs are successful who wisely use and exploit their 
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brokering position. Beyond the mere bridging of structural holes it is about strategically 
establishing (trustful) social ties to the “right” target employees. Our interviews demonstrated 
that the resulting social capital helped IMs to connect otherwise unconnected individuals and 
allowed them to transfer important knowledge between the two companies, leading to a more 
successful integration process. Furthermore it turned out that IM’s previous integration/change 
process experience and the experience of having been at a target company (we call this “victim” 
experience), impacted knowledge transfer and subsequent integration process performance. 
Finally, we qualitatively discovered moderating implications from IM’s industry experience on 
the effect of previous integration/change process experience on knowledge transfer. 
With our research we contribute to two fields of literature: M&A and social network theory. 
First, we add to M&A research by adding one of the few empirical studies investigating the 
complex and underexplored integration process in acquisitions (Graebner, 2009, 2004; 
Teerikangas et al., 2011), based on an inductive qualitative approach. We further expand M&A 
research by applying a social network perspective to the integration process, which allows us 
to better understand underlying processes, mechanisms and errors which emerge within this 
process. We demonstrate that bridging social ties and the arising social capital are key success 
factors of acquisition performance as they positively influence knowledge transfer, thereby 
leading to a more successful integration process. Moreover, we advance M&A research by 
highlighting the important role of IMs within the integration process. We carve out IMs as 
knowledge brokers who bridge structural holes and strategically develop social ties between 
actors of acquirers and targets, thus initiating and implementing knowledge transfer between 
the organizations, which in turn impacts the integration process performance. By doing so and 
by applying a social network lens, we outline underlying mechanisms in the integration process 
that help us understand the yet underexplored “black box” of the “how” and “why” of the 
integration processes. 
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Second, we contribute to social network and social capital literature. In particular we answer 
the recent call by Fang et al. (2014) who request research dealing with how individuals actually 
construct their social networks and how their networks emerge and develop. The authors further 
call for studies which deal with an associated question, namely how individuals then make use 
of their social networks and how the consequent social capital is exploited. In analyzing how 
IMs strategically construct their social networks and how they exploit their social capital within 
the integration process, our study is one of the first at the intersection of social network and 
M&A research which answers those two important questions. By showing that there is quite a 
variance among IMs in their ability to bridge structural holes and in building both individual 
and mutual social capital with target employees, we demonstrate that brokers are not necessarily 
by their very construction or initial network position equally capable of building and utilizing 
their social capital. Thereby we seize Kwon and Adlers' (2014) cognition argument which 
implies that equal nodes and relationships in a network can be perceived dissimilar by 
individuals, whereby this varying cognition in turn influences social capital formation. We were 
able to exactly observe this diverse perception when IMs in our study differently recognize 
important individuals at targets during integration, which in turn influenced their social capital 
development. Furthermore, we thereby tie on research which shows that there can be a 
difference between having social capital and using social capital in the way that individuals 
will not equally well take advantage of their networks (Smith, 2005). We do so in showing that 
IMs although being in the same brokering position are not equally able to mobilize their social 
capital uniformly well (Kwon & Adler, 2014). 
Furthermore we partially add to the underdeveloped research area on social liabilities in 
networks. Previous literature has demonstrated that previous positive relationships between 
actors in a network can become harmful over time (Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; Portes & 
Sensenbrenner, 1993). We revealed structural lock-ins, as also IMs during the pre-closing stage 
Chapter 5:  The Value Creating Role Of Integration Managers In M&A Integration Processes 
 
 
119 
 
in general were only allowed to establish ties to a couple of top managers at the target firm and 
were not able to build ties to relevant actors of the target network, some IMs were able to 
overcome this lock-in. This circumstance hindered knowledge transfer before the closing of the 
deal which would have been important for the success of the whole integration process. 
5.2 THEORETICAL GROUNDING 
Jemison and Sitkin (1986) were among the first who explicitly stated that the acquisition 
process itself is important in determining activities and outcomes in acquisitions. Subsequent 
work by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) uncovered the importance for companies to carefully 
select their targets, to negotiate the deal, and to decide how to manage the post-acquisition 
integration process. The authors summarized that the integration process represents the main 
value enhancing vehicle in acquisitions, as nearly all value creation takes place during this very 
process (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007).  
Previous integration process literature reveals several factors which play a decisive role for 
the success of the integration process, like e.g. the level of integration (Pablo, 1994; Zollo & 
Singh, 2004), the actors perceptions of (in) justice (Monin et al., 2013) and informal or 
procedural justice (Ellis et al., 2009), the target autonomy (Datta & Grant, 1990; Zollo & Singh, 
2004), the influence of cultural differences between target and acquirer on capability transfer 
(Björkman et al., 2007), or the extent of resource redeployment after the acquisition (Capron, 
1999). Most importantly, knowledge transfer (Bresman et al., 1999) influences the success of 
the integration process and subsequently the organizations’ performance (Wijk et al., 2008). 
For successful transfer of resources like knowledge to occur, literature has emphasized social 
network structures and the potentially arising social capital as important antecedents (Inkpen & 
Tsang, 2005). Thus social capital represents the positive network effects like trust or shared 
norms, whereas social liabilities are understood as negative social network effects like mistrust 
between or avoidance of people in working relationships (Labianca & Brass, 2006). 
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Originating in sociology, social networks and social capital and their implications for success 
have been analyzed from different scientific viewpoints like political science (Coleman, 1988), 
economics (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993) and management (Adler & Kwon, 2002). 
Management literature has investigated social capital in company-supplier relationships (Baker, 
1990; Uzzi, 1997), between business units in intra-firm settings (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998), or in 
corporate venture capital triads (Weber & Weber, 2011). In all these settings social capital is 
highly important in enabling and facilitating the combination and exchange of resources in 
general (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998), and to ease knowledge transfer in particular (Hansen, 1999; 
Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; Wijk et al., 2008). The three dimensions of social capital – structural, 
relational, and cognitive (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998) – thereby feature distinct impacts on 
knowledge transfer (Weber & Weber, 2011). For instance, the number of network ties and the 
configuration of networks (structural dimension) can ease knowledge transfer by influencing 
the scope of contacts and the reachability between network members (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; 
Tsai, 2001). Trust and the strength of ties (relational dimension) play a key role in the 
willingness of individuals to share knowledge (Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). A common 
language or shared narratives (cognitive dimension) of a business unit or a company influence 
the transfer of tacit knowledge (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Furthermore social capital helps 
firms to create sustainable competitive advantage (Argote & Ingram, 2000) and raises 
organizational performance (Lane, Salk, & Lyles, 2001; March & Sutton, 1997). 
Within the context of acquisitions social network research is in the early stage of its 
development. Rogan and Sorenson (2014) demonstrate that indirect social network ties in the 
form of common clients of acquirers and targets negatively impact the performance of the 
merged companies, as clients get lost and fewer products are sold to existing clients. Further 
literature has shown that a shared venture capitalist (Gompers & Xuan, 2008), or mutual board 
members between acquirers and targets (Cai & Sevilir, 2012) lead to a decrease in information 
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asymmetries, which in turn positively influences acquisition performance. Ishii and Xuan 
(2014) highlight that already existing network ties between senior executives of acquirers and 
targets negatively impact acquisition performance of acquirers and the combined entity due to 
poor decision making. Turning to post-acquisition integration, Briscoe and Tsai (2011) reveal 
that the sharing of clients in mergers between law firms leads to greater inter-unit sharing but 
also to the cutting of existing intra-unit ties. Although the authors offer interesting insights with 
their findings on client sharing between merging companies, their work focuses on the structural 
dimension of social capital and it remains quite unclear whether and in how far the other two 
dimensions of social capital influence the integration process. However, the different 
dimensions of social capital are highly interdependent and a better understanding of the multi-
dimensional construct of social capital and its respective impact in the integration process might 
help to capture the complexity of the whole picture of integration process success. 
Notwithstanding, literature remains largely silent, when it comes to social capital in 
acquisitions, with one exception by Graebner (2009) who concentrates on one facet of social 
capital – namely trust as main characteristic of the relational dimension. She analyzes how trust 
asymmetries between both parties involved originate, develop and influence the two parties’ 
behavior. Expanding Graebners' (2009) study, our research does not only focus on trust as a 
key variable between acquirers and targets but also investigates the two other dimensions. 
Based on the insights by Weber and Weber (2011) that the different dimensions of social capital 
differently impact organizational knowledge transfer and creation, we consider the M&A 
context as a fruitful research ground for additional and deeper analyses in this field. We believe 
the M&A context to be, on the one hand, sufficiently similar to Weber and Weber’s CVC 
context to be able to build on their findings and, on the other hand, to be sufficiently different 
to be able to add new and more generalizable insights to the social capital literature. This holds 
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as the integration of a target in an acquisition features several unique attributes such as the 
integration of corporate cultures or the role of IMs that do not occur in CVC settings.  
In this research, we specifically focus on IMs as knowledge brokers and analyze how they 
bridge structural holes, how they strategically develop and subsequently use their social ties to 
the employees of the target company, and how the different dimensions of their social capital 
resulting from these social ties eventually influence the integration process success. While 
Graebner (2004) highlights that the leaders of target companies play a crucial role within the 
integration of the company as they can create expected and serendipitous value, we rather focus 
on IMs as envoys of acquiring companies and their role within this very process, as they are, 
according to our insights, the key individuals within this very process.  
5.3 METHOD 
By conducting initial exploratory interviews with acquirer employees in hierarchically 
outstanding positions, we tried to receive a first impression of the role of social networks and 
social capital in the integration process and who the individuals are that set up those ties. Hereby 
three important points turned out. First, IMs seemed to be the central individuals during the 
integration process, due to their exposed position in the network. To reflect this important 
insight, we decided to concentrate on IMs and considered them potential knowledge brokers or 
boundary spanners between the merging organizations. Second, only a few top managers at the 
acquirer and the target knew about the forthcoming acquisition and were involved in decision 
making processes concerning the integration, expressing the very sensitive nature of this 
corporate event. Third, during these first initial interviews, we were already pointed to most of 
the IMs as well as to some other important individuals we should talk to in the respective 
acquisitions. Hence, in every acquisition case, we started our primary interviews by talking to 
the IMs appointed by the acquirers, then other integration team members and, in addition, target 
employees who were in contact with the integration team during the integration process. 
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As research design we apply multiple case studies with a grounded theory approach 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1984) by conducting six in depth case studies and applying a 
“replication logic”. Hence, the implications of every previous case are validated or not by the 
following case, whereby the experiences from the respective preceding interview(s) help 
researchers to put important questions into place for the subsequent interview(s) (Yin, 1984). 
Case study methodology is appropriate as it allows scientists to investigate settings where 
“how” and/or “why” questions dominate the research endeavor (Yin, 1984). In our setting we 
want to understand the role of IMs within the integration process opening the black box of both 
successful and unsuccessful integration processes and carving out relevant antecedents as well 
as moderators. Furthermore, the deployment of a so called embedded design (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Yin, 1984) allows the present study to examine different levels of analysis within the companies 
like for instance the individual level (interviews with IMs and target employees) and the 
organizational level (integration process performance). Such a design helps researchers to 
develop sound and comprehensive research models (Yin, 1984). 
5.3.1 Data Sources 
The investigation started in the middle of 2013 and lasted until the end of 2014. We executed 
30 interviews with IMs and leading managers of six acquisitions of two multinational high-tech 
companies, as well as with top managers and employees of the respective targets, with those 
the IMs had interacted during the integration. Our choice of high-tech multinationals makes 
sense, as first in those two high-tech organizations corporate M&As have become a major 
means for accessing knowledge, competencies, technologies, and innovations from external 
sources (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; Phan et al., 2009; Tsai & Wang, 2008). Second, in such 
high-tech industries the transfer of tacit knowledge as a source of innovativeness is key (Kohers 
& Kohers, 2001). Thus, displaying a lot of acquisition experience, these companies have 
learned from past acquisitions that the deployment of IMs is highly important for the integration 
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process and the acquisitions to be successful (Ashkenas et al., 1998; Ashkenas & Francis, 2000). 
Notwithstanding, our sample also encompasses acquisitions which were, in spite of having IMs 
deployed, less successful than others regarding their integration processes as one of our aims 
was to find out if there were differences in the establishment of social ties by IMs. Third, all 
takeovers in our data set were strategic acquisitions with a main focus on the strategic fit 
between the acquirer and the target. This is relevant, because solely in those acquisitions it is 
of high importance to manage the integration process in a way that the expected synergies can 
be realized, in contrast to financial acquisitions, in which the involved companies mostly have 
no business overlap. While we kept our sample explicitly homogeneous in terms of these 
criteria, it explicitly differs in terms of M&A success, consisting of four successful and two less 
successful acquisitions. Table 8 summarizes characteristics of the six acquisitions. 
Table 8: Variables characterizing the sample of the study 
Acquirer Target Target 
Industry 
Transaction 
Value (Mio. $) 
Number of 
Employees 
Year of 
Takeover 
Zeus Adonis High-Tech 180 550 2004 
Achilles Aphrodite 
Automobile 
Supplier 
17,2 10,000 2007 
Zeus Apollon High-Tech not specified 100 2007 
Zeus Athene High-Tech not specified 60 2008 
Zeus Dionysus High-Tech 3,2 5,300 2011 
Achilles Herakles Manufacturing 1,4 9,000 2014 
 
For our data collection we extracted several data sources, following the notion of data 
triangulation (Flick, von Kardorff, & Steinke, 2009). In addition to our introductory interviews 
mentioned above, our main data source was qualitative expert interviews with IMs and 
managers from the acquirers, target managers and employees. Table 9 gives an overview of the 
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different individuals we chose for analysis. Second, we performed emails and phone calls to 
follow up the interviews, if things turned out to be unclear or additional questions arose. In 
addition, we collected archival data like company web sites, business publications, materials 
provided by informants as well as company reports. 
Our interviews lasted 60-120 minutes and followed a partly structured interview guide which 
was slightly adapted for the IMs, the integration team members, and the target employees. 
Furthermore, the interview guide was adjusted every time questions became obsolete or new 
important questions crystallized from the previous interviews. 
Table 9: Acquirer and target companies and their respective interviewees 
No. Acquirer Target Interviewees 
1 Zeus Adonis Acquirer: IM; Target: CEO, Three employees 
2 Achilles Aphrodite Acquirer: IM; CEO; Head of HR; Target: CEO 
3 Zeus Apollon 
Acquirer: IM; Target: Sales Person, Head of 
Finance, Technology Leader 
4 Zeus Athene Acquirer: IM; Target: Seven employees 
5 Zeus Dionysus Acquirer: IM, HR IM, Integration Team Staff 
Member; Target: Head of HR 
6 Achilles Herakles 
Acquirer: IM, CEO IM; Target: Four target 
employees 
 
The interview guideline was structured as follows: First, the interviewer(s) shortly introduced 
the topic to the informants. This introduction was followed by asking the interviewees to report 
about the development of the integration process starting from the very beginning of their 
involvement. We concentrated our investigation especially on the role of IMs of the respective 
acquisition. We thereby asked IMs questions about their role within the integration process, 
how this role developed throughout the integration process, how and why they built their social 
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capital to the target employees they did, which barriers and difficulties they faced during this 
process and how they coped with them, how and which type of knowledge was transferred and 
how this knowledge transfer impacted the integration process success. We concluded the 
interviews with some questions about the position of the IMs before they joined the respective 
acquisition and their potential previous acquisition experience, about some hard facts of the 
company under research, and about the transaction itself (transaction value, friendly or hostile 
acquisition, etc.). Finally we asked each respondent at the end of the interview to name 
additional potential interview partners, people who were relevant during the respective 
integration process and from whom we were likely to receive additional, valuable information 
about the acquisition and the integration process. All interviews were tape recorded and 
transcribed. 
To minimize respondent biases in our research, we took several steps. First, as outlined above, 
we always interviewed different persons from the acquirer and the target side. As it is implied 
by their respective status and role in the respective company, the interviewees should have 
differing views and opinions on the integration process. Researchers must be aware of the fact 
that past events like an acquisition can bias results, as answers from respondents might be 
distorted due to retrospective sensemaking (Huber & Power, 1985). If our results were biased 
by retrospective sensemaking, we would have seen major differences in the basic description 
of the critical event by several respondents. However, we did not observe differences in those 
answers, whereby we can space out this bias. Moreover, an acquisition is an incisive event that 
the parties involved remember very well. The advantage of retrospective data lies in the fact 
that it allows the researcher to increase the number of cases and thereby the efficiency of data 
collection (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004).  
Second, as mentioned before, we focused on the most influential and proficient persons in the 
integration process. These key persons are the most reliable when recalling important 
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information from particular events (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004; Huber & Power, 1985). 
Furthermore, in our interviews we also always touched the facts of the integration process. For 
example, we asked questions concerning the number of established ties by the IMs to target 
employees during the integration process, about the type and amount of knowledge transferred 
or performance outcomes. This proceeding leads to a reduction in impression management and 
cognitive biases (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004; Huber & Power, 1985; Miller, Cardinal, & 
Glick, 1997). Notwithstanding, subjective interpretations and differing meanings were often 
added by the informants. Third, another point which could have influenced our results from the 
interviews would have been the risk that the interviewees “glamour up” their firms, which 
means that they present their company better than what it really is and thereby change their 
answering behaviors (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). By anonymizing respondent names and 
companies, this bias should also be restricted (Miller et al., 1997). Another potential bias could 
have been occurred if the interviewee’s answers would have been affected by the structure of 
the interviews and the underlying interview guidelines (Bailar, Bailey, & Stevens, 1977). As 
leading questions and influencing means were avoided and the interview partners were not 
hustled into their statements, this bias should also be negligible. To get the allowance to conduct 
the interviews as well as to motivate the informants to answer we set up and signed a 
nondisclosure agreement together with the involved parties, thereby assuring sensitivity of the 
data (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004; Huber & Power, 1985; Miller et al., 1997). 
5.3.2 Data Analysis 
In keeping with qualitative research methods, we used overlapping data collection and 
analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). We first analyzed single cases individually (Graebner & 
Eisenhardt, 2004). After the within-case analysis we continued with cross-case analysis. The 
within-case analysis focused on the development of constructs, emerging from the respective 
integration process of a single acquisition. These arising constructs were then compared 
Chapter 5:  The Value Creating Role Of Integration Managers In M&A Integration Processes 
 
 
128 
 
between the cases in cross-case analyses (Eisenhardt, 1989), to identify similar or divergent 
patterns of how IMs developed and structured their social networks, how knowledge transfer 
occurred through the established ties, and how the emerging social capital, if it than did develop, 
allowed IMs to structure the integration process more or less successfully. Our construct 
building approach was inductive as we allowed the constructs to emerge from the interviews 
during the coding of the interviews. In a replication logic proceeding we elaborated our 
conceptual categories, every time new information arose from the data (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007; Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004). To reduce a potential coding bias, both authors coded 
independently and checked the interview codings for possible divergent interpretations, thereby 
assuring intercoder reliability. Table 10 gives an overview of the emerging constructs from our 
interviews. 
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Table 10: Constructs emerging from the interviews and their respective measurement 
Emerging 
construct 
Measurement 
Structural 
dimension 
Number of ties (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998), diversity (Burt, 1992), 
centrality and frequency (Freeman, 1979; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998) 
Relational 
dimension 
Strength of ties (Coleman, 1988) and trust (Barney and Hansen, 
1994; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998) 
Cognitive 
dimension 
Shared norms (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998), common identification 
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998) 
Structural lock-out Legal barriers to the establishment of network ties 
Structural lock-in Wrong investment decisions (Maurer & Ebers, 2006; Weber & 
Weber, 2011) 
Integration/change 
process experience 
IMs experiences from previous acquisitions or change processes, 
they have been involved in 
“Victim” 
experience 
IMs experiences of having been at a target company in an previous 
acquisition 
Integration Process 
Performance 
Self-reported success of the integration process as result of the social 
capital of integration managers and the knowledge transferred  
 
5.4 RESULTS 
The result section is structured along our research questions as well as our main findings. 
Accordingly, we start with answering the question of how IMs established social ties during the 
integration process, how social capital developed through these ties over time, and how this 
social capital allowed IMs to structure the integration process more or less successful. During 
our analysis of the IMs’ emerging social capital it became apparent that the integration process 
had to be subdivided into two distinct phases: (1) a pre-closing stage from the first negotiations 
up to the point where the deal is closed and (2) a post deal closing phase from the closing until 
the point where the integration ended. This distinction seems to be quite evident at a first glance 
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as the integration process shouldn’t start until the closing of the deal. However, our 
investigation revealed that this is not necessarily the case. Some IMs thought of the pre-closing 
stage as the point in time at which the integration process already started, whereas others took 
the closing of the deal as integration starting point. This differentiation turned out to have 
significant effects for the development of social capital and social liabilities and the subsequent 
knowledge transfer between IMs and target actors. Therefore, we will distinguish those two 
stages for the rest of the paper and develop two differing figures, which display the emerging 
social ties within these two stages (Figure 5 and 6). We will reinforce our argumentation with 
additional quotations (see Table 11).  
5.4.1 Pre-Closing Stage 
Structural dimension of social capital 
The structural dimension is concerned with the pattern of relationships between the members 
of a given network (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Thereby, this pattern 
features different aspects like the number of direct and indirect network ties between network 
actors (McFadyen & Canella, 2004; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998) and the network configuration, 
which manifests in constructs like hierarchy, density, and connectivity (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005). 
In our research we follow Burt (1992, 1997) in regarding networks as rich in structural holes, 
which offer the possibility for brokering information and knowledge. We thereby consider IMs 
as knowledge brokers, who operate at the intersection between two companies and bring 
together individuals who were otherwise disconnected (Rost, 2011). Literature shows that 
knowledge brokers can be companies as well as individuals who bridge different markets, 
branches and organizational barriers. They link otherwise unconnected groups and distract 
knowledge from areas where it is known, applying it to areas where it is not known (Hargadon, 
2002, 1998), thus linking know-who, know-how, know-why and know-what (Meyer, 2010). As 
units in organizations themselves develop their own local norms, values, and languages, the 
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task of knowledge brokers or boundary spanners is “to speak both languages” and translate at 
the interface of social systems (Tushman & Scanlan, 1981). 
Throughout all cases our results show, that during the pre-closing stage IMs were deployed 
as potential knowledge brokers being in the position to potentially set up social ties between 
yet unconnected actors (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Situation IMs faced during the pre-closing stage 
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Table 11: Additional quotations from the pre-closing stage and the post-acquisition phase 
 Pre-Closing Stage Post-acquisition 
Structural 
dimension 
Structural lock-out: 
“I only was allowed to talk to a handful of 
mostly marketing people during due 
diligence to understand basic market 
dynamics and how products were positioned 
in different markets. It was very concentrated 
to 3-4 people” (Integration Team Staff 
Member 5) 
“It is absolutely common, that you only have 
contact to the formal leaders. Having contact 
to the other employees is not allowed” (IM 6) 
Number of ties: 
“As soon as the closing happens, the gates are open and you can talk 
to a number of employees” (IM 6) 
Frequency: 
“I didn't have enough time and opportunities to connect with entry 
level junior people. I mean we had things like roundtables. But 
during those events you don't really built trustful relationships” 
(Integration Team Staff Member 5) 
“Frequency definitely plays a role, although we recognized that ‘the 
more the better” not really holds” (IM 6) 
Centrality: “Myself, I fly to our new site relatively often, once a 
month for week, so that I am on site. I am located at the headquarter. 
All the other sites are visited by the business unit IMs. There is 
dramatic traffic at the moment. It is definitely a success factor that 
the integrators show up on site” (IM 6) 
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Relational 
dimension 
Trust: 
“The building of trust starts, when you have 
signed the deal and it is closed” (CEO IM 6) 
Trust: 
“To be honest matters even more as people watch the integration 
and decide really whether they should trust this mechanism or not it 
is very important that we follow through and we do what we say we 
gonna do” (Integration Team Staff Member 5) 
“Something [an action], which can be put into action during the first 
two or three month, so that they say: ‘oh, he did listen to us, he did 
understand, he did act on that, and we notice it is getting better’. If 
you have one or two of those things during the first two or three 
month you establish trust very fast” (IM 4) 
Cognitive 
dimension 
Norms: 
“We could have done much more work with 
the people, in the sense of seminars or 
workshops. We could have done this by 
sure“ (CEO 2) 
Norms: 
“We have regular newsletters and newspaper, which take place once 
a month, were the employees receive an update, what happens at the 
moment. We also have a portal where we as the acquirer present 
ourselves, the different subunits, the integration, the strategy” (IM 6) 
“The way in which manner you choose your words, how you choose 
your speeches impacts if you create or break down barriers” (IM 4) 
Values: 
“So we conduct cultural workshops to get the employees acquainted 
to the values and the culture which constitute us” (IM 6) 
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Integration 
process/ 
Change process 
experience 
 
„In the acquisition of Y [acquisition of prior firm] we were too fast 
laying down the names of the people on the organization chart. […] 
we were too hectic and had to correct a lot afterwards” (CEO IM 6) 
“I was extremely fortunate that one colleague of mine did an 
integration before and that I benefitted a lot from the plans he has, 
from the procedures and experiences which he had and which I 
could flow in” (IM 4) 
Industry 
experience 
 “So you look for somebody that has a previous experience. That 
somebody has to have a broad business understanding but also 
specific industry knowledge. That is the integration leader profile” 
(HR IM 5) 
“Victim” 
experience 
 “I think, it is a good precondition, if one is able to slip into the shoes 
of  the respective counterpart” (IM 4) 
 
Chapter 5:  The Value Creating Role Of Integration Managers In M&A Integration Processes 
 
 
135 
 
It thereby became evident that in this phase IMs only had sparse contacts: “During due diligence 
there was regular communication with the three major decision makers, who were the two 
owners and one chief executive, who was responsible for sales” (IM 1). The reason for this was 
that during this pre-closing stage IMs and their teams faced legal barriers to the establishment 
of ties as well as a prohibition of making decisions regarding the acquisition. 
Previous literature has demonstrated that when observed from a process perspective former 
positive relationships between actors in a network can become harmful over time (Gargiulo & 
Benassi, 2000; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993). Maurer and Ebers (2006) show that former 
social capital of young biotechnology firms can turn into social liabilities if the employees of 
the organization are no longer capable to adapt the configurations of their networks to changing 
resource needs. Maurer and Ebers (2006) as well as Weber and Weber (2011) identify different 
forms of social liabilities like a structural lock-in (strategic misfit or strategic reorientation 
between the actors), a relational lock-in (norms of reciprocity together with a dense network), 
or a cognitive lock-in (high degree of similarity in actors identities together with frequent 
relations with restricted amount of actors). A structural lock-in can arises if “[…] the actor’s 
possibilities of exploiting the theoretically fruitful configuration of new external ties” (Weber 
& Weber 2011, p.267) are constrained. Such a structural lock-in for example exists if a wrong 
investment decision of an actor is made upfront an investment, so that it isn’t possible for the 
actor to exploit the potentially rewarding new network ties. This in turn leads to a restraint in 
the building of social capital (Weber & Weber, 2011). In our M&A context we were also able 
to observe such a structural lock-in in the form of a strategic misfit. A strategic misfit occurred 
when one of the acquirers bought a target which had its business in totally different segments 
than the acquirer: “It became very clear during due diligence that Y (the target) was in a totally 
different segment. At the point of the acquisition, 80% of their volume was in electronics and 
R&D, both segments which we were not heading for. This means that we artificially bought 
Chapter 5:  The Value Creating Role Of Integration Managers In M&A Integration Processes 
 
 
136 
 
new segments, which is never a good idea. Eventually the desire to acquire and the hunger for 
this technology prevailed. At the end I retrospectively have to say that I pointed at that fact but 
ultimately we ran into it with one’s eyes open” (IM 3). In addition to this structural lock-in we 
could observe another type of lock-in which is on closer consideration rather a lock-out. As 
mentioned before IMs reported that due to legal restrictions during the due diligence it was 
explicitly forbidden to autonomously establish connecting ties with target employees, this is to 
broker the structural holes. “[…] any communication exclusively occurred between manager A 
at X (acquirer) and the top manager at Y (target). No other communication was allowed” (IM 
3). As a consequence IMs were not able to access and benefit from the potential advantages of 
the employees’ network ties leading to limited knowledge transfer which would have been 
highly important in that stage to understand the business of the target acquired. Our results lead 
us to our first proposition: 
Proposition 1: In case IMs face structural lock-ins/lock-outs during the pre-closing stage, 
knowledge transfer will be restricted, jeopardizing the success of the integration process. 
Relational dimension of social capital 
The relational dimension of social capital is concerned with the quality of a relationship (Tsai 
& Ghoshal, 1998). Within this relational dimension, the focus lies predominantly on trust and 
trustworthiness as core elements as well as on the strength of ties, consisting of intensity and 
frequency of communication (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). Trust can be understood as a 
characteristic of a relationship between actors, whereas trustworthiness is seen as property of 
actors themselves (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). These two constructs 
represent a critical component in influencing the knowledge transfer between companies and 
play a key role in the willingness of individuals to share knowledge (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; 
Zaheer et al., 1998). Previous research demonstrates that in relationships where trust is in place, 
individuals are generally more prone to interact socially and cooperate (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
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1998), and are more willing to listen to others and absorb knowledge (Levinthal & Cross, 2004; 
Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). 
During the pre-closing stage, due to the structural constraints which are reflected in the limited 
amount of target managers involved and often the explicit prohibition to officially communicate 
decisions to other target employees, trust didn’t play a decisive role, as it could only develop 
between IMs and those few target managers. One IM in a Zeus acquisition explained: “Before 
the closing you are in a twilight zone, in which you have to be very careful. You are not allowed 
to reveal or babble internals as the possibility exists that afterwards, in case of doubt, you will 
be competitors on the market again” (IM 4). Our data revealed that this the pre-closing stage 
phase was characterized rather by mistrust between the target employees and IMs as 
ambassadors sent by the acquirers: “We thought: ‘They (the integration team) arrive and want 
to change everything” (HR IM 5). As a consequence, as a staff member of an integration team 
stated, it became highly important for IMs to signalize trustworthiness and to act in a way that 
employees would not feel dumbfounded. “Mostly I would say it was listening as opposed to 
sort of coming in with 'This is the way we do things at X (acquirer) and that's what we need to 
change’. You have to be very sensitive around the value of their (targets) totally unstructured 
approach to innovation. I tried to be unbiased to make the best of their ways of doing things, 
and our way, which brings rigor and more reliability into the process” (Integration Team Staff 
Member 5). How unsatisfying situations could become when IMs annoyed target employees 
was expressed by a sales manager. “We had a European meeting. An American came in. The 
language was English, necessarily. She was the IM. They didn’t bring someone speaking local 
language. She presented how awesome the company (acquirer) is and what is going to happen 
during the next 30, 60, 90 days. And that this is awesome. And that everybody, who doesn’t 
find that awesome, can go. […] she did provoke a whole European Sales Team by doing so” 
(Sales Manager 3). This dissatisfaction of target employees was supported by the fact that the 
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relationship between the concerned parties during that stage had more the character of providing 
the acquirer with information it needed to advance the pre-closing stage: “It was circulated that 
there are people from X (acquirer) around, who will ask you questions. They would leave their 
business cards with their email addresses and you are allowed to send them the respective data” 
(HR Manager 5). This unemotional and matter-of-fact proceeding was confirmed by the IMs 
themselves. For instance, one IM mentioned that the relationships at that time were 
predominantly based on the obligation of the target to endow the acquirer with the required 
information: “The communication was really based on facts, to simply examine documents, to 
receive information, who does what, who has which role, how do the products look like, how 
does the production process look like, which customer relationships exist” (IM 4). Due to the 
skepticism target employees disapproved of the acquirer and due to the absence of trust the 
requested information was sometimes deliberately held back: “I must say that, from a financial 
point of view, I only gave away what I had to. I did not release certain things, whereby I was 
asked to do so” (Head of Finance 3). Besides these restrictions, we were able to observe in our 
four successful integration processes that IMs and their team were able to lay the foundation of 
trust building already during this stage: “…we demonstrated that we were interested in them 
[the target] by holding small talk with the employees […], by discussing things and giving 
casual workshops on how we understand teamwork […] not only with the management but also 
with the employees on the shop floor level” (IM 6). Another IM stated: “I have been on site at 
location X and talked to the people and also accepted their questions. And this is exactly the 
first trust building” (IM 6).  Thus, in one of the successful integration processes one IM revealed 
that the early trust building within the pre-closing phase speeded up the eventual integration 
process and helped the acquirer to save money, as for example less workshops had to be 
established after deal closing and employees of the target started earlier to transfer important 
knowledge. As this early establishment of trust happened in all of our four successful 
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integration processes but less in the less successful ones, it seemed that early “investments” in 
trust building during the pre-closing stage helped the integration process to become more 
successful. Besides these early efforts to lay the foundation of trust, the level of trust within the 
pre-closing stage remained low, which lead to limited knowledge transfer between IMs and 
target managers and was, as a rule, limited to explicit knowledge such as financial figures. “[…] 
we intensively worked together with the CEO to collect the necessary data. We had to submit 
regional market shares of both companies and had to do the whole data coordination” (IM 3). 
Summarizing, because IMs were not allowed to contact target employees before deal closing, 
trustful and strong ties had no chance to be established. 
5.4.2 Post-Acquisition Stage 
Structural dimension of social capital 
At the point of deal-closing, the situation for IMs and employees changed fundamentally. 
Having only been able to talk to executives during the pre-closing stage, IMs were now allowed 
to live their potential brokering role by intensifying their networking in terms of increasing the 
number of ties to employees: “At the moment you are allowed to talk, you face a totally different 
situation […] you can talk to the employees in a different way and you can talk to all employees, 
as you are as IM part of the company and able to display a different openness” (IM 4). In trying 
to develop their networks by establishing own social ties IMs used the few target executives to 
whom they were connected since the pre-closing stage, as “door openers”. Thereby IMs gained 
entrance to additional managers and target employees and were able to locate individuals or 
organizational subunits that had the potency to act as multipliers of the integration. These 
individuals did not necessarily have to be key figures on the organization chart: “We were able 
to identify change agents or informal leaders that did not belong to the top management and 
from those we hoped that they ‘infect’ others” (IM 6). Moreover, in this phase IMs tried to 
convince the initial target executives to support the change intention: ”I concentrated most 
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extensively on A, who came from the executive board of Aphrodite. He was a kind of a corner 
stone for me during my integration work. I knew that if I didn’t win this leader over, I would 
have had no chance” (IM 2). 
Our data revealed that the diversity of ties to different target employees also became an 
important antecedent for knowledge transfer. By talking to these different functions of the value 
chain, IMs were enabled to capture the whole picture of the organization, which was previously 
only fragmented (see Figure 6): “[…] I realized that the more you talk to as many people as 
possible, and the more you are withal open for the big picture, the more the specific pieces of 
the puzzle connect” (IM 4). IMs who established more and more diverse ties performed better 
than those IMs who put less emphasis on this task. Our findings therewith allow to convey 
results from previous social capital research to the M&A integration context: the mere 
establishment of ties to target employees during this phase, especially of non-redundant ties, 
which are said to lead to the transfer of diverse knowledge (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Burt, 1992; 
Rost, 2011), had an impact on performance, namely the integration process performance. 
Figure 6: Situation IMs faced after the closing of the deal (post-acquisition) 
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Besides this establishment of diverse ties, the sheer number of ties was not necessarily 
promising. Thus during communicating to diverse actors, it was a key task for IMs to quickly 
find out the “right” individuals to which they had to talk to, to understand where decisions are 
actually made and thus where the relevant knowledge rests: “It was important that he (IM) 
talked to as many employees as possible, to understand what the essential structures in the 
company are. In fact the real structures, not the ones on paper. […] to know as much as possible 
about the status quo, to understand how decisions are operated” (Employee 1, Athene). When 
IMs didn’t succeed in understanding the underlying essential, sometimes informal structure of 
the company and weren’t able to timely figure out key individuals for central decision making, 
knowledge transfer crucial for leveraging potential synergies such as complementary products 
and processes was obviously hindered: “Who makes decisions, why does he make decisions, 
which information do I get? It is important to talk to a sufficient amount of individuals to get a 
true image and to integrate this knowledge into the new structures and ways in which decisions 
flow. These structures weren’t broken up […] this did hurt us very much in different situations, 
concerning product development, staff development. The focus in product development was 
very much on “developing”, without getting the sales department on board. What does the 
market really want? Things happened, which were not in the sense of market development” 
(Employee 3, Athene). 
At this stage in the process it already turned out that IMs differed in how successful they were 
in establishing diverse ties to important target actors: “[…] then you recognize, like in normal 
day life, this person pushes the business and you should sit down with that person and work on 
it. Then you can begin to identify who the ‘leader of the pack’, who the informal leaders really 
are” (IM 6). Another IM stated:  “That was a massive misjudgment on my part with whom I 
built my network with” (IM 3). The IMs who were more successful in recognizing that the 
target actors they were tied with were not the key individuals in terms of important knowledge 
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and managed to identify the rewarding ties: “You did recognize that you were not able to receive 
the information, or you noticed that in some places, specific questions were not answered, as 
we (as acquirer) would answer it. So you felt that, if you went one layer deeper, you would get 
the answers” (IM 2). Another IM brought up: “There were two persons from HR to whom we 
talk a lot and who transfer a lot of important knowledge to integrate the HR business. Of course 
the HR leader pushes it but those two employees are much more important” (IM 6). 
Summarizing, the IMs who were able to identify the important target employees equipped with 
knowledge important for successful integration, were all deployed in our four successful 
integration processes. Our findings concerning the structural dimension let us therefore 
propose: 
Proposition 2a: The higher the number of ties IMs establish after the closing of the deal, the 
more the knowledge transfer is facilitated, leading to a more successful integration process. 
Proposition 2b: The greater the diversity of ties IMs establish after the closing of the deal, the 
more the transfer of knowledge is facilitated, leading to a more successful integration process. 
Besides the number and diversity of ties, our data revealed that successful IMs invested 
substantial efforts to occupy a central position within the newly established network with the 
target employees: “From then on I was on site four days a week” (IM 3). Centrality is said to 
influence the efficiency of groups in solving problems, to impact the awareness towards 
leadership and to lead to a higher satisfaction of individuals (Freeman, 1979). Thus, previous 
findings show that knowledge brokers like IMs are well advised to occupy central positions in 
establishing relationships and bridge different local norms, values and languages of different 
organizations (Tushman & Scanlan, 1981). This was also observed in our cases. A strong 
presence on site was consciously applied by many of the IMs to generate awareness and 
closeness: “Besides my current office, I had another office at the end of the hallway. There is a 
desk, and when you keep the door open everyone who walks in the hallway virtually is heading 
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for the table” (IM 4). The more IMs positioned themselves in a central and unequivocal 
position, the more attention and power was attributed to them: “Suddenly there is somebody 
who is on an equal footing as the CEO” (IM 3). These actions of being central and close to the 
employees had a significant impact on the perception of IMs as approachable individuals in the 
eyes of the employees. “He (IM) took up things we told him, discussed them and tried to 
implement them” (Employee 2, Athene). 
How important centrality became for the communication between IMs and employees, which 
strong signal a non-central position of IMs sent out, and which implications this had for the 
success of the integration process, was expressed by a Zeus IM. “I was put in a marginal office 
at the end of the production hall, at the farthest end, at the end of the gallery. […] The signal 
couldn’t have been much stronger. It would have been right to put me directly next to the CEO. 
It took me one and a half year to establish my network with the target employees” (IM 3). 
Summarizing our results regarding centrality within the integration process, we propose: 
Proposition 2c: The more IMs occupy central positions within the integration process, the 
more the knowledge transfer is facilitated, leading to a more successful integration process. 
Relational dimension of social capital 
As mentioned before, after the deal closing, IMs were allowed to establish ties not only to 
managers, but to any employees of the target. This allowance functioned as a precondition for 
the successful transfer of explicit and implicit knowledge from the target to the acquirer and 
vice versa. Regarding the relational dimension it became apparent that frequency and intensity 
of communication between IMs and target employees were key antecedents to unfold trustful 
relationships: “I often visited the production area to talk to the people individually. We also had 
regular meetings at least once a month with the whole workforce to inform them about the 
proceedings of the integration and to listen to the topics and problems they faced” (IM 4). This 
increased frequency in communication was very well perceived by the target employees and 
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interpreted as means of openness as well as transparency: “We then had quarterly meetings. In 
these meeting, business numbers, outlooks, and current issues which concern the location were 
presented by the management to all employees. In this way all people are informed. In former 
times that happened may be once a year at the Christmas party. They try to create a good 
transparency for the individual employee. You feel esteemed” (Employee 2, Athene). Our 
further analysis showed this frequency of communication combined with openness to be at the 
very core of trust building between the parties: “As we go along, I did build up very trustful 
relationships with the employees in the course of the one and a half years, because I 
communicated a lot, when I was allowed to. I helped the people to understand how we do 
things” (IM 4). 
The intensity of communication as the second construct within the strength of ties (Tsai & 
Ghoshal, 1998) also became crucial during that phase. The employees of the target mentioned 
that besides subject-specific questions, they also had the chance to approach IMs with non-
functional questions which led to an intensification of ties: “I became the reference person, how 
it works at X (acquirer), how one has to get along. I occupied a mentor-coaching-role for many 
of the executives. Many of them who had questions approached me” (IM 3). 
From the target employees’ perspective the main antecedents for establishing trustful 
relationships were reliability, transparency and predictability. First, target employees 
highlighted as one of the most crucial points that the acquirer in general and IMs in particular 
act on what had been promised before: “Something (an action), which can be put into action 
during the first two or three month, so that they say: ‘oh, he did listen to us, he did understand, 
he did act on that, and we notice it is getting better’. If you have one or two of those things 
during the first two or three month, you establish trust very fast” (IM 3). 
Second, transparency and the reduction of arbitrariness as a very similar construct further 
persuaded the target employees to trust IMs: “[…] they did understand that we were quite 
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consistent and straightforward. That meant that employees who performed well and contributed 
positively were appreciated, and the ones who did not, weren’t honored. […] this meant, they 
knew that I either say nothing or if I say something they can trust me” (IM 3). The 
meaningfulness of IMs to be transparent in the eyes of the target employees and to stick to their 
words to gain trust was also emphasized by one target employee. “I highly esteem him, because 
he takes up things you tell him, discusses them and tries to implement them” (Employee 2, 
Adonis).  
In another case we could observe what happened when promises were broken and a trustful 
relationship was destroyed. In that acquisition a well esteemed IM was unexpectedly replaced 
during the integration and trust which had been built between the target employees and this IM 
over the years somewhat instantly disappeared: “After two years of being here the (IM) left. 
Then person A came as the site leader. It wasn’t possible to work with him in this consequent 
way. We faced a vigorous depression. Now since January he (the former IM) is back as site 
leader. We were able to stabilize the status through working consequently, through the analysis 
of problems and because he cared about the people“ (Employee 7, Athene). Another IM faced 
a very similar problem: “I was removed from the integration to work in my old function at X. 
In my opinion, that was way too early and disrupted most of the trustful ties that I had 
established” (IM 3). 
Considering the type of knowledge transferred between IMs and target employees, our data 
showed that unlike the mainly explicit knowledge transferred during the pre-closing stage, the 
knowledge in this stage had a more implicit character: “They (acquirer) thought a production 
process could be described by instructions, by measuring criteria, in fact so precise that the 
production could be run anywhere else. You can’t always foresee the right results of the 
production, as you are not able to distinctly and formally codify the physical backgrounds. 
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There is a degree of voodoo added. This is why we kept those people, to transfer the knowledge” 
(IM 4). 
By turning to the performance implications of IMs’ social capital and the knowledge 
transferred through the trustful ties, our interviews unveiled that those IMs who managed to 
successfully establish trustful ties with the relevant target employees significantly facilitated 
the crucial transfer of knowledge which, in turn, led to a more successful integration process in 
terms of speed of integration, employee retention, achievement of strategic goals such an 
increase in product development or the attainment of more customers. “The acquisition was 
strategically a great success. The site became headquarter of the global X-ray range. If you have 
a look at how many products we produce and how many customers we reach with these 
products, this was a strategic success” (IM 3). Moreover, employee retention through trustful 
ties was another measure for success: “I focused on retaining those employees who really have 
the market know-how and the technological know-how. I succeeded concerning this task” (IM 
3). 
Recapitulating the above, our results support previous findings and provide additional 
empirical evidence within the integration context that social capital, particularly the relational 
dimension, is highly causal for valuable knowledge transfer to occur which, in turn, impacts 
organizational performance (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998; Weber & Weber, 
2011). Summarizing the results above, we postulate the following propositions: 
Proposition 3a: The frequency of communication between IMs and target actors during the 
integration process positively impacts the transfer of explicit knowledge. 
Proposition 3b: A higher intensity of communication between IMs and target actors during 
the integration process leads to the transfer of more implicit knowledge. 
Proposition 3c: A higher number of trustful ties between IMs and target actors during the 
integration process leads to the transfer of more implicit knowledge. 
Chapter 5:  The Value Creating Role Of Integration Managers In M&A Integration Processes 
 
 
147 
 
Proposition 3d: If IMs are removed during the integration process, trustful ties are destroyed, 
negatively impacting knowledge transfer. 
Cognitive dimension of social capital 
In the post-acquisition phase the IMs in our study set up several influential mechanisms which 
were meant to establish shared norms and to motivate the target company’s individuals to share 
their knowledge. One of the most successful mechanisms established to explicitly encourage 
and maintain the norm of reciprocity during the integration process originated at the Dionysus 
acquisition: “We have an award program: 'Hey you helped me last week. That was a tough 
meeting but you worked overtime, you really helped me prepare that.’ So we have a very formal 
way of acknowledging that: 'Here is a hundred dollars' or whatever it is. And that goes from a 
‘dinner for two voucher’ to really a thousand Euros” (HR IM 5). This mechanism of developing 
shared norms of reciprocity led to the aspired disclosure of knowledge between the target 
individuals and their counterparts at the acquiring company. Throughout almost all interviews 
IMs mentioned that they had set up sustainable mechanisms aiming to encourage shared norms 
between the target and the acquirer: “We invented a standardized ritual, which takes place at 
every location of X (acquirer), the so called “Quarterly Employee Meetings”. […] we also 
implemented compliance guidelines where the employees sit together with their supervisors 
and discuss if they have any questions or concerns” (IM 3). 
Another powerful mechanism pointing into the same direction was an initiative to help target 
employees identify with the merged company. Successful IMs launched especially designed 
team events to foster cohesion within the new company: “When the factory ships a new product 
for the first time, we throw a party. When we lounge a new process or we get rid of an old 
process that didn't work or everybody get bored about it and here is the new one, we have a 
small party. We really say: 'Let's celebrate the small successes, because the world is tough 
enough'” (HR IM 5). Our data also revealed that reaching a common vision between the 
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employees of the acquirer and the target within the newly merged company helped the 
integration process to become successful: “I would say the integration has been successful in a 
way that everybody understands that vision” (HR IM 5). Summarizing our data concerning the 
cognitive dimension of social capital let us propose: 
Proposition 4: Shared norms and a common identification between IMs and target actors 
during the integration process facilitate the transfer of knowledge, leading to a more 
successful integration process. 
IMs’ previous experience 
Besides the discussed three dimensions of social capital and their effects on knowledge 
transfer and the subsequent performance implications for the integration process, it became 
apparent that IMs’ previous change and integration processes experiences impacted knowledge 
transfer and subsequent integration process performance. In addition, IMs’ personal experience 
of having been at a target company when it got acquired, this is having been a “victim” himself, 
was also observed to play a major role. Moreover, we discovered moderating implications of 
IMs’ industry experience on the relationship between integration process/change process 
experience and knowledge transfer (see Figure 7).  
IMs’ integration process/change process experience 
Our interviews revealed that IMs previous experiences from change processes in general and 
integration processes in particular, played a major role in explaining the emergence of trustful 
ties, a shared identification between IMs and target actors, as well as knowledge transfer. 
Literature shows that acquisitions are not singular events but are most of the time rather parts 
of a whole acquisition strategy of a firm (Laamanen & Keil, 2008). Thereby acquisition 
experience acquirers gain in previous acquisitions is shown to impact subsequent acquisitions 
(Barkema & Schijven, 2008a; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). Similarly the replication of tasks 
has been shown to increase companies’ performance in general (Finkelstein & Haleblian, 
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2002). Strategy literature dealing with organizational learning has uncovered the impact of 
learning on firm performance (Liebermann, 1987). Hitt et al. (1998) show that companies which 
have gained experience from former acquisitions are more successful in accomplishing 
synergies between the two firms and in integrating distinct corporate cultures, thereby achieving 
a more efficient and effective integration process. The reason lies in the fact that managers with 
acquisition experiences are better prepared for acquisition integration and creating value 
(Barkema & Schijven, 2008a), as the increased managerial experience with acquisitions and 
associated integration and restructuring can lead to better decisions in subsequent acquisitions 
(Barkema & Schijven, 2008b). 
Chapter 5:  The Value Creating Role Of Integration Managers In M&A Integration Processes 
 
 
150 
 
 
Figure 7: Integrative framework of social capital within the integration process 
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We were able to show in our interviews that the experience of IMs from former change 
processes played a key role for IMs during the integration process: “An integration is a lot about 
communication and motivation and the creation of understanding. One of the reasons I got 
appointed the role of the IM was my capability to accompany employees within change 
processes. And an integration is a change process” (IM 4). This experience from prior change 
processes, for example the experience of how to deal with different organizational and national 
cultures during the integration, helped IMs to build trust and to make the integration process 
more efficient: “At that time (before the IM came to the focal acquisition) I was HR leader for 
the energy business […]. I had to do a lot of change management there. So they were looking 
for someone with a track record that was not too American, not too whatever. You look for 
somebody who can easily move between all these different cultures, so to your point about trust 
building. By doing so, you lower the barriers from day one. We look at people’s “style 
background” in order to make this transition quicker” (IM 5). Taking into account these results 
from our data concerning IMs’ former integration/change process experience, we propose: 
Proposition 5a: IMs’ prior integration/change process experience positively influences the 
relational dimension of social capital in the relationship between IMs and target actors in the 
focal acquisition, leading to a more successful integration process. 
Besides the impact of IMs’ experience on the ability to build strong and trustful ties, it also 
came to light that this experience played a key role in establishing shared norms and a common 
identification between IMs and target employees: “It is all about understanding people, to 
translate why we do things, how we do them, to incorporate people, to incorporate the new 
company and to head for a mutual aim” (IM 4). We thus propose: 
Proposition 5b: IMs prior integration/change process experience positively influences the 
cognitive dimension in the relationship between IMs and target actors in the focal acquisition, 
leading to a more successful integration process. 
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Going one step further, our interviews revealed that besides the direct influence of IMs’ 
integration/change process experience on the relational as well as the cognitive dimension of 
social capital, those experiences also directly facilitated the transfer of knowledge between IMs 
and target actors. For instance, by applying change process specific techniques and tools IMs 
made the transfer of knowledge more effective and efficient. Thus, one IM stated. “When I was 
at the takeover of Z (former acquisition), I learned how to approach people. […] That helped 
me a lot in knowing which employees to contact to get the knowledge I needed to reach the 
desired decisions” (IM 6). These results let us propose: 
Proposition 5c: IMs prior integration/change process experience facilitates the knowledge 
transfer between IMs and target actors in the focal acquisition, leading to a more successful 
integration process. 
IMs’ industry experience (moderating role) 
Barkema and Shijven (2008b) point out that the effect of companies experience on 
performance hinges to a certain degree on context specificity in order to ease learning. Thus 
literature in different settings shows that gained experience in a certain industry does not 
necessarily mean that the knowledge companies gain during this experience is transferrable to 
other industries, where it could advantageously be applied and lead to learning (Hebert et al., 
2005; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). Transferring this logic to our setting leads to the assumption 
that experiences IMs gained in former change or integration processes do not necessarily enable 
IMs to more efficiently manage the focal integration process. Our data showed that in small 
acquisitions where there was only one IM in place, specific industry experience and thereby 
specific knowledge seemed to be less important for those IMs as they were exposed to the whole 
value chain and automatically got acquainted with the necessary knowledge over time: “I didn’t 
have knowledge about the products or about the market. I had to learn it step by step. […] you 
analyze the different areas of the company you are acquiring much more in-depth in such a 
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small acquisition, as everything seems to be equally important” (IM 4). In contrast, in big 
acquisitions or when the integration team grew bigger, the tide was somewhat turning as it 
became more and more important to bring along experienced integration team members with 
knowledge from industry areas which fit to the target characteristics: “[…] when you have a 
bigger acquisition, you also have a bigger integration team. Then it is quite meaningful to have 
someone who knows the market respectively the products and brings the expertise to the table” 
(IM 4). Consequently, our proposition concerning the moderating role of IMs’ industry 
experience is: 
Proposition 6a: IMs prior industry experience strengthens the effect of previous integration 
or change process experience on knowledge transfer in smaller acquisitions. 
Proposition 6b: IMs prior industry experience does not strengthen the effect of previous 
integration or change process experience on knowledge transfer in bigger acquisitions.  
IMs’ “victim” experience 
As mentioned before, Barkema and Schijven (2008b) found that experiences companies 
gathered from previous acquisitions have a decisive influence on acquirers performance in 
following acquisitions. This influence of previous experience can also be observed in alliance 
settings (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002) or acquisitions of distressed firms 
(Bruton et al., 1994). In our case a similar line of reasoning might be applicable. Our interviews 
brought to light that IMs who had participated in an acquisition being a staff member of the 
respective acquired target, this is being on the “victim” or target side of the acquisition, reported 
that this experience and expert knowledge about getting acquired, was extremely helpful for 
executing the role as IM in the focal acquisition. One IM argued that this “victim” experience, 
as we call it, had enabled him to slip into the target employees’ shoes, which means to 
understand how the employees of the target firm feel when witnessing the focal acquisition: “It 
helped a lot that I had been at a company which X (acquirer) acquired when I started working 
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as IM for X. I knew how it feels to be in a corporate culture when getting acquired by X. So I 
had learned about the other side of the coin” (IM 4). IMs featuring this capability were 
particularly gifted as they were endowed with greater empathy allowing them to be very 
sensitive towards target employees. This resulted again in an increased ability to establish 
trusting ties (relational dimension) as well as a shared identification between them and the target 
employees (cognitive dimension), thereby facilitating knowledge transfer and optimizing the 
integration process. We therefore propose: 
Proposition 7a: IMs prior “victim” experience positively influences the relational dimension 
of social capital in the relationship between IMs and target actors leading to a more successful 
integration process. 
Proposition 7b: IMs prior “victim” experience positively influences the cognitive dimension 
of social capital in the relationship between IMs and target actors leading to a more successful 
integration process. 
5.5 DISCUSSION 
In this paper we set out to qualitatively explore IMs’ role as knowledge brokers between 
acquiring and target companies within the M&A integration process – a major lever for 
acquirers to enhance value in acquisitions. More precisely, by applying a social network 
perspective and based on an exploratory multi case analysis, we investigated the process of how 
IMs strategically develop their social ties with target employees and how they do or do not 
make use of their resulting social capital when trying to facilitate the aspired transfer of 
knowledge between the organizations involved in order to improve the subsequent integration 
process performance. Thereby our social network theory lens revealed that IMs are not by their 
very nature of their network position successful knowledge brokers, but that instead the success 
of the integration process largely depends on IMs’ capabilities to strategically establish and 
successfully exploit such knowledge broker positions. This is IMs’ brokering positions seem to 
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be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for successful integration processes to unfold. In 
contrast, successful IMs distinguish themselves from less successful IMs in that the former 
bridge more and divers structural holes and strategically establish (trustful) social ties to the 
“right” target employees. Thus, successful IMs in contrast to their less successful counterparts 
already start to lay the foundation of trustful tie establishment during the pre-closing stage of 
the acquisition. Moreover, in using various tools and incentives, successful IMs better 
understand to exploit the resulting social capital thereby facilitating the interorganizational 
knowledge transfer which, in turn, leads to a more successful integration process. Furthermore 
it became apparent that IM’s previous change and integration process experience as well as 
their “victim” experience impacted knowledge transfer and subsequent integration process 
performance. In addition, we discovered moderating implications from IM’s industry 
experience on the relationship between integration and change process experience and 
knowledge transfer. 
With our research we contribute to several streams of literature. First, we add to M&A 
research by adding one of the few empirical studies investigating the complex and 
underexplored integration process in acquisitions (Graebner, 2009, 2004; Teerikangas et al., 
2011), based on an inductive qualitative approach. We further add to M&A research, by 
applying a social network perspective to the M&A integration process, covering an intersection 
of research that has received little attention in the literature to date. As a result we shed light on 
the yet underexplored “black box” of how to successfully initiate, maintain and complete an 
M&A integration process. Moreover, the social network lens allows us to better understand the 
underlying processes, mechanisms and errors which emerge within the integration process. 
Most importantly, we demonstrate that social ties and the arising social capital that positively 
influences the knowledge transfer, thereby leading to a more successful integration process are 
key success factors of acquisition performance. Moreover, we advance M&A research by 
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highlighting the important role of IMs within the integration process. We carve out IMs’ role 
as knowledge brokers who have by their very position the potential to bridge structural holes 
and develop social ties between actors of acquirers and targets initiating and implementing 
knowledge transfer and change processes between organizations. Although having this 
potential for brokering knowledge, our social network theory lens revealed that IMs are 
precisely not by the very nature of their exposed network position successful knowledge 
brokers, but that instead the success of the integration process largely depends on IMs’ 
capabilities to strategically establish and successfully exploit such knowledge broker positions. 
This is the IM’s brokering position seems to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
successful integration processes to unfold. We thus seize Kwon and Adlers' (2014) cognition 
argument which implies that equal nodes and relationships in a network can be perceived 
dissimilar by individuals, whereby this varying cognition in turn influences social capital 
formation. We were able to exactly observe this diverse perception when IMs in our study 
differently recognize important individuals at targets during integration, which in turn 
influenced their social capital development. Furthermore, we thereby tie on research which 
shows that there can be a difference between having social capital and using social capital in 
the way that individuals will not equally well take advantage of their networks (Smith, 2005). 
We do so in showing that IMs although being in the same brokering position are not equally 
able to mobilize their social capital uniformly well (Kwon & Adler, 2014). 
By offering this social network lens, we also expand previous work from Graebner (2004) 
who showed that managers in general are highly important individuals in acquisition processes, 
as well as findings from Ashkenas and Francis (2000) and Ashkenas et al. (1998) who argue 
that IMs as delegates of the acquirer are key individuals during the integration process. We 
complement their research as with our theoretical foundation we get closer to the “how’s” in 
the integration process. For example, Ashkenas and Francis (2000) as well as Ashkenas et al. 
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(1998) explain that the IMs task is to ease the communication between acquirer and target, get 
the target employees acquainted to the acquirer requirements, and facilitate transfers of best 
practices between the two companies. We demonstrate how this could be reached successfully, 
by differentiating between successful and less successful integration processes. As outlined 
above, IMs in successful integrations are shown to build their network differently by setting 
somewhat different priorities, and to apply more or different mechanisms to exploit their 
resulting social capital thereby facilitating the interorganizational knowledge transfer which, in 
turn, leads to a more successful integration process.  
Furthermore, with our results we challenge M&A findings by Teerikangas et al. (2011) 
dealing with the due diligence phase. The authors analyze IMs’ impact on the performance of 
acquisitions, demonstrating that IMs are able to capture value during the pre-acquisition phase 
from both the acquirer and the target. The paper states that IMs do this by acting as role models 
for the target staff, being staff mobilizers, or cultural carriers, thereby managing to create 
additional economic value and helping to reduce value leakage. Based on our results that during 
the pre-acquisition phase all IMs reported to have faced a sincere legally caused lock-out effects 
and that only successful IMs were able to lay the groundwork for later establishment of trustful 
ties, we cannot confirm Teerikangas et al. (2011). In contrast, we only saw IMs acting as role 
model or being a staff mobilizer from that point in time on that they were officially allowed to 
approach the target staff – this is after the deal was closed. 
Second, with our study we contribute to social network and social capital literature by 
answering the recent call by Fang et al. (2014), who request research dealing with how 
individuals actually construct their social networks and thereby on how networks emerge and 
develop. Furthermore, the authors call for studies which deal with an associated question, 
namely how individuals make use of their social networks and how the consequent social capital 
is exploited (Baron, 2007). We contribute to this research gap by highlighting mechanisms of 
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how social networks are strategically formed by IMs and how the emerging social capital is 
then used in order to mobilize knowledge transfer between IMs and both groups of employees 
which in turn enhances integration performance. By showing that there is quite a variance 
among IMs in their ability to bridge structural holes and in building social capital with target 
employees, we demonstrate, again, the IM’s brokering position to be a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for successful integration processes to unfold. This is, brokers are not by 
their very construction equally capable of building networks and of utilizing their social capital. 
We, hence confirm to some extent the diverse findings by Burt (1992) and others (Hargadon, 
2002, 1998) that brokering positions are beneficial. However, we also expand their findings, in 
that we complement, that brokering is not at all an automatism, but that instead further factors, 
attributes of the broker and applied tools have to be added, so that the potentially existing impact 
of the predestinated network position unfolds. 
Furthermore we contribute to the yet underdeveloped research area on social liabilities in 
networks by adding one of the few studies that reveals social capital’s possible subsequent 
transformation into social liabilities. Besides strengthening previous research, which shows that 
different forms of social liabilities in networks like structural lock-ins, relational lock-ins, or 
cognitive lock-ins can occur (Maurer & Ebers, 2006; Weber & Weber, 2011), our data unveils 
a setting what we labeled structural lock-outs. As outlined before, during the pre-closing stage 
the IMs faced the described legal instructions that provoked an area of tension between getting 
as close as possible on the one side and protecting as much as possible on the other side. This 
structural lock-out hindered knowledge transfer before the closing of the deal which would have 
been highly important for both sides involved, to get to the bottom of strategic synergies and 
potentials of knowledge transfer, which in turn would be truly relevant for the success of the 
whole integration process. However, in the spirit of Principal Agent Theory and concerned 
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about an opportunistic calculus of the respective counterpart, the parties deliberately limit each 
other, to protect oneself for the worst case of a non-accomplishment. 
Implications and Future Research 
Our study has various implications for theory as well as for future research. First, looking at 
the fruitful insights from our research, we encourage more studies at the intersection between 
M&A and social network research. Our findings might guide the integration process literature 
in M&A's in that it should reflect upon this process from a social network perspective in greater 
depth. Applying such lens is one step in moving M&A literature forward for M&A scholars 
who should regard the complex integration process more from a micro-perspective and 
understand this very process as a nexus of ties between individual actors. Doing so might help 
M&A researchers to more fully understand the underlying patterns, mechanisms and logics 
within this “black box” of the integration process and to answer questions of how this very 
process creates value in acquisitions. 
Second, literature on M&A’s in general and on the integration process in acquisitions in 
particular might benefit from our findings that highlight the role of IMs within the integration 
process. By demonstrating that IMs as potential knowledge brokers are key actors during the 
integration process and by highlighting that the nuances and differences inherent in such 
brokering roles decide over the success of the acquisition, we have laid the foundation for future 
research on M&A integration processes, which should more extensively focus on the attributes 
and specific characteristics of IMs within this process, on the possibilities to support and 
leverage that role, and how these attributes and characteristics influence acquisition integration 
performance. 
Third, our findings concerning IMs might also have direct implications for M&A 
practitioners, as those findings might raise the awareness of acquiring companies to intensify 
their search activities for IMs which feature those attributes. Furthermore, acquirers should 
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deploy IMs who are able to set up mechanisms allowing (trustful) relationships to emerge. As 
our data revealed there are several mechanisms for IMs to apply in order to establish and 
maintain (trustful) social ties which may lead to the important knowledge transfer. Regarding 
the attributes IMs should feature, acquirers should select IMs very carefully in terms of 
integration/change process, “victim”, and industry experience. Besides these attributes located 
by our study, there will be a manifold set of characteristics – maybe similar to those that we 
already know from change management literature – which might also influence IMs ability to 
successfully develop social ties and make use of their social capital. 
Social network theory research, as the second main area for which our study might have 
potential implications, can first of all benefit by taking our research as a starting point to answer 
the widespread question raised by Fang et al. (2014) of how individuals actually construct their 
social networks and how they make use of the resulting social capital. In showing that 
individuals starting at the identical brokerage position are not equally able to build social ties 
and thus successfully construct their social networks as well as make use of their social capital, 
literature should focus more thoroughly on the preconditions, mechanisms and contexts that 
allow these individuals to leverage these potential benefits. 
Second, social network and social liability literature might also profit from our research in 
that it directs a greater focus to the development and repercussions of social liabilities in 
networks. Our confirmation of the established lock-ins and the detection of the described lock-
out makes it advisable, to explore social liabilities in more detail and maybe even more types 
of liabilities to prevent those unintended future developments. Our analyzed area of tension in 
which structural lock–ins and –outs developed, should be transferrable to almost every pre-
contractual situation. The findings might make different research streams as well as 
practitioners listen actively and take them into account in their respective fields. 
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Moreover, another social network theory literature stream for which our results have 
implications is the one on knowledge brokering. By expanding Burt’s (1980, 1992, 1997) and 
Hargadon's (1998, 2002) findings that network brokerage positions are favorable in that they 
are definitively necessary but are not sufficient for successful knowledge transfer, future 
research in this field should further focus on the actors themselves who broker the knowledge, 
this is, on their attributes and on the “how’s” of the knowledge brokering process itself. 
Our findings feature the natural limitations of any other qualitative research. As it is common 
in such studies our sample size is limited. Although a larger number of interview partners would 
have been desirable, the diverse selection of interviewees from different positions within the 
companies guarantees high relevance and validity (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Future 
research is encouraged to validate our qualitative results and the emerging framework by using 
quantitative methods. Thus it would be fruitful to run statistical analysis of the different social 
capital dimensions and IM characteristics on knowledge transfer and the performance of the 
integration process in a larger sample to check whether our propositions withstand statistical 
verification. 
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V. APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 1: Average and cumulative average residuals for bidders and targets 
Event Targets   Bidders   
Day AR [-5;+5] AR [-10;+10] CAR [-5;+5] CAR [-10:+10] AR [-5;+5] AR [-10;+10] CAR [-5;+5] CAR [-10:+10] 
-10     +0.363%       +0.363%       +0.343%       +0.343%   
-9     +0.539%       +0.902%       +0.002%       +0.345%   
-8     -0.355%       +0.547%       +0.483%       +0.828%   
-7     -0.105%       +0.442%       -0.037%       +0.791%   
-6     +0.107%       +0.549%       +0.017%       +0.808%   
-5 +0.533%   +0.529%   +0.533%   +1.078%   -0.261%   -0.278%   -0.261%   +0.529%   
-4 +1.182%   +1.199%   +1.715%   +2.277%   +0.498%   +0.503%   +0.237%   +1.033%   
-3 +0.378%   +0.379%   +2.093% * +2.656%   +0.372%   +0.368%   +0.610%   +1.400%   
-2 +0.984%   +0.990%   +3.077% ** +3.646% ** +0.195%   +0.197%   +0.805%   +1.598%   
-1 +3.163% *** +3.155% *** +6.239% *** +6.802% *** -0.962% ** -0.954% ** -0.158%   +0.644%   
0 +9.992% *** +10.004% *** +16.232% *** +16.806% *** +2.810% *** +2.813% *** +2.653% ** +3.457% ** 
1 +0.740%   +0.743%   +16.971% *** +17.548% *** +0.434%   +0.450%   +3.087% ** +3.907% ** 
2 -0.649%   -0.627%   +16.322% *** +16.922% *** -0.880% * -0.872% * +2.207%   +3.035% * 
3 -0.924% * -0.922% * +15.399% *** +16.000% *** -0.775% ** -0.765% ** +1.432%   +2.271%   
4 -0.135%   -0.146%   +15.264% *** +15.854% *** -0.485%   -0.479%   +0.947%   +1.791%   
5 -0.686%   -0.664%   +14.578% *** +15.190% *** +0.731% * +0.737% * +1.678%   +2.528%   
6     +0.423%       +15.613% ***     -0.093%       +2.435%   
7     -0.254%       +15.359% ***     -0.109%       +2.326%   
8     -0.352%       +15.007% ***     +0.061%       +2.387%   
9     -0.336%       +14.671% ***     +0.557% *     +2.944%   
10     -0.205%       +14.465% ***     +0.003%       +2.947%   
*/**/***: (cumulative) average residuals for sampled targets/bidders significantly different from 0 to 90% / 95% / 99% levels of confidence. 
 
